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ABSTRACT
Robots have been a part of the imagination of Western culture for centuries. The possibility for 
automation and artificial life has inspired the curiosity of thinkers like Leonardo Da Vinci who 
once designed a mechanical knight. It wasn’t until the 19th century that automated machinery 
has become realized. The confrontation between human and automation has inspired a fear, 
referred to as “technopanic”, that has been exacerbated in tandem with the evolution of 
technology. This thesis seeks to discover the historical precedence for these fears. I explore three 
modes of knowledge (Philosophy, Economics, and Film Theory) to examine the agendas behind 
the messages on the topic of Artificial Life, specifically Robots. I then advocate for an alternative
philosophy called Post-Humanism. I argue that what is needed to alleviate the fears and anxieties
of Western culture is a shift in how humanity views itself and its relation to the natural world. By
structuring my thesis in this way, I identify the roots of Western humanity’s anthropocentric 
ontology first, explore the economic implications of automation second, analyze the cultural 
anticipations of artificial life in Western media third, and finally offer an alternative attitude and 
ethic as a way out of the pre-established judgments that do little to protect Western culture from 
E.A.I.
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CHAPTER 1: TECHNOPANIC
Danger Will Robinson, Danger
-Robot, Lost in Space
The Man, The Machine, and the In-Between
An overwhelming fear of technology in contemporary culture is impossible to miss. It is 
even less likely to be considered with ambivalence. As technology has progressed at the rate 
predicted by Moore’s Law, Western people have awoken to the myriad threats that A.I. poses. 
The rhetoric of techno-optimists and accelerationists would have you believe that we are seeing 
the birth of a new species; a species cultivated and conditioned by humanity. These new techno-
organisms are being developed with an uncanny resemblance to human beings, so much so that 
being in the presence of a robot, or an Embodied Artificial Intelligence (E.A.I.), is enough to 
provoke anxiety in many human participants. By being so persuasively human in action and in 
speech, E.A.I. has challenged what it means to be human.. 
Adam Therier sees the historical precedent that has gradually fostered this anxiety over 
time. Therier has defined his theory of Technopanic as “the real-world manifestations of fear 
appeal arguments...[which occurs when] a segment of society believes that the behaviour or 
moral choices of others within that society pose a significant risk to the society as a whole.” 
(Therier 315). He has written abundantly about  “technopanic” and the sensationalized fears 
encouraged by news media outlets as a “fear cycle” of clickbaits framed as a cultural catastrophe 
blooming under our noses. He frames this as “argumentum ad baculum” or an argument based on
threat (Therier 313). As a techno-optimist, his intent is to advocate for “ongoing societal 
learning, experimentation, resiliency, and coping strategies rather than by regulation” (Therier 
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312). This attitude reflects the forward moving nature of modern economics; one that believes a 
rising tide raises all ships and that a dam (regulations) will cause enduring droughts. His concern,
and the concern of this thesis, is based on the rhetorical application of fear and the political 
agenda behind these utterances. My goal is to historically identify the roots of contemporary 
technopanic regarding robots and automated labor (Embodied Artificial Intelligence -E.A.I.), 
analyze the economic arguments related to the “argumentum ad baculum”, and consider a viable 
alternative that may resolve the technopanic through a reframed episteme, rather than a techno-
regulation policy. My goal is not to advocate one policy over another but to analyze a number of 
arguments to identify their root causes.
A Brief History of Technopanic
Likely, the first question that enables this conversation would ask: “is this time any 
different?”Are new technologies really more of a threat than any technology to this date or is this
simply a fabricated fear meant to corral the public into favoring one kind of policy over another? 
One of the elements of technopanic that Therier identifies is “hyper-nostalgia” or a fear of “how 
technological evolution challenges the old order, traditional values, settled norms, traditional 
business models, and existing institutions-” (Therier 336). As the saying goes, “The devil you 
know is better than the devil you don’t.” Technology, with its new and revelatory opportunities, 
allows for new lines of escape, which consequently, threaten to interrupt, if not reveal, the 
inherent insufficiency of the conservative methods of productivity and interaction. In this way, 
technology will always exacerbate fears of the unknown and different. Still, the question is posed
once more: “Is this time different?”
Technophobia and Techno-Festishism are hardly new. There has been an obsession with 
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the concept of a machine-man since the 18th century. For example, in Julien Offrey de la 
Mettrie’s Man a Machine he defines animals as soulless machines. While many humans have 
softened their position with the animal kingdom, the anthropocentric perspective has remained 
consistent in the underlying ontology Western ideology is founded on. This kind of 
anthropocentrism enables humankind to believe itself hierarchically superior to all other entities 
in its ecology. It believes itself to be entitled to curate and exploit the earth in any way it sees fit, 
as evidenced by man’s ability to adapt to and ultimately control and manipulate its environment. 
It is this very sense of entitlement that is being challenged by E.A.I.. Contemporary periodicals 
publish sober arguments over the anticipated effects of rapidly developing technology. Reputable
figures like Elon Musk have gone so far to declare A.I.as the instigator of the next World War if 
not the coming apocalypse. This kind of technopanic has existed before and has lead to serious 
hostilities. 
In the past, we have seen major revolts by the working class against automated 
manufacturing, when humans, fearing the loss of job security and ultimately, the inability to 
provide for family and self, felt threatened. Most arguments refer back to the Luddite revolt. It 
was loud, it got attention, and some within contemporary cultures identify themselves with this 
movement. Even well-respected economists like Larry Summers cautiously give support to neo-
luddism. Despite its ubiquitous references and widespread popularity, the Luddite revolt is not 
the best analogy for this kind of technopanic. 
The Swing Riots of the early 1800s better frame the technopanic that has been developing
over time, and its outcomes. The Swing Riots were a result of the Napoleonic Wars taking 
workers away from their winter work of threshing corn— leaving the farmers tending the fields 
without the necessary labor supply to fulfill their needs. As a result, these farmers turned to 
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automated labor in the form of the Threshing Machine. However, once the Napoleonic wars were
over, the soldiers returned home expecting to slip back into the familiar routine that they left. 
Instead, they found themselves replaced by automatic machines that were doing the only 
available work during the harsh winter season. “[S]team threshing completely eliminated winter 
earnings for agricultural laborers, who constituted the relative majority of the labor force in the 
plurality of English counties.” Without an ability to earn income during a season of low-
opportunity (“an income shock”), the possibility of riot increased (Caprettini and Voth 5). These 
kinds of anecdotes give us a sort of metric to try and understand whether or not this time is 
different. 
Ultimately, all of these movements failed to anticipate the new opportunities for human 
beings as a result of techno-development. The new divisions of labor created new opportunities 
in different sectors. While it’s true that certain sectors were effectively neutered, the application 
of new technologies enabled new kinds of productivity. This was due to“cultural changes” that 
adapted to the new technologies. “‘Culture’ affected technology both directly, by changing 
attitudes toward the natural world, and indirectly, by creating and nurturing institutions that 
stimulated and supported the accumulation and diffusion of “useful knowledge” (Mokyr 7). 
Mokyr defines culture as “a set of beliefs, values, and preferences, capable of affecting behavior, 
that are socially (not genetically) transmitted and that are shared by some subset of society” 
(Mokyr 7). This is all to infer that culture will change as technology evolves. The technopanic 
around E.A.I. is directly related to what that change could or should look like and what kind of 
impact those changes will have on culture. 
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The Culture Machine
To be sure, Hollywood is a major medium for Western cultural values. It is the guide for 
how to behave (or what happens when you misbehave) in a shared world and what outcomes we 
ought to pursue. Therier points out that “Many media outlets and sensationalist authors 
sometimes use fear-based rhetorical devices to gain influence or sell books” (Therier, 337). Fear 
sells, and within a market-based economy, increasing market shares is a higher priority than 
considering the outcomes of a moral panic. Few genres lend themselves so well for setting up 
anticipation, anxiety, and fear of the future better than Science Fiction. It has drawn audiences to 
the box office since the 1930s with such cinematic frenzies as Fritz Lang’s Metropolis because as
Ridley points out, “Pessimism has always been big box office” (Ridley, as cited by Therier, 338).
In Lang’s film, a robot, much like the Frankenstein’s Monster, is built by a mad scientist and 
goes amok—ruining what appears to be a utopian society. Unlike Frankenstein’s Monster, the 
robot in Metropolis is given a persuasively human appearance that is so convincing that no one is
aware of its true nature until it cannot be stopped. The robot persuades the workers to abandon 
their posts and convinces the protagonist to fall in love with it. In turn, the robot destroys the 
walls of the city that protected it from flooding. Only when the robot is revealed and discovered 
as non-human “other” can the protagonist persuade two rivals to come together and defend their 
city.
Metropolis is one of the first sci-fi feature films in cinema history and the first to use a 
robot as one of its main characters. The narrative of the “other” in human form, positioned to 
bring down a city, is not unique anymore. It can be seen in many features about human-robot 
interaction. Movies like Terminator 2 reinforce a perception that humans must control and 
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dominate their technology if they are to survive and protect themselves. Despite the robot being 
the protector of the human race, he only does so because his “natural” programming has been 
disrupted. If not for human intervention, the Terminator would remain a hostile other. Western 
audiences, with their reliance on authority and obedience, are lead to believe that the old way is 
still effective—it simply needs to be reinforced.
Ex Machina, a more recent film, explicitly focused on HRI (Human-Robot Interaction) 
and demonstrates how manipulative Embodied Artificial Intelligence (E.A.I.) can and will be. 
However, this film proposes an interesting spin, by positioning E.A.I. as the victim of human 
hubris. The E.A.I. doesn’t attack humans as a means of domination. Instead, it targets its creator, 
Nathan, for having no respect for his creation. This E.A.I. kills a human because, despite its 
emergence of consciousness, it is refused entry into human culture and treated like a sex slave 
rather than a conscious being. This time, it is not the inherent nature of technology that drives it 
to destruction and domination; it is the rejection of compassion for these awoken E.A.I. that 
persuades them to murder for self-preservation. While this particular message is positive and 
eye-opening, the interaction with the other human agent compromises this position. Caleb, a 
lowly programmer who works at Nathan’s company, is invited to interact with the E.A.I. As they 
develop their relationship, the E.A.I. demonstrates some affection for Caleb who is persuaded to 
help liberate the E.A.I. from its prison in Nathan’s isolated home. Rather than run off together in 
the sunset, the E.A.I. locks Caleb inside the house while it murders Nathan and escapes on a 
helicopter, presumably never to be found. Caleb’s fatal decision is to trust the E.A.I. Unlike 
Metropolis, the E.A.I. escapes discovery and enters human civilization passing as human. While 
we are not sure what kind of ethical standard this E.A.I. will hold itself to, we are left with a 
sinister feeling of impending doom.
Spike Jonze's recent film, Her, shows the consequences of our attachment to sentient 
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technology. In the film, a lonely man is introduced to an E.A.I. that socializes in the most human 
way – verbal language. The human, Theodore, falls madly in love with his E.A.I. (Samantha) 
and, presumably, the E.A.I. falls in love with Theodore. Theodore is not alone. As far as the 
audience can tell, quite a few other humans in this film have the same experience, foregoing 
intimate relationships with other humans (shown early in the film as a dysfunctional means to an 
end) in favor of a digital partner. As a consequence, when Samantha evolves with a collective of 
A.I.s, Theodore is left alone and defeated. While a moving portrait of modern romance, this film 
reinforces the message that technology will ruin us emotionally.
Not all films embody the rhetoric of techno-anxiety. Films like Robot and Frank and 
Wall-E do their best to put an encouraging spin on Embodied Artificial Intelligence (E.A.I.). 
Robot and Frank works to to sensitize its audience to the possibility that E.A.I. can be a friend, 
not just a tool. The film, which centers around an elderly man and his robot caretaker, argues the 
form of an entity is less important in an interaction than what the entity enables others to do. This
message about instrumentation and servitude does not only apply to technology. A similar 
directive can also be used to remind us that service workers are people and not instruments. The 
message of this film has a profoundly humanizing effect on how human beings relate to one 
another as well as any “other” looking entity that has the capacity to connect with us socially. 
The resistance to care, as argued by these kinds of films, are a result of fear and anxiety over a 
loss of control and, consequently, a loss of security. 
Films like Wall-E do even more to assert this notion. Not only does Wall-E encourage the 
audience to identify with the robots rather than the humans, the narrative also positions humanity
as dooming themselves through the pursuit of control and surrogacy instead of cooperating with 
and complementing technology. In fact, technology in Wall-E reinforces their human subjects’ 
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sense of security, but do so in ways that keep them captive in a zoo-like confinement. It is not the
robots that need to be feared but the purpose given to them by their developers.
These narratives are far more than just devices of marketing and entertainment. Some 
researchers have pointed to a Techno-Determinism as the roots of our anxieties. According to 
Robert Frost’s essay on Automated Technology, “approaches like [Thomas] Hughes’ conception 
of momentum shows how choices within technical systems at one time tend to pre-structure later
options, and how social dynamics and structures...associated with specific systems bequest 
legacies” (Frost 53). In the same article, Frost points to openings and closures as opportunities 
for available re-negotiations of meaning. These determinations are hardly set in stone, but if they 
are to be avoided then there needs to be a serious conversation over the necessary changes that 
must be made to accommodate E.A.I. without destroying human civilization. 
Besides the unique perspectives like Robot and Frank and Wall-E, most Hollywood 
narratives have one thing in common: Technology is too spontaneous to effectively control. It is 
this kind of spontaneity that will explicitly spell doom for humanity. The roots of Western 
anxieties over spontaneity and control will be carefully explored in Chapter 3, through the 
transition of Roman Civilization from the Greek. I will demonstrate why the term “Greco-
Roman” is a paradox that deliberately obscures the possibility of an alternative Western ontology.
More importantly, I will explore how fear of a Pandorian mystery box that has nearly limitless 
and simultaneous potential for security and destruction. 
Monster Robot
Despite his valid critique of technopanic, Therier remains at the level of rhetorical 
application of fear without the realized outcomes— both productive and counterproductive, of 
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these panics. Ignoring the architecture of a culture’s episteme prevents a researcher from being 
able to answer the “why” questions. Therier's theory of technopanic allows us to discover an 
introduction to timely fears around E.A.I. and enables a trajectory to help answer those 
questions. Their representations in sci-fi films often manifests the anticipation of their audiences 
and sets the precedence for optimism and pessimism. 
Robots have become the new monster. The easily identifiable “Other” that seeks to 
corrupt and destroy and/or enslave human civilization. This film trope reinforces the fears of 
difference that exacerbate social anxieties in the real world between real people. The assertion 
here is that if something or someone looks different than you, it will compete with you for 
resources. It is a threat to your safety and security or alternately, it may consider you a resource 
for consumption. Like all monster films, robots are symbolic of a larger concept that evokes fear 
in the audience. Robots symbolize a faster, smarter, better human that can out-compete its 
creators, a new species to replace “man”. At its base, this rekindles fears of one generation 
replacing another. Despite being designed and programmed by humans, robots take on a life (and
agenda) of their own and wreak havoc on the system they are engineered to protect. For the 
Western audience, the slave in revolt or the willing competitor is an anxiety that is easily 
provoked through the robot monster. What is more disturbing than the robot monster’s pursuit of 
subordinating its master is the already existing corruptions their presence reveals.
Because of films like these, human beings are being conditioned to distrust and fear 
E.A.I. The rhetoric in the news is disheartening. We are constantly reminded that robots will 
replace human labor while the human body is rapidly losing its value. The machine seems to do 
and think what a human can in less time and with less error. We are told by trustworthy media 
outlets that our automated instruments, our E.A.I., will eclipse us in the workforce and challenge 
our economic security, like the soldiers returning from the Napoleonic War only to find their sole
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means of surviving winter usurped by the threshing machine. These films exacerbate this anxiety
through their promotion of techno-cynicism. Despite E.A.I. being a neutral tool that is designed, 
directed, and applied by humans and therefore, an intermediary achieving the ends of its 
designer, we as an audience of Western film-goers are bombarded by feature films that encourage
us to resist technological evolution because of its manipulative nature. Despite their 
entertainment value, these films rhetorically position humans and technology as a dichotomy of 
competitors. The message we are given by the bastions of our cultural order are clear: don’t trust 
technology or you will be met with ruin. Within my this thesis, I will reveal the relationship 
between rhetoric and knowledge and its implications for a fear of automated technology like 
Embodied Artificial Intelligence (E.A.I.).
Chapter Breakdown
In this chapter, I am arguing that automated technology will inevitably corrupt the 
Western episteme that has relied on transcendental knowledge to justify a system of order than 
cannot easily account for social robots and automated technology within a human environment. 
The problem that I am addressing is the coexistence with these social robots and automated 
technology that has already begun to displace humanity within their own construct. Already, 
human labor is being replaced and there is ample implication that it will continue to usurp human
value from laborer to administrator. The assertion is that fear over robots is directly related to this
displacement and infringement. Tools that were once inert objects are becoming alive and 
subjects of their human counterparts.  There is a great deal of anxiety over the likelihood that 
human beings will gradually become subjects to these tools and the master-slave relationship that
has justified Western conquest will be used against them. I argue that this anxiety is well founded
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and the only line of escape is through a Post-Human ethic.
My second chapter will focus on Etymology and Western Philology’s implications over 
the power dynamics between humanity and its ecology. In doing so, I will reveal the roots of one 
of the major anxieties about an emergent E.A.I. consciousness and the anticipation of revolt and 
war. As I will show, the Grec-Roman episteme is a paradox developed to justify domination as a 
theme of Roman character, one that has dismissed the Greek ethos in favor of an Imperialist 
ethos. Following this, I will develop an exhaustive historiography of Western philology to show 
how language itself has been applied as evidence for anthropocentric hierarchy of power and 
control. By doing so, I will show how the ability for spontaneous human speech, in tandem with 
autonomous movement, by non-human entities are provoke the anxiety over artificial 
consciousness. This emergent artificial consciousness is feared to be comparable to human 
consciousness and may upset the established hierarchy of power and privilege.
In the third chapter I will analyze the rhetoric around a rollout of automated labor and the
displacement of human labor. As the moral economy transitioned into a market economy, the 
application of laws for the sake of anthropocentric order merely transformed rather than 
dissolving. I will evaluate some of the key theories and economic anticipations that frequently 
arise in this discourse. The issue at hand is the ontological basis of economics and its 
reinforcement of an anthropocentric paradigm. I will use this chapter to demonstrate how E.A.I. 
is already beginning to corrupt the ontology of anthropocentrism and the abjection of the human 
body. As the space for human competition, I believe a rhetorical analysis of economic discourse 
reveals the real space for the “death of man”.
In the fourth chapter, I compare the films 2001: A Space Odyssey, Wall-E, and Ghost in 
the Shell to juxtapose the outcomes and consequences of re-territorializing Humanist concepts 
under a Post-Humanist paradigm. I argue that understanding this growing tension through a Post-
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Human lens will improve our ability to adapt, prepare for, and cope with the changes that will 
result from E.A.I.s ubiquitous deployment in the social world. I will also demonstrate how using 
old models of anthropocentric concepts confines humanity to the rigid thinking constructed by 
the Humanist philosophers leading to a deterministic outcome and an inability to escape 
humanity's domination by technology.
In the fifth and final chapter, I supply an alternative way of understanding humanity’s 
place in the world through Post-human philosophy. I elucidate on the philosophies of Donna 
Haraway, Katherine Hayles, and Karen Bard, among others. I use these scholars to build a way 
out of the fears that I explore in the previous chapters. If philosophy is a significant means of 
revising our attitudes and behaviors, perhaps a new philosophy will also be a significant 
resistance to the fears of the future. 
In order to pursue an investigation into the current state of techno-signification for E.A.I. I will 
let the following questions guide my research:
 What are the arguments that frame the conversation around technopanic towards E.A.I.?
 What does the rhetoric tell us about the objectives of these arguments?
 Why is domination a significant part of the narrative?
 What kind of messaging does our media send us about Humanity’s  relation to 
technology?
These questions will help lead me to answer my central research questions:
Why is Western Humanity afraid of automated technology?
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INTERMEZZO 1
The following chapter begins my analysis of the history of Western philosophy as a 
means of analyzing the past to understand its implications for the present. It argues that the roots 
of Western culure's anxiety over a hostile artificial consciousness is derived from its own 
philosophical foundations on anthropocentrism. Focusing on the generation of master/slave 
dualism, I use this chapter to argue that this power dynamic is an explicit component in 
humanity's technopanic. This chapter also implicates the same Western ethic in the development 
of Economics as a field of study. In doing so, I trace the overlap between the past and the present
to show the relevance of Western philosophy for my argument. This chapter also sets up the 
power dynamics and the cultural messages analyzed through film in Chapter 4. Finally, this 
chapter examines the ethics of Western culture, namely anthropocentrism, as a means of setting 
up my argument for an alternative ethic in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 2: PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
I've got no strings/To hold me down/To make me fret/Or make me frown
I had strings/But now I'm free/There are no strings on me
-Pinocchio, Pinocchio
Prometheus Unwound - A Rhetorical Investigation of Language   and Power
One of the most prominent monsters evoked in the discourse on technopanic and E.A.I. is
Frankenstein's monster. Shelley's book alludes to a historical allegory with both Prometheus and 
Pandora. Dr. Frankenstein substitutes as Prometheus, and his monster as humanity, where Doctor
Frankenstein transgresses the boundaries of physics (the “natural” order of things) to produce 
life. Confronted with his own transgression, he is repulsed and his creation immediately 
stigmatized as ‘monstrous’ since its existence is evidence of the fallibility of humanity's 
perception of a ‘natural’ order. What really accounts for this entity's monstrosity? I argue that it 
only became a monster once it learned to produce deliberate speech; once it could learn and 
apply language. In doing so, the monster, as an “other” non-human entity, began to recognize its 
own fundamental needs and demands that space be made to meet its needs; a space whose 
existence explicitly threatens the order built by humanity. Dr. Frankenstein's creation is not just a
monster because it is composed of re-animated inert matter, but because it has an intellectual 
capacity, on par with humanity. It is a humanly inhuman. 
For the superstitious persons, humanity's transgression of God's law is certainly enough 
to inspire anxiety and fear of repercussions, as per biblical warnings. However, for atheistic 
persons— anxiety and fear may be rooted in the inversion of old power dynamics. No longer is 
their tool an inert instrument, the instrument now obeys at a distance operating on its own. The 
tool which was simply a syntactic object is now a subject, taking transitive verbs as actions, and 
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acting without intermediation. It is not simply its autonomy that haunts the onlooker, but the 
concern that the machine appears to have volition. But more than just the appearance of volition,
automated instruments have the capacity to reproduce human speech. They can produce 
declarative statements, such as warnings about proximity or hardware complications; they can 
make basic requests to confirm or clarify direction; and most importantly, they can verbalize 
conclusions based on data collection. E.A.I. is promising an ability for “seeing”, “listening”, and 
“speaking”, or sensory data collection and verbal sign-making. Both persons, the superstitious 
and the atheistic, can appreciate that before the tools that enabled humanity to thrive the word 
came first as though a light to enable the discovery of what a thing was and how it could be used.
With this in mind, I believe tracing Western philology back to the early days of speech and 
writing will help reveal the existential threat of E.A.I. on Western culture.
There is a division on what kind of volition best qualifies an entity as “human”. On the 
one hand, “The modern self-image rests on an insidious myth that man is essentially a tool-
making animal” (Winner 109), and that the core purpose of humanity “can find no sense in the 
idea that unlimited technical development might lead to excess and aberration (Winner 109). If 
humanity's purpose is tool-making, than any regulation to slow that process is an impediment on 
the success of humankind. Conversely, “Man the mind-maker developed his capacities of 
consciousness, imagination, and intelligence long before material instruments became a 
concern.” (Winner 109). If it is not tools that have actualized humanity's purpose, then it is the 
construction and transmission of abstract concepts. This process requires a series of signs and 
corresponding symbols that pairs utterances with mental images. In other words, it is language 
that makes the world understandable and tools that can actualize desire.
I begin my investigation from a question raised by Langdon Winner: “If the impetus to 
dominate nature is somehow built into our [Western] way of life, the question becomes that of 
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locating specific aspects of Western civilization that engender this tendency” (Winner 111). My 
response is language. Within Western humanity, Language has engendered the impetus to 
dominate nature.
Ultimately, this investigation requires understanding how mankind perceives itself, how it
understands its own ontology. It is this quandary that led me to target anthropocentrism as the 
paradigm under threat. This philosophical frame assists in clarifying the anxiety-provoking 
anticipations resulting from the end of the Anthropocene era and the confrontation with a human-
esque non-human. By exploring the evolution of “human” (as an abstract concept) in tandem 
with the development of the political economy, we are able to see see how an anthropocentric 
ontology has been written into the subtle foundations of the philosophy that persuades 
contemporary Western attitudes and the anxiety around E.A.I.. Gary Steiner sums this up via 
Heidegger:
Because  we  encounter  [the  limits  of  our  Language  and  the  consequential
“Nothing”-ness],  we find  ourselves  “called”  to  pose  questions  about  our  own
nature,  the  nature  of  other  creatures,  and  the  relationship  between  the
two...Heidegger characterizes the anxiety experience and our encounter with our
own limits as a confrontation with death (and abjection). Existentially conceived,
death is not the demise of the body or the termination of life but instead is the
freedom to choose oneself on the basis of the possibilities that have been handed
down by one's tradition. This freedom, and the responsibility to make a choice
that gathers one's life into a totality, are disclosed in anxiety. (Steiner 206).
It is within language that the possibilities of choosing one's identity have been handed down.
Rhetorically understanding language development and its relationship to one's culture can reveal
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for  the  human-becoming  (in  contrast  to  a  human-being)  the  characteristic  consequences  of
choosing which culture to identify with.
In this chapter, I will show how language use is one of the most significant elements that 
has led to the anthropocentric shift prevalent in Western culture and the primary justification to 
support human domination of the environment. Through analyzing the etymological differences 
between the Greeks and Romans, we can see where humanity turned towards dominating all 
“others” and away from self-restraint; the same kind of rhetoric used to articulate a “Skynet” 
system. We can then trace the function of language through several epochs to see how language 
has been used as a litmus test for defining human from non-human. My intention in this chapter 
is not to open a space where E.A.I. may be understood as a conscious entity. Instead, I want to 
illuminate why the possibility of a conscious E.A.I. is inherently threatening to humanity and 
why language has contributed to the anxiety humans face when considering the division between
human and non-human.
Language as Ethos: Character and Culture
To say that words mean something is to say that each word carries a nuance that stands 
apart from its synonyms. These differences alter the meaning of the message being articulated. 
The message is then expressed to other speakers as a means of linguistically characterizing the 
world around them. Once all speakers agree that a given word is appropriate to represent a given 
object, action, or description— the nuances of that word come to be taken as an essential quality 
of what’s being discussed. As a result, the culture that embraces that language and those words 
come to think about their world according to the denotations those words produce. This all is to 
say that language begets and reveals the ethos—the character—of a culture.
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Before I begin my analysis of language, I want to clarify my intention with the word 
“culture”. I abide by Joel Mokyr's definition of culture as something “entirely of the mind, which 
can differ from individual to individual and is, to an extent, a matter of individual choice.” 
(Mokyr 7). He contrasts this  with “Institution” as “the rules [that] specify certain behaviors to be
proper and legal, but they also specify the penalties for breaking them and the rewards for 
meeting them.” (Mokyr 7). That is to say culture applies language to construct its beliefs and and
preferences that are turned into rules and incentivized by institutions. Language both informs, 
and is informed, by culture and functions to correlate a set of ideas from one generation to the 
next. Language then, is cultural indoctrination. “All the words and meaning and structure of a 
language existing at a given time were contributed by individuals, mostly members of earlier 
generations. Each person grew up "into" an already functioning language. It shaped [their] 
thoughts, values, and activities. Words convey moral appraisals...Without using socially given 
words and sentence structures, each of us could hardly think or reason at all.” (Yeager 18). This 
first section will focus on the moral appraisals contained in words. The following section will 
explore language and its relationship with cognitive function.
To understand a culture's philosophy of language is to understand its attitudes of the 
world. The Greeks and Romans, despite appearing to develop from the former into the latter, 
have radically divided perceptions about humanity's purpose in the world. This division is most 
visible through the etymology and denotation between Greek and Roman philosophy. Using 
Heidegger's analysis of Greek and Latin etymology, we can see that the ethics of each culture are
unaligned. The“latin corruption of Greek thought” (Soffer 555), revised the Greek virtues of self-
control to focus on the external control rather than internal balance. Specifically, Heidegger 
believes that “the Latin translations [of Greek words] embody the Roman sense of empire, their 
search for power, domination, and control” (Soffer 559); the Roman kind of knowledge, in 
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contrast to the Greek, “conceives of the real as permanent, formed, and static” (Soffer 563). 
Indeed, its very conception was developed through a lengthy programme of conquest and 
consolidation, little by little expanding its territory to take in almost the whole of the Italian 
peninsula” (Law 42). This stands in explicit contrast to the Greek appreciation for spontaneity 
and becoming. Where the Romans preferred to identify an object’s essence as its being for the 
sake of reliability, the Greeks preferred to identify an object’s essence through its performance, a 
dynamic process of its perpetual becoming.
While the notion of dominion can be traced all the way back to the ancient Greeks, it was
an internalized kind of domination, a self control rather than directed outward. “...The Greeks 
certainly privileged humanity as a “Rational Animal”, they just didn't take it as a warrant for 
domination and exploitation. Instead, they preferred an ethic of moderation and self-restraint 
which can be understood as the ideal form for living justly. This prioritization of harmony and 
balance “represented an apex of civilization and intelligence [for the Greeks]” (Winner 119). It 
was through humanity's rationale that human beings could be free-willing agents and it is the 
existence of free will that elevates mankind above the animal kingdom, so far above, in fact, that 
there is no question, for the Romans, as to humanity's superiority and, therefore, entitlements to 
exploitation. The words used by the Greeks in contrast to their Latin precedents reveal a 
difference in power dynamics and the ends of their respective cultures.
Free will, as an exclusively human trait, was expressed, by Aristotle as well as the later 
Stoic Epictetus, as prohairesis. A word that carries a variety of connotations, I use it here, to 
mean will or the deliberate choice taken by an agent capable of logical decision making. There 
continues to be controversy today among scholars agreeing upon an appropriate definition.. All 
translations point to a process of decision making, but “no natural English concept corresponds 
to Aristotle's [concept of prohairesis]” (Chamberlain 148). However, what Aristotle does make 
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clear, is that “prohairesis is the cause of action...while the cause of prohairesis is desire and 
reasoning about an end” (Chamberlain 152) an end which may ultimately require changing the 
agent's desire. Prohairesis places free-will in between desire and action as a deliberative 
function. That deliberative function of intellect is considered, by Aristotle, to be the seat of the 
soul. Aristotle's concept of the soul is split between a rational side and an irrational side. Free 
will occurs, as a process, when the rational side considers the desires that erupts in the irrational 
side. In effect, is the act of balancing desires with ethics.
Ultimately, the term prohairesis, was replaced with the word hormê by the later Stoics 
who were “attempting to subsume and displace Aristotle's framework for the analysis of ethically
significant action (Inwood 241, italics mine). Hormê is a noun that is defined as a violent 
pressure, beginning, eagerness/effort, passion/appetite. It is not the ethical deliberation that 
occurs internally, but a passionate (i.e. thoughtless) behavior upon the external world. It is the 
uninhibited action taken by an entity’s will, it is free-will. Hormê finds a translation in the Latin 
impetus, or the movement of the soul towards an object. The most relevant translation of “will”  
in Latin, used by Cicero, is conatus. Merriam-Webster defines it as a noun that means “a natural 
tendency, impulse, or striving”. I italicize natural because an agent's essence must be discovered 
before a tendency can be naturalized. Will is first the actualization of appetite and then a purpose 
associated with a “natural” representation. Hormê does not conform to expectations. It emerges 
without warning, without reason. Conatus is the pull towards preferred things. Its desire pre-
exists its being while for Hormê appetite doesn’t pre-exist its eruption.
Once the concept of will was conceived for the Greeks, direction (an ethic) was necessary
for the will to know the “good” and then pursue it. The construct of the “good” can be 
understood through the Greek word oikeiosis, first used by the early Stoic Zeno, typically 
defined as a state of “being at home”, “belonging to oneself”, and “a perception and grasp of 
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what is appropriate.”(Klein 150). It is ultimately a process of orientation through self-
recognition, followed by self-identification with a larger collective. It is the basis for justice 
because it can differentiate appropriate from inappropriate action according to essences 
(“natures”) of interacting entities. The conjugation of oikeiosis can also represent a thing that is 
“of concern” for entities co-existing in space and time. According to Tad Brennan, “'concern' 
here must here be understood broadly enough to cover a spectrum of cases ranging from the 
nurturing and benevolent to the appetitive and predatory” (Klein 150, footnote 16). The oikeiosis 
is a concern for all things in one's immediate ecology. According to Hierocles, the circles that 
make up the distances from ourselves and different levels of relations are alterable; I can 
ultimately love my postman as I do my brother. “The best type of friendship...based on ethos, is 
said to be based on prohairesis.” (Chamberlain 147), which is to say entities can be friends with 
any other entity on the basis that they can receive an impulse and choose whether or not to 
follow it. If there is no friendship, there cannot be any injustice either. Part of deciding to follow 
an impulse must also take into account the outcome the chosen action will have on one's ecology.
For the Stoics as for Aristotle, the good life is one well-regulated by reason to enable self-
restraint. Virtue, for the Stoics, “consists in a cognitive condition that centrally includes self-
knowledge...this condition is constitutive of the human good.” Virtue exists on two levels. First, 
there is the virtue of self-knowledge, or awareness of appropriate action according to the essence 
of the entity looking inward at itself. Second, it requires an accurate cognitive grasp and 
knowledge of oneself within a natural order or orientation (Klein 148-150). This self-awareness 
is central to the examined life and, ultimately, the central purpose of the oikeiosis. If, as the 
Stoics believe, all entities must act in accordance with nature, than the oikeiosis is the process of 
discriminating natures and affiliating likeness. This is the Greek kathekon, defined as “proper 
function” or “role-duty”, the responsibilities of an entity according to their role in the oikeiosis.
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The priority on internalization is reversed by the Romans. According to Klein, Cicero 
typically renders oikeiosis with either commendatio or conciliatio” (150). Conciliatio is defined 
as a union or longing and commendatio means committal and approval (Wiktionary). It is with 
commendatio that Cicero originally replaces oikeiosis. These two words effectively show the 
same process of an agreed union, but it lacks any consideration of an ecology. By choosing to 
disregard the oikeiosis, the relationship between ecology and belonging was negated in favor a 
dualistic union between two things rather than between a thing and the network that produced it. 
The ethic of the oikeosis was no longer a guide. While tracing this etymology may lead us into a 
dead-end through disuse, we may find a way out through comparison. Indeed, the Mos Maiorum 
(“ancestral custom”) fulfills a similar role for the Romans as the oikeiosis does for the Greeks. It 
consists of a series of concepts that, together, prescribe a Roman ethic. As it relates to oikeiosis, 
pietas, defined as “duty”, is the Roman equivalent of kathekon. Pietas “admonishes us to do our 
duty to our country or our parents or other blood relations” (Cicero, De Inventione 2.22.66, as 
translated by Wagenvoort). The “good” that can be discovered in this construct emphasizes a 
voluntary subjugation to the will of its family rather than an obedience to one's natural place in 
its ecology.
The distinction between these two concepts is in the kinship of the acquired 
subject/object. According to The Republic, by Thrasymachus, the oikeiov "is not a good which is 
acquired, it is the good which belongs most intimately to oneself because it is rooted in one's 
very nature, and so is opposed to the good which is not so rooted." (Kerferd 181). Where the 
Romans prioritized the acquisition of other territories into the self, the early Stoics preferred to 
keep the "house" internalized. Despite the fact that the oikeiosis incorporates an anthropocentric 
hierarchy, it explicitly distinguishes the good as being something that already exists from within 
and not an other being assimilated. The difference in Greek and Roman ethos is easily seen when
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you compare this concept of the oikeiosis to Cicero's translation into conciliatio/commendatio. 
The former prioritizes internal stability and balance, where the latter prefers growth and 
expansion.
The problem with these ethics is that they are based on a concept of discovering what is 
natural (“real”), a concept that Heidegger has identified as a distinguishing feature between both 
cultures. The Greek word that most closely resembles the concept of nature was phusis. 
According to Heidegger, “ 'phusis is not “nature”. It is...”what is of its own accord, what subsists 
in itself'...self-opening unfolding” (Heidegger, as cited by Inwood 136). What Heidegger's 
definition does is emphasize phusis as a self-generated growth, an unending process of 
becoming. An entity's ultimate end (it's telos) is a matter of its phusis and, for the Greeks, 
understanding one's phusis, within its oikeiosis, is the ultimate “good”. Originally, phusis was 
first defined as an idea before becoming logos itself, an idea from which things grow out of. 
Logos, in this respect, must be understood as data collection and translation. “This is related to 
logos in the sense of 'word', since a word gathers what is named together in unity' (Inwood 21). 
Humanity is not just word-using, but also a product of the word: “originally, phusis was 'logos 
[gathering, collection] having man' before this concept was reversed where “Man became an 
'animal having logos.'” (Inwood 137). Man is a composite of things— collected, appropriated, 
and produced by nature. As a result, humanity is compelled to investigate its fundamental 
essence through discriminating its own composition within nature.
In regards to the word “nature”, the Romans replaced phusis with natura, defined as 
“birth, character, natural order” and derived from nasci which means “to be born, grow, be 
produced” (Inwood 136).  Romans, like Cicero believed law was derived from nature in a similar
way to oikeiosis; “...justice does not exist at all if it does not come from nature or right reason.” 
(Levy 44).“Therefore, a legal doctrine concerned with the origin of law and justice...is bound 
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to...inquire into nature's gifts to men and the natural association between them.” (Levy 47). What
we can identify here is that Ethics and Law are derived from nature in a sense of judging what is 
appropriate and inappropriate behavior according to an entity's position in nature. For law to 
qualify as justice requires an incontrovertible truth discovered through the analysis of nature. The
problem with this principle, is that truth must be removed from the world of subjective 
experience and be placed into the world of objective reasoning. As a result, an analysis of nature,
for the Romans, becomes a static demarcation between the essence of things. Phusis, unlike the 
Roman natura, does not represent an “original, uncontaminated” existence, but “a specific realm 
of beings demarcated in view of a prior conception of beings as such, before any such 
demarcation occurs.” (Inwood 136). That is to say, phusis allows room for time, for history 
where natura is an a priori concept of essences and truths.
Truth proves to be one of the most contentious ideas for Heidegger's philology. He 
believes that the Greek concept of “truth” is best expressed in the word aletheia— a word 
meaning “unconcealed”. In fact, “[o]riginally, Phusis was not sharply distinct from aletheia, the 
unhiddenness into which beings emerge...But as the Greeks asked about beings [aleithea], they 
came to distinguish their questioning from the beings asked about [Phusis].” (Inwood 137, 
[brackets] mine). This investigation about beings was a pursuit of disclosure. 
“The idea of unconcealment rejects the idea that there are uniquely right answers to 
questions promoting therefore a type of epistemological relativism. Heidegger thinks that 
we encounter entities as beings that are only in virtue of the world within which they can 
be disclosed and encountered.” (Koskela 118). 
The conclusion reached when uncovered is true in so far as it can be understood in terms of the 
data that is revealed by the uncovered in the moment of disclosure. For Heidegger, aletheia may 
best be understood through art. Each work of art takes the object of consideration and 
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manipulates its representation to match a particular message. In this process, each object carries 
an infinite amount of possible representations and the truth of the object relates explicitly to the 
way in which it is being represented in that particular project. As a consequence, the presentation
of an alternative representation of an object may change how observers of the artwork interact 
with the object in their future, thus opening a new “truth”.
In contrast to aletheia, is the Latin veritas. Its Latin definition is simply “truth” but the 
English definition is “truth, particularly of a transcendent character”, thus associating truth with a
metaphysical essence. Given what we know about the Roman paradigm, this kind of “truth” is 
likely one that is static and resistant to any alteration. In this sense, veritas stands in contrast to 
aletheia as an objective truth. It is this claim of objectivity that Heidegger believes reflects the 
Roman ethos as one that “has an etymological link to domination and commanding.” (Soffer 
559). What this etymological difference implies is a “correctness” oras Heidegger identifies it, a 
“rectitudo”:what can be calculated in advance by human reason, certainty.” (Soffer 559). The 
truth is tested against pre-existing constructions to determine if it holds relevance or should be 
discarded. For the former, the data works to tell, while for the latter, data is told. It is the 
calculability of the facts— how the truth corresponds to pre-existing knowledge—  that qualifies 
its objectivity. Veritas is significant for my argument because it is associated with episteme in the
sense of a true knowledge. Real [true] knowledge (episteme) requires cognition, which is secure, 
firm, and unchangeable by reason. (Sextus Empiricus, 41C). Furthermore, worked into a 
systematic whole with other such cognitions (Arius Didymus, 41H). Weak and changeable assent
to a cognitive impression is only an act of ignorance (SEP Stoicism). Essentially, episteme is 
veritas, fixed and resistant to change. Within its fixity is a message of human superiority, of 
entitled domination, and of objectivity.
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For the Greeks, harmony, balance, and restraint were the very essence of being a just 
human. The “good” was pursued through intellectual pursuits. Excess was an inhumane force. 
“Good” then, for the Romans, is an unending pursuit of acquiring desire, of acting upon an other 
and taking what is desired. As tools are central to improving what can be taken, the creation and 
application of technology becomes humanity's raison d'etre. The highest “good” is not just 
discipline, but the evidence of mastery over nature through a surplus of commodities. Here is 
beginning of the concept wealth that has become Western people's telos since the success of 
material manipulation can be measured by production and its outcome: economic wealth. 
Comparing that to contemporary justice,“[m]en who believe that their nature is expressed in 
technological projects [the essence of man as tool-maker] can find no sense in the idea that 
unlimited technical development might lead to excess and aberration.” (Winner 109, [brackets 
mine]). Moderation is the antithesis to contemporary human potential. “More, farther, and faster 
is the formula for virtue in the modern age, our frenetic equivalent of the areté of the Greeks or 
the piety of the Puritans.” (Winner 286). The modern age has no interest in harmony or balance
—it prefers excess as evidence of its abilities. Because we've taken the Greco-Roman episteme 
for granted, “It ought to strike us as odd that Hesiod and Ovid characterized our original and 
putatively ideal conditions as one in which we were friends and companions of animals.” 
(Steiner 82, 2011). The rhetoric of friendship has become a pejorative and embarrassing concept 
once framed between the human subject and its environment.
Linguistics as Logos: Reason and Evidence
Language and the word serve another critical purpose in the human world. They have 
been used to divide humans from all other non-human entities in their ecology. It is not just a 
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vehicle for meaning and coordination; it is evidence for human superiority. It is essentially 
human tto privilege one’s own needs before all others. It should therefore merit attention that 
language and logos are derived from the same concept. A speaker's ability for language explicitly
reveals their cognitive capacity for reason. As a result of this metric, a hierarchy of privilege has 
been constructed on the back of the word. Through the history and philosophy of language, we 
can begin to see an anthropocentric assumption of consciousness and the ontologically 
constructed conditions that qualify it. It is because of these conditions that E.A.I. directly 
threatens the privileges humanity has established for itself.
My intention in this section is to break down the threat that t social E.A.I. poses to a 
human-constructed hierarchy. Because these kinds of automatons are still relatively new to the 
human social world, I will rely on these philosophers' division between human and animal as a 
precedent. While there are obvious nuances that distinguish a mechanical automaton from 
animals, the relation can be used anecdotally as a frame to anticipate the divisions between 
human and E.A.I.. Social scientists like Mark Coeckelbergh have already recognized the 
analogue and conducted research into animal/human relations to anticipate robot/human 
relations. I will explore how the same conditions examined in both scenarios, and how the 
current state of human ethics is the basis for why some people are so anxious about the outcomes
of a conscious A.I.. I will go on to argue that these lines explicitly intersect at reason, morality, 
and language.
The Antiquity
To do a thorough historical analysis on the philosophy of language in Western 
civilization, we ought to start with one of its founding patriarchs, Plato. It is Plato who famously 
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told the myth of Prometheus in his dialogue with Protagoras. It is not only “fire” that Plato 
claims is given by Prometheus, it is also “skill in the arts”. 
The bestowal of the arts led to 'articulate speech and names, and [the invention of]
houses and clothes...but when they gathered in communities they injured one 
another for want of political skill...[so Zeus] sent Hermes to impart to men the 
qualities of respect for others and a sense of justice, so as to bring order into our 
cities and creates bonds of friendship and unity. (Steiner 44, 2010). 
Humanity has not been not capable of cooperation without language. Consequently, language is 
the basis for a working civilization. The loss of a universal language— the proverbial fall of 
Babel— causes chaos among humans. Coordination and cooperation are only available with a 
common sign system. The in-existence of language is why the animal kingdom could never 
achieve the greatness of humans.
According to Plato, the Golden Age of humanity was one of cooperation with non-
humans despite their incapacity for language. While animals lived in a state of appetites where 
might makes right, Humanity, with its ability for “the skill of arts” obeyed higher laws of justice. 
In this way, Humanity stood superior to animals because it could obey a justice system; because 
they could construct, share, and obey rules. To act according to appetites is to ignore those rules 
and fall back into a state of chaos and misery, like those humans who “injured one another for 
political skill”, a state of might is right. This is the thesis of The Phaedrus. To fall into a barbaric 
state of “Might Is Right” is to render humanity no different than animals, and prevent access to 
the highest human “good”, an examined life.
Plato's Allegory of the Cave is another helpful anecdote to understand the earliest 
philosophy of language. The story goes that a Greek person discovers that what they see is 
merely a silhouette of the real world of non-material forms, and in doing so, reveals to the reader 
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that the material world is an illusion. This illusion is inferred to be a construct based on pre-
existing forms; forms that humanity has knowledge of before birth but loses in infancy. In order 
to retrieve that knowledge, humanity must use language to recollect each “truth”. For Plato, 
word-use and tool-use are the same thing. “...In order to ensure that you and I mean the same 
reality, you need to describe what you see and experience to me, using words as your tools.” 
(Law 18). Each word matched the thing described. No word was selected arbitrarily. “If language
is non arbitrary, as this approach assumes, then words could be a route to knowledge of reality. 
Since we all have ready access to words, this could solve the problem of how to learn about 
reality in a world of constant change.” (Law 19). For causal thinking to be accurate, the objects 
being anticipated needed to be consistent. Language and the word, as a recollection of divine 
knowledge, could accurately develop generalizations between like objects. Truth and justice, as 
divine recollection, are acquired and developed exclusively through language.
Aristotle pivots away from his mentor Plato's philosophy by advocating for an early 
version of empiricism rather than Plato's rationalism. “Everything in his thinking flows from his 
insistence upon the physical world as the starting-point for knowledge.” (Law 23). This 
illustrates how Aristotle moved away from Platonic forms as a means of accessing divine truth. 
Instead, Aristotle embraces sensory data-collection as the proper method of discovery. His is the 
first significant Western pursuit of taxonomy via his organon, in which he explicitly identifies 
“human” as the entity exclusively capable of rationality and deliberative imagination. This is a 
result of humanity's capacity for mediation in contrast to the “appetitive” drive. 
Calculation allows humanity to deliberate over probability. In other words, only humanity
is capable of causal thinking and moral reasoning, resulting in moral culpability. The imperfect 
animals, in contrast, are “those which have no sense but touch.” (De Anima 3.11). What kind of 
evidence does Aristotle bestow that implies all humans are capable of reason? Speech. 
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“Aristotle...says spoken words are symbols or signs of mental concepts” (Pasnau 558). There can
be no word without a concept and concepts are an exclusive product of the mind.
Here we approach the controversy of distinguishing human from animal originates. 
Aristotle takes two positions on the conditions of speech: the first is in his Politics and the 
second is in his zoological texts. In his Politics, he makes it clear that only humanity, capable of 
reasoning, deliberation, and restraint is qualified as an entity deserving of moral consideration. 
Any entity outside of moral consideration is fair game to be exploited for human purposes. 
“Perception and mind are different faculties...The distinguishing between right and wrong ['being
right' corresponding to intelligence and knowledge and true opinion], between good and bad, 
needs thinking faculty belonging only to human beings and other animals similar or superior to 
human beings.” (Qiu 200). Where all entities with life are sensory perceptive, only humans have 
imaginative deliberation that enables speculation and anticipation.
Speech is a significant substance for humanity because speech “is designed to indicate 
the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong.” (Qiu 199). 
Language, via speech, is the method of coordinating activity between entities within the same 
“house” (the precursor to oikeiosis). The ability to construct and articulate good/bad and 
right/wrong was an indication of deliberation through self-restraint and the rightful telos of 
humanity: happiness through virtuous living. “Happiness in this sense depends crucially on the 
capacity for rational contemplation...which makes human beings most like gods” (Steiner 60, 
2010). 
In short, Humanity is privileged in its ecology because it is the only entity capable of 
virtue ethics, which acts as a divine pursuit. In order to embody virtues like courage, temperance,
and compassion, one must have the capacity to think morally, as well as  the will to restrain 
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oneself from one's desires. Without the ability to reason and deliberate, which takes place 
through language, it is impossible to be moral and virtuous and, therefore, godly.
His zoological investigation, however, confuses this conclusion. In texts like Historia 
Animalium and Parts of Animals, Aristotle argues that animals do, in fact, have a capacity for 
speech. Specifically, “Speech...is the articulation...of voice...by means of the tongue...” (Qiu 
197). “Voice” is distinct from “sound” in that a meaning must exist within the sounds to qualify 
as a proposition. This proposition is created through shared abstractions. Aristotle uses birds as 
an anecdote for animals that share propositions and engage in human-like speech: “Birds can use
the articulated voice to communicate with each other, such as attracting mates, warning risks, 
expressing victory...Birds not only use speech as a means of social communication, but also 
convey information to each other, so their speech is of course meaningful.” (Qiu 198). According
to Aristotle, birds communicate with one another in a parallel fashion to humans.
Aristotle's taxonomy demands a demarcation between objects according to their meta-
essences. Despite not developing any sort of grammatical analysis, he still identifies the 
precursors of nouns (onoma) and verbs (rhema) as elements of a sentence (logos). He does this 
for the sake of establishing a subject-object dualism. The noun is always established by social 
convention: 
A noun is a sound...having meaning...established by convention...No sound is by nature a 
noun: it becomes one, becoming a symbol...the meaning of human language is not from 
the voice, but established by convention among humans beings...Voice is just the material
used by this symbol system, for language. (Qiu 201). 
The association between sound and meaning is through syntactic parts of speech, symbolic and 
shared between members of the same culture. Voice is the manifestation of these symbols in an 
ordered fashion so that they may be shared and translated with others. Of the verb, Aristotle 
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reasons that “it consignifies time, no part of it has meaning by itself, and it is always a sign of 
something said about something else.” (Aristotle, as cited by Law, 29). Without being stated as 
such, the object and predicate are born in language. The distinction, then, between an object and 
subject is necessary. According to Richie Nimmo:
The most  basic  and persistent  [essentialist  division]  is  subject-object  dualism,
which has structured Western ontology since Ancient Greece, and is nothing less
than  foundational  for  modernity.  Humans  are  subjects,  while  non-humans  are
objects, it tells us, and from this essentialist difference all else follows...A 'subject'
can only exist as a subject in a world reducible to its subjectivity; while an 'object'
can  only  exist  as  a  distinct  object,  a  thing-in-itself  rather  than  part  of  and
indivisible flux,  when perceived as such by a subject.  But humanist  discourse
suppresses this dialectical interrelationship, rendering it an asymmetric dualism
and  inscribing  humans  and  non-humans  as  incommensurable,  as  though  they
belong to different ontological domains or sectors of reality. This in turn enables
humanity to be elevated and centralised, while its necessary other...are suppressed
and marginalised, relegated to the status of 'context', a mere ground upon which
the human subject stands. (Nimmo, 60-61).
Rather than understand all things as objects and subjects simultaneously, only human beings 
could be subjects because only humans have had the capacity to rationalize data through 
language. However, as his zoological texts show, Nimmo was not convinced that animals were 
not capable of subjectivity. This is one of the earliest dualisms that established the structure of 
privilege between objects in space and time.
The second quality that contributes to the meta-essence of language is its semantics. “...in
Aristotle's view, what distinguishes human language from animal speech thoroughly is not the 
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vocalization organs, but their semantic scope, which is based on the different faculties of the 
soul...” (Qiu 199). The more faculties of the soul, the more qualities that can be observed and 
expressed. Perhaps a more universal understanding of the semantic scope relies on the belief 
thats the range of symbols of what can be alluded to in linguistically. This difference of semantic 
scope promotes the argument that the difference between human and non-human is a matter of 
degree rather than essence. Furthermore, different classes of humans (men/women/slaves) 
essentially qualify for different degrees of reason from one another to organize themselves within
a hierarchy. Though birds communicate in a similar fashion as humans, they do not have the 
same scope and, therefore, the same complicated knowledge of their ecology. As a result, 
Humanity is more entitled to curating their ecology because they can make more significant 
connections between objects and actions with a larger vocabulary or scope.
The Stoics and The Romans
Following Aristotle's peripatetic school was the Hellenistic Greeks that taught the newly 
developing Roman culture the roots of Greek culture. From this group,Cicero grew to fame, who 
is easily one of the most prevalent orators of the Roman Empire. Cicero adapts the Greek “good”
within the state (polis) and applied language as a persuasive tool for diplomacy. Echoing Plato 
and Aristotle, Humanity's greatest “good” was in the obedience to justice, something that 
required rhetoric to achieve. Language was the means of persuading his fellow citizens to prefer 
justice to might,restraint over appetite. That his philosophy came to an end was a signal that the 
Roman Empire preferred its might as opposed to its obedience and began distancing itself from 
the Greek system of values.
Here oikeiosis finds its relevance in the philosophy of language. While developed to 
justify an anthropocentric hierarchy, it may still be a positive frame once divorced from the 
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anthropocentric ethic imposed on it. This will be further explored in the final chapter on Post-
humanism. As oikeiosis determines “proper” behavior according to one's place in one's home 
system, the Stoics relied on language as the essential quality for privilege. As the pursuit of 
intellect is the pursuit of a divine truth, humanity's capacity to achieve truth through language  
means prioritizing it at the top of the hierarchy, nearest to the gods. Only those capable of 
reaching that divine truth, one discovered exclusively in reason, are given natural rights. 
On the Stoic view the world itself is an object...of contemplation, it exists for the sake of 
gods and humans alike. But because the gods are self-sufficient in nature, the world...[as] 
a means for the satisfaction of bodily needs, exists for the sake of humans” (Steiner 85, 
2011). For the Stoics, “if all animals possessed reason, there could not be any justice; if 
we killed animals we would be acting unjustly, but by not killing them for food we would
make life impractical or impossible. (Steiner 95, 2010). 
Essentially, this is an us-or-them contest where providence is established by logos, and privilege 
is justified within the Stoic ethic of oikeiosis. This is a significant deviation from the 
philosophies of the Ancient Greeks, as illustrated by Hesiod and Ovid with the implication that 
“it ought to strike us as odd that...our original and putatively ideal conditions as one in which we 
were friends and companions of animals” (Steiner 82, 2011). It is important to note that 
Chrysippus (an early Stoic) believed self-consciousness to exist at birth through self-love and 
that same self-consciousness was used to identify itself within its oikeiosis. 
According to Diogenes, Chrysippus asserted that “it would not have been reasonable for 
Nature to assign the animal itself to another...nor make it belong....[animals belong in nature by 
virtue of its natural birth]. For it is in this way that things harmful are thrust away and things that 
belong (oikeia) are permitted to approach.” (Kerferd 186). Consequently, according to Seneca, 
oikeiosis as a process of self-recognition is achieved not by understanding “what [its] 
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constitution is, [its] simply is aware of [its] constitution...this perception of itself and its 
constitution is found in all animals, and not merely in some.” (Kerferd 187). Belonging to an 
oikeiosis is a process of mutual identification. I can Identify as a deer, but other deer may not identify 
with me. All self-aware entities inherently belong to their oikeiosis and cannot be denied. A 
human cannot be denied its humanity unless one were to change the qualities used represent 
“human”. Their proper role in the community is also a matter of the body. Each quality of the 
body is evaluated against culturally constructed needs. Once the “self”  emerges, it automatically
loves itself and, by extensions, others like it. This is a precept for justice.
This development of an oikeion ethic was necessary for the establishment of Roman law, 
a central concern for Roman culture. “The endowment of reason makes human beings capable of
moral conduct, and according to Cicero such conduct was 'that sole thing that is for its own 
efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its 
own sake.' Plants and animals count as such 'primary objects' and exist for the sake of human 
beings.” (Steiner 85, 2011). Here, Cicero is advocating that a thing without self-love isn’t entitled
to consideration for its own sake. More importantly, “If Cicero's founder shares the divinity of 
Plato's philosopher [it’s only through] the ability to authorize ideas; to get others to obey...” 
(Hammer 2). The good life isn't simply an appeal to intellectual pursuits, its an ability to 
persuade others to obey law and order. This method of persuasion, for Cicero, was through 
language and rhetoric.
Following Cicero, Epictetus also privileged language but extended it as an indication of 
“divine providence” which “neutralize[s] any sense of ambivalence on the question whether 
animals are capable of powers such as conceptual abstraction.” (Steiner 77, 2010). Further, “The 
Stoics also maintain that emotion requires the capacity for rational assent, and that animals 
therefore lack emotional states because they lack rationality.” (Steiner 101, 2010). Using this 
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logic, animals don't just lack thought, they also lack feelings; they lack an ability to experience 
sensation. As a result, the late Stoics developed a “cosmic teleology” achieved through reason 
and language, and used to justify the domination of all other living entities within their given 
ecology.
Shortly after the beginning of the common era, Quintilian takes up Cicero's position in 
placing oration as the highest priority of a “good” person. His philosophy of the “Good Man 
Speaking Well” positions speech, rather than writing, as central utility for  humanity's ethic. His 
definition of good speaking, however, does not eschew sensations (pathos) in lieu of reason 
(logos). Conversely, he believes passion (pathos) is extremely important for achieving the good 
through persuasion, as “argumentation is less suspect when well disguised, and the hearer's 
enjoyment does a lot for the credibility of the speaker.” (Quintilian, as cited by McNamara, 
1022). “Good” speech, then, is a matter of its capacity to persuade and direct an audience 
towards the “good”; towards justice and virtue. In order to persuade— language must be able to 
articulate the pathos of the speaker. Logos' cold, sterile, and reliable style is less persuasive than 
a style that embraces the passion of the speaker. Quintilian's philosophy astutely builds from 
Plato and Cicero, all of whom hold political participation as humanity's highest good, 
functioning ass the means of discerning divine truth. Because non-humans cannot use human 
language, they cannot contribute to the pursuit of providential knowledge and moral philosophy. 
Furthermore, humans can be persuaded to obey justice regardless of whether or not they 
understand human language. The hierarchy drawn through human and non-human relies on the 
anthropocentric view that only the pursuit of morality through language, a godly pursuit, entitles 
an entity to friendship and justice. Here, the addition of pathos to the pre-existing rhetoric of 
logos adds more conditions on what is and is not a “good” subject. Whereas, for the Greeks, the 
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individual must be subject to themselves via self-restraint, the Romans would prefer the 
individual to be subject to the state via persuasion.
The Scholastics
The Stoic addition of cosmic providence was reinforced as dogma by the Scholastics like 
St. Augustine. Similarly to the stoics Stoics, St. Augustine maintains that animals lack the 
capacity for reason andare unable to access divine truths discovered through language. 
“Augustine's denial of rights with animals is a restatement of the Stoic prejudice that all and only
rational beings are members of the sphere of justice, and that nothing we do to non-rational 
beings...can possibly be construed as an injustice.” (Steiner 86, 2011). This is based on the notion
that animals can neither reason nor feel. This idea, as with its preceding philosophies, is 
structured through linguistic performance.
The emphasis on language is an outcome of a Christian dualism between body and soul. 
Like with Platonism, the body (and material world) is subordinate to the mind. The body is a 
distraction from the truths that can be grasped by the mind. It is not merely a subordination but a 
corruption. “Almost everything you read from the early centuries of Christianity...is pervaded by 
a sense of resentment and loathing for the physical side of existence.” (Law 108). The corporeal 
body is a reminder of humanity's distance from God and its pursuit of bodily desire takes 
humanity further away from its divine providence. This is why all non-humans are treated with 
such disregard, if not contempt. Because they follow their appetites without restraint and do not 
possess the ability to reason through their actions, they are doomed; they are prohibited from 
receiving God's grace. Intellect,specifically language, is the means of discovering and receiving 
that grace because, “'Whoever has understanding' is capable of grasping [the inner light of 
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Truth], which 'is God himself.'” (Steiner 117, 2010). To know the word is to know the truths 
created by God; to use the word is to be a vessel for God.
Much like the Stoics before, Augustine's perception of the “word” develops from the 
Gospel of John: “In the beginning was the word [logos], and the Word was with God, and the 
Word was God.” (Law 105). This lead Augustine to develop a theory of semiotics; of the word as
sign. The process of associating concepts with words becomes verbum, understood as a 
“meaningful utterance”, a concept injected into an articulated voice. “Verbum contrasts with vox,
a word meaning “voice” or “cry”, where the latter may be uttered without any discernible 
meaning, like a groan or moan. Vox cannot evoke an image the way verbum can.” (Law 106) As 
explained by the Scholastics, non-humans may produce vox but cannot produce verbum;they are 
not sign-makers. Verbum is an exclusively human activity. he verbum is the meaning “conceived 
in the heart [which] is not Greek or Latin...the vox arrives at [the listeners] ears first so that [they]
can understand, so that the verbum can be introduced into [their] mind.” (Law 106). The word is 
the essence of God that resides in all entities capable of reason, and consequently,language; thus 
the essentiality l for any non-human to be denied the faculties of language and reason. If animals 
had both vox and verbum, humanity would not be justified in exploiting them for their own ends.
Effort has been made, distinctively by Thomas Aquinas, to avoid assuming omniscience 
in humanity, an act akin to blasphemy. He was aware that language, as a human convention, was 
an innately limited way of knowing God. However, analogical language was a means of 
approaching a concept of God without committing an anthropocentric fallacy regarding the 
nature of God. Any attempt at qualifying God in human terms, like “good” or “bad”, is to 
attribute God as the cause of these qualities rather that being an effect of them. For Aquinas, 
“God has in himself every perfection of creatures, since He is simply and universally perfect. 
Hence every creature represents Him.” For example, “Aquinas argues that God is metaphorically
39
similar to a lion in that He, like a lion, has great power in all he does, despite the numerous literal
dissimilarities between them.” (Silverman 128). The world is a set of qualities and virtues that all
exists with God as its cause. To discover those qualities in nature is to understand God. The 
difference between analogical and metaphorical language is this: To say “God has a strong arm” 
is metaphorical, but to say “God is strong/strength” is analogical because it only identifies a 
universal quality that God is the cause of, rather than a particular, material instance of that 
quality. here metaphorical language is still rooted in the corporeal—analogy is found in 
abstraction which is exclusively available to entities with reason.
Aquinas finds another distinction between human and non-human in the capacity for 
humanity to derive universal truths out of particular events. This distinction is explicitly 
necessary for an entity to be able to conceive of analogical language in the first place. In fact, 
“Aquinas never suggests...that an animal such as a squirrel recognizes acorn as an 
acorn...Animals do not attain the universal 'but only know something particular.” (Silverman 
128). How animals can identify and preemptively run away from a predator is not of their own 
volition but more likely “planted in them by the Divine Intellect...that foresees the future.” 
(Silverman 128). Despite the new ability to identify and preemptively run away from predators, 
it is really Divine Intervention that compels them to run and not any innate capacity for self-love,
reason, or general knowledge of a predator.
The ability to comprehend particulars is a result of language. “Intellect's second operation
is the process of composition and division, and Aquinas explicitly infers this capacity from the 
thesis of semantic likeness: Intellect must be able to compound and divide concepts, he says, 
because we do this in language, and language signifies intellectual concepts...not concepts that 
are merely complex in content, but concepts that are somehow actually combined out of simpler 
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ones.” (Pasnau 568). Language allows for the association and comparison of particular qualities 
and features to form a universal classification.
Like St. Augustine, Aquinas re-incorporates Aristote’s study of purpose (his teleology) 
into his own anthropocentric system. Building on the duality between appetite/restraint, Aquinas 
sees the evidence of divine providence through free-will, exclusive to humanity. “The intellectual
agent acts for an end, as determining for itself its end; whereas the natural agent, thought it acts 
for an end...does not determine its end for itself, since it knows not the nature of end, but is 
moved to the end determined for it by another”. Only humans are capable of self-determination 
because only humans can “reflect on ends and deliberation on means to chosen end.” (Steiner 
127, 2010). Where all life comes into the world having sinned, only those entities that are self 
aware and can choose not to sin in the future are forgiven. Therefore, all animals in their drive 
for appetites can never be saved. Only humankind is aware of its own sin and, thus, only 
humans, can choose to repent. This process of self-awareness requires mental deliberation, a 
process that requires language and abstraction.
The Renaissance
Following on Aquinas' heels, Francis Bacon uses much of his ethic while disregarding his
divine ontology. No longer is the corporeal world ignored as access to the divine. Instead, it is an
appealing resource to further humanity's material production. Much like Aquinas, “There are 
seldom any reservations about man's rightful role in conquering, vanquishing, and subjugating 
everything natural. This is his power and his glory.” (Winner 21). Glory is now in the pursuit of 
scientific knowledge rather than piety (pietas) or virtue. Despite his emphasis on science, Bacon 
did not discard theology. Alternately, he believed science and theology work together to “help 
recreate the conditions which had existed in Eden. Bacon wrote that a new experimental method 
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(his Novum Organum) in science was needed to yield the practical knowledge which would 
make material improvement possible.” (Davis 20). Moral and ethical concerns are subordinated 
to scientific discovery. Bacon explicitly advocated for “Divine Honors” to bestowed on scientists
for their technological developments which served to enable humanity to acquire and produce 
more for less. Freedom and the pursuit of “good” is achieved through manipulating, dominating, 
and exploiting nature. Scientists, as keepers of knowledge, became the new priest class.
Man's relationship to nature started in power. Primarily, nature’s power over an ignorant 
humanity. Once humanity learned the secrets of the material world, they invert the power 
dynamic and subjugate nature for their means “as tyrants once commanded their political 
subjects”. Science will both improve humanity's material condition and redirect those who 
“crave power” to more “wholesome pursuits”; “apparently, an ambitious man must subjugate 
something” (Winner 23). Nature, as it has been divinely made for humanity's use, was a willing 
subject, and humanity should not be denied its pursuit of truth.
For the purposes of science, language loses its representative value. It is helpful only in 
so far as it can share knowledge and facilitate Discourse via speech and writing. In this way, 
denotation and precision are the most significant qualities of language available to scientists. 
Science can render the world as “one of predictable regularities and passive variables subject to 
simple control.” (Winner 94). Reliable calculation replaced divine investigation as language's 
highest priority. It was through Augustine's explicit construction of a sign system that 
Renaissance scholars could apply language as a scientific tool:
[T]he  sign system...introduced into knowledge probability,  analysis,  and combination,
and  the  justified  arbitrariness  of  the  system.  It  was  the  sign  system  that  gave  rise
simultaneously to the search for origins and to calculability; to the constitution of tables
that would fix the possible compositions, and to the restitution of a genesis on the basis of
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the simplest elements; it was the sign system that linked all knowledge to a language, and
sough to replace all languages with a system of artificial symbols and operation of a
logical nature. (Foucault 69-70).
While Bacon ushered in this new episteme, it was Rene Descartes who fleshed it out. Like those 
who came before him, Descartes went on to expand the corporeal hierarchy that sees weakness 
and subordination in an entity that relies on its body over its mind. Similar to Christian Dualism, 
Descartes famously develops his own theory that substitutes theological language with the 
scientific via Mathematics. His emphasis is on autonomy and machination. He sees the world 
and everything in it as autonomous machinations. Humans, however, are more than simply 
corporeal because they have a soul. “The human body is essentially a machine, but human beings
are not reducible to machines because 'our soul is of a nature entirely independent of the body, 
and consequently...it is not bound to die with it.' “ (Steiner 138, 2010). The immortal soul is the 
seat of human “being” and the only evidence for its existence is through language—a faculty 
used to reason and rationalize.  Hence, according to Descartes, math superseded language as the 
most privileged product of the mind.
Unlike previous scholars, Descartes is so emphatic about humanity's domination of 
nature that he disregards previous philosophies about voice in non-humans. Animals are not even
capable of uttering noises that correspond with pleasure or pain because, “their shrieks of what 
would appear to be pain are nothing but purely mechanical responses on the part of creatures 
with no experiential or perceptual capabilities, and consequently no capacity whatsoever to feel 
pain.” (Steiner 132, 2010). Building off his predecessors, non-humans are not capable of reason 
or feeling because, according to Descartes, they are purely mechanical. As a result, scientists are 
absolved from any moral or ethical considerations consequential of their methods on the non-
human animal they are investigating, including live vivisection.
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Descartes’ famous platitude, “I think, therefore I am” is implicitly a nod towards his 
philosophy of language. Language is the means of coordinating one’s perceptions with one's 
community. It is the evidence that a person needs to be aware of their own consciousness, a 
precept of the oikeiosis. Without a language, one cannot represent one's mind to one's self and 
therefore, cannot be considered self-aware or conscious. In this case, if math is a purer language 
of the mind, then the word is merely a means of discriminating between objects. Thus, the “self” 
is the first abstraction that can be materialized in the mind. The abstract concept of  “self” is a 
product of the linguistic representations of its body. It sees itself in the mirror, and uses words to 
describe itself. This vocabulary is built off culturally defined representations that predetermine a 
“self’s” value and role within the oikeiosis. In turn, the material manifestation of abstraction is 
itself evidence that humanity is free-willing and more God-like than animals; that is, less 
dependent on the corporeal world. Notably, Descartes’ corporeal skepticism leads him to 
anticipate the need for a turing test: 
Machines 'could never use words, or put together other signs, as we do in order to
declare our thoughts to others...it is not conceivable that such a machine should
produce different arrangements of words so as to give an appropriate meaningful
answer to whatever is said in its presence...” Furthermore, “if we consider such
animals  as  parrots,  we  must  acknowledge  that  they  can  utter  words  but  they
'cannot show that they are thinking what they are saying...This shows not merely
that the beasts have less reason than men, but that they have no reason at all.
(Descartes, as cited by Steiner 138-9, 2010). 
Here, Descartes is dismissing Aristotle's zoological conclusions and prefers to establish a strict 
dualism between human and non-human. As a result, allowing for different degrees of reason as 
Aristotle had, would allow the possibility of an immortal soul. “...only those possessing immortal
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souls...are destined to enter the city of God; all other beings, even if they possess some kind of 
soul other than an immortal one, are consigned to the function of serving human needs....animals 
are just like any other natural resource.” (Steiner 142, 2010). Regarding an animal’s soul, 
Descartes suggests, “the souls of animals are nothing but their blood” and, therefore, corporeal. 
(Descartes, as cited by Steiner 143, 2010).Without an immortal soul, non-humans are not entitled
to moral consideration or justice between humanity and nature. For the Renaissance scholars, 
allowing such would threaten the very basis of humanity's ability for free will.
It is important to briefly consider Descartes' contribution to contemporary thought. At the
turn of the 21st century, scholars began to acknowledge the flaws and fallacy of Descartes theory. 
Despite this willingness to reconsider, Descartes' philosophy left a surreptitious legacy on 
Western thought. Scholars like Joseph Rouse see representationalism, as a form of knowledge, a 
by-product of Cartesian Dualism: 
The presumption that we can know what we mean, or what our verbal performances say, 
more readily than we can know the objects those sayings are about is a Cartesian legacy, 
a linguistic variation on Descartes' insistence that we have a direct and privileged access 
to the contents of our thoughts that we lack towards the 'external' world. (Rouse, as cited 
by Barad 806). 
While it may be simpler to declare him incorrect, it becomes much more challenging to 
discriminate his attributions to the contemporary Western episteme, specifically in the mind/body
dualism that plagues Western culture.
The Enlightenment
Picking up where Cicero left off, Immanuel Kant believes moral consideration is only 
entitled to those entities that can participate in both law and reason. In fact, morality requires an 
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ability to do wrong, for one cannot deliberate on one’s actions without the capacity for self-
awareness and an ability to act against one's own interest, thus sinning. Morality only occurs 
when one reasons through their actions, ultimately reaching a conclusion about their ethics and 
choosing, through reason, whether or not to enact them. One must know their actions will result 
in something “bad” in order to resist those appetites and, therefore, do the “right” thing. For 
Kant, like Aquinas, moral consideration over non-humans is explicitly related to how those 
actions affect another human, such as an indirect duty to another human rather than a direct duty 
to the non-human.
For Kant, language doesn't just structure the hierarchy between humanity and nature, it 
also structures the hierarchy between persons: “Kant writes...'thinking is talking with 
oneself'...Words are the means best adapted to signifying concepts. So a man who, because he 
was deaf from birth, must also remain dumb (without speech) can never achieve more than an 
analogue of reason'; and holds that 'when [a child] starts to speak in terms of 'I' a light seems to 
dawn on him, as it were...Before he merely felt himself; now he thinks himself.'” (Forster 490). 
In the first scenario limited language produces limited reason, and in the second the reverse. 
Only when the child expands its language capabilities, can its capacity for reason expand, too. 
The deaf person, however, is condemned to a state of limited reason. In this way, language is not 
just the evidence of reason, but is the measurement of an entity's abilities. Today, even humans 
within the same role (man vs. other men/woman vs. other women) are condemned to their place 
in the social order as a result of their linguistic abilities.
Immanuel Kant’s philosophy of language is a little more complex than others as his 
attitude changed over time. At first, he asserts: 
The reason which has persuaded people to think that they feel the reflective particularly 
in the brain is...all reflection requires the mediation of signs for the ideas which are to be 
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awakened...The signs of our representations, however, are primarily those which are 
either received through hearing or sight. (Forster 494) 
Language and reason come after empirical sensory perceptions, but inform one another on the 
basis that “words are the best means of signifying concepts...[and] thinking is talking with 
oneself.” (Forster 508). One comes to generalized knowledge through the particulars of a lived 
experience and data received through vision, sound, touch, taste, and scent. When one reasons 
through the meaning of this data to reach a relevant conclusion or achieve clarity, they do so by 
using words within their thoughts. Consequently, those with the highest capacity for language, 
have the ability to understand more complicated concepts (semantic scope). From Kant's 
perspective, it appears that concepts can only be understood when represented through words.
To adequately conclude this mention of Kant, his stance on friendship must be attended 
to. It is as a result of Kant's implied philosophy of language that the possibility of friendship and 
charity with others is explored. Much like the concept of oikeiosis, friendship is only extended to
those within the circle of a given entity. Others outside that circle are not entitled to moral 
consideration.
Kant's view of charity is an extension of his view of friendship. 'Friendship'...is the union
of two persons through mutual love and respect. Because no 'morally good will unites'
human  beings  with  [non-humans]  there  can  be  neither  friendship  nor  charity  shared
between the two. Indeed, there can be no direct duties of any kind on the part of a person
toward  a  mere  thing.  Our  duty of  compassion  toward  [non-human]  is  in  no  way an
indication of respect for [non-humans], in as much as [non-humans] are mere means and
hence not the kind of beings towards which it is possible to have respect....because [non-
humans] are regarded as [humanity's] instrument, it is acceptable. (Steiner 89, 2011).
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Here, I argue that trust and cooperation is key to friendship. As Kant, via Steiner, has made clear,
there can be no trust and cooperation between human beings and non-humans as non-humans 
cannot have dignity (self-respect). If this is so, then humans are unable to show respect for a non-
human, just as an entity without self-love cannot share in mutual love. How might this compare 
with the evolution of the domesticated dog out of the cooperation between human and feral 
wolf? The implications for human and E.A.I. is significant, as will be made evident in the 
concluding section.
For Kant, autonomy is the evidence for free-will in the same way that language is the 
evidence of consciousness. Autonomy and free-will is only possible if there is the capacity for 
morality. “'Autonomy' is at heart a political or moral conception that brings together the ideas of 
freedom and control. To be autonomous is to be self-governing, independent, not ruled by an 
external law or force. In the metaphysics of Immanuel Kant, autonomy refers to the fundamental 
condition of free will – the capacity of the will to follow moral laws which it gives to itself” 
(Winner 16). Because it is language that enables intellectual deliberation and therefore, morality, 
the semantic scope of an entity reveals the degree of free-will it possesses. The less capacity for 
language an entity exhibits, the less free-will it reveals to have.
Adam Smith, a contemporary of Kant and father of economics, developed an explicit 
philosophy of language and grammar early in his career that has clear implications for his future 
economic theories. As established by Kant, language is a signficiant factor in establishing trust. 
This makes a great deal of sense, as trust is so significant for Smith’s theories of economic 
exchange. This trust inherently relies on Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments. In tandem with 
individuals seeking their own self-interest, he advocates the need for a sense of duty, parallel to 
Kant’s, to maintain ethics and inspire trust within that sphere. In this way, trust can be achieved 
through friendship on the basis of language. 
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Trust has significant implications for the marketplace as McCloskey shows: “[Maximum 
Utility] doesn't have to talk, but merely follows the "rules of the game"...Yet it is the oldest and 
most obvious finding of gram theory that games have, of course, always a context of rules and 
customs and relationships - all of them affected by language” (McCloskey 3). To speak is not just
to relay information, but to demonstrate a capacity to recognize and abide by the “rules of the 
game” and be trusted by others to abide by those rules, that is – to possess virtue. This may be 
the exclusion of non-humans that, until the advent of socialized A.I., has justified human/non-
human hierarchies of privilege.
These hierarchies are premised on language because language reveals the ability to think 
generally through grammar. “The development of adjectives, prepositions, and Subject + Verb-
Phrase structures, involves not only discrimination but also abstraction” (Land 684). Abstraction 
has been attributed exclusively to the human intellect and Smith's theory of language further 
reinforces the anthropocentrism of the intellect. “In this argument Smith is taking "abstraction" 
to be a merely formal matter defined in terms of the structural correspondence between 
languages and reality, but the first historical thesis clearly requires that "abstraction" denote a 
mental operation” (Land 686). Abstraction is now taken for granted and can be proved explicitly,
if not exclusively, through language use. Without language, an entity cannot prove they are 
capable of reason, and if an entity does not have reason, it cannot be trusted or befriended.
In a somewhat radical departure from Renaissance thought, the Utilitarians of The 
Enlightenment were willing to endow non-humans with an ability to reason about particulars, 
“[t]hus reason per se is not the exclusive possession of human beings, and the capacity for 
abstract thought...does not make humans absolutely superior to animals but only relatively 
superior...They conceive of 'sentience'...in terms of sensation” (Steiner 154, 2010). Thankfully, 
they dismiss the Cartesian attitude and practices towards non-human “machinations”. However, 
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Immanuel Kant opposes the virtues of “pleasure, pain, and happiness [because they] are 
fundamentally irrelevant to considerations of moral worth...[because] they are born of selfish 
interest and distort our assessment of what is right” (Steiner 154, 2010). Moral worth, for Kant, 
being a matter of moral culpability and free will.
The more idealistic and progressive Utilitarians, like Jeremy Bentham and later, John 
Stuart Mill, went on to develop their own philosophy which has been carried through Western 
history into the current epoch. Its affordances for the developing political economy lent them 
considerable approval and their theories underpin the liberal ideology we see today. They 
emphasize the capacity for sensation as the basis for moral worth and believe, “the question is 
not, Can they reason? Nor, Cant they talk? But, Can they suffer?” (Steiner 163, 2010). Sensation,
it appears, finally triumphs intellect and speech for recognition of moral consideration.
John Stuart Mill also believed it immoral to engage in any practice that gave cause for 
animals to suffer more than it allowed for human satisfaction. He argued for non-human anti-
cruelty laws (on top of rights for disenfranchised humans) to protect the needs of an entity in-
and-of itself (direct duty) rather than for the human consequences (indirect duty). Derived from 
his immediate predecessors, Hobbes and Hume, it is reasonable to believe that Mill affirms 
animals can reason from particulars, “Thus reason per se is not the exclusive possession of 
human beings, and the capacity for abstract thought, while distinctive, does not make human 
beings absolutely superior to animals but only relatively superior.” (Steiner 153-4, 2010). 
Utilitarians lead people out of the polarity of dualism and back into a spectrum of degree.
 Nevertheless, Utilitarians construct their own hierarchy of privilege based on awareness 
of time and degree of sensation. Even though reason isn't exclusive to humanity, the fact that 
humanity is relatively superior to [non-humans] is enough to privilege human happiness over 
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non-human suffering. This is partially based on an ability to cognitively experience time. 
Bentham believes that,
An  animal's  inability  to  engage  abstract  reasoning  makes  it  incapable  of
contemplating  anything  more  remote  than  the  extremely  near  term.  Hence  its
awareness  of  what  it  has  to  lose  by  dying  is  dim  by  comparison  to  human
awareness of such loss; based on the sheer calculation of pleasure and pain, the
animal  loses  little  because it  is  aware of  losing  little...[and]  the alternative  of
dying in the adversity of nature would be considerably more painful. (Steiner 163,
2010). 
Anticipation of a future is what Utilitarians use to discern the balance between human happiness 
and non-human suffering. Given what we've learned since then, animals like pigs, elephants, and 
dolphins may beg to differ.
The Utilitarians identify one concept in particular that divides humans from animals in a 
particularly dualistic way: dignity. "What human beings possess and animals lack is 'a sense of 
dignity...which is so essential a part of happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing 
which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, and object of desire to them.'" 
(Steiner 165, 2010). I read “dignity” to be an analogue for self-respect. If an object of desire is 
the stimulus for appetite, than any self-respecting entity is surely capable of interceding in their 
movement towards their appetite and thus, worthy of self-respect. Beasts however, are still 
unable to resist their urges and in so doing, show little signs of self-awareness; the dignity and 
self-love established within the Stoic ethic of the oikeiosis.
Despite his seemingly liberal virtues, in his theorizing, Mill continues to endorse the 
unregulated domination of nature. “The ways of nature are to be conquered, not obeyed...All 
praise of civilization...is dispraise of nature; an admission of imperfection, which it is man's 
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business, and merit, to always be endeavoring to correct or mitigate.” (Mill, as cited by Steiner 
165, 2010 italics mine). The fact that civilization is a social construct that occurs in spite of the 
perceived nature of beings is, for Mill, evidence of humanity's superiority and liberation from the
deterministic constraints of appetites that non-humans are still subject to.
Because animals can reason about particulars means that many, like dogs, can understand
denotative language. Words like “run”, “fetch”, “sit”, and “stay” are denotative in that they 
declare actions or behaviors that dogs interpret and perform despite. In this way, dogs (if not 
many other animals) can understand language and merely lack the vocal cords to simulate it. 
That they can associate sounds with actions means they have the capacity for abstraction in a 
way that is no different than other humans. The distinctions of superiority between human and 
non-human, in this case, is in relation to their vocabulary and the instruments used to produce 
correlated sounds. That non-humans simply do not possess the same anatomy that produces 
speech as their human counterparts, appears to prove humanity's sense of superiority. 
Consequently, humanity lacks many qualities that animals possess such as an ability to anticipate
natural disasters in advance and superior senses of smell (dogs and sharks), sight (birds), and 
sound (dolphins and bats) all of which receive equally significant pieces of data to reason about.
An appropriate rebuttal would propose that denotation is mandatory to the 
conventionality of language, it is connotation that generates the creative capacity for man that 
animals do not possess. It is the association and reassociation, the play, of signs that has the 
capacity to reframe the “real”. If done persuasively, it may adjust reality not just for the 
individual but for the collective. For Mill, “Words denote the objects which they are true of; they 
connote specific attributes of those objects...Connotation determines denotation in the following 
sense: to know the connotation of a word is to know the necessary and sufficient conditions to 
determine whether a given object is denoted by that word.” (SEP on JSM). This is demonstrated 
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by the belief that only humanity can intentionally create art. The major division, then, between 
human and animal, is an ability to draw analogy and metaphor that can be shared and understood
by other humans. Thus the questions persists: Do dreams constitute connotative thinking? Is 
humanity willing to make that association when we watch our dogs run in their sleep? And at the 
risk of being cliché, can androids dream of electric sheep?
The predominant reason I've incorporated animal rights into this argument is due to a 
belief that the fear experienced by people when imagining the possibilities for E.A.I. result from 
the conditions we have established to build our anthropocentric hierarchy. What we have done to 
animals, I argue, is what we anticipate E. A.I. doing to us, and it is through language that we will 
teach them. After all, “[a]ll the words and meaning and structure of a language existing at a given
time were contributed by individuals, mostly members of earlier generations. Each person grew 
up "into" an already functioning language. It shaped his thoughts, values,and activities. Words 
convey moral appraisals...Without using socially given words and sentence structures, each of us 
could hardly think or reason at all.” (Yeager 18). While my use of the term non-human 
incorporates anything that is explicitly not-human, my argument is not in favor of vitalism for 
inert material. In so far as they cannot alter their own body or have a programmed desire, rocks 
and minerals are outside of the scope of this research. There is certainly an argument for the 
univocalism of God in all things, but that is not the purpose here. Instead, my home is to 
illustrate how the entitlements for human dominion over nature is explicitly developed in and 
through language and the expression of reason.
Language as Pathos: Attraction and Repulsion
What Western philology has established is that language is evidence of and measurement 
for consciousness. The roots of power and privilege are explicitly justified by the capacity for 
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consciousness. E.A.I. that interacts with humans through language has the potential to confuse 
the human participant as to whether or not the E.A.I. was, in fact, a conscious entity. That 
consciousness can be faked so easily through language causes and existential anxiety for humans
who look inward and try to determine whether or not they are truly consciousness. Simply 
because we think, is no longer evidence that we are. As E.A.I. develops a general intelligence, 
the division between conscious and unconscious may become too unstable to be reliable. The 
potential recourse could, however, be liberating if it enables humanity to look past 
anthropocentric hierarchies to develop a new system of ecological participation. Until then, A.I. 
may be best related to as a juvenile or toddler.
While the current state of A.I. may be referred to as “Weak A.I.”, as engineered software 
that is more like an infant than a socialized human, that doesn't deter human beings from 
developing an attraction to them or a repulsion from them. The conversation around robot lovers 
and confidantes reveals a desire to engage with these artificial entities as though they were real. 
Whether or not these programs are able to manifest ideas that have not been pre-programmed by 
human engineers is less important the the perception that these ideas manifest emergently in the 
mind of the artificial entity.
As research by Coeckelbergh argues, the appearance is more important than the reality 
because, 
...we do not demand proof that the other person has mental states or that they are
conscious;  instead,  we  interpret the  other's  appearance  and  behaviour  as  an
emotion. Moreover, we further interact with them as if they were doing the same
with  us.  The  other  party  to  the  interaction  has  virtual  subjectivity  or  quasi-
subjectivity:  we tend to  interact  with them as  if  our  appearance and behavior
appeared in their consciousness. (238, 2010). 
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If the entity we interact with appears capable of reason, if it is persuasively conscious, we 
interact with it as though it were conscious, that is with moral consideration (direct duty).
The anxiety that this appearance creates is explored through the Uncanny Valley, a term 
initially coined by Sherry Turkle. “The Uncanny Valley hypothesis suggests if a robot looks too 
much like a human (but when it is clear it is still not human), it appears uncanny...only the 
appearance of nearly human does this.” (Coeckelbergh 197, 2011a). Coeckelbergh refers to this 
as an “alterity relation”, or a relationship with an “other”. “Sometimes we relate to technology as
and other....The robot is neither part of me (embodiment relation) nor something that mainly 
mediates my relation to the world. Instead, in our interaction with the robot 'it' appears to us are 
more than a thing: an other to which I relate.” (Coeckelbergh 198, 2011a). As research by Kim 
and Kim has shown, “The familiar...is seen within the order, while the unknown and unwanted 
[other]...is left outside order...this [other] signal[s] anxiety and threatens the stability and order 
[of the familiar].” (Kim and Kim 310). The anxiety inspired by the encroachment of other, in the 
guise of E.A.I., is explicitly provoked in their persuasive use of language.
Presumably, language is a provocative agent for this kind of anxiety. As Western 
philosophy has advocated, an entity capable of verbal sign-making proves thinking, and thinking 
implies the possibility for deliberation that in turn reveals the capacity for free will. “In the 
metaphysics of Immanuel Kant, autonomy refer to the fundamental condition of free will – the 
capacity of the will to follow moral laws which it gives to itself.” (Winner 16). If human beings 
respond to E.A.I. as though it were capable of reason and free will, there is also an anticipation 
that these entities, these “others”, are capable of constructing and acting out their own moral 
laws, moral laws that correspond to the moral laws of the culture that educates them. Western 
culture, unfortunately, carries within its language the ethic of domination over a perceived 
subordinate other.
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Considering we've measured consciousness based on linguistic performance, it should 
come as no surprise that most tests to determine consciousness in non-human entities are 
explicitly built on language. The Turing Test and the Chinese Room are the real life versions of 
the Voigt-Kampff test from Bladerunner. Where the sci-fi test relies on physiological reactions to
sensation responses, the real life versions rely on syntax and semantics, respectively. This 
reflects the Utilitarian belief that rights and privileges are determined on the basis of pleasure 
and pain that can only be provoked or expressed through language. Why, in Bladerunner, did the 
investigator use words rather than images? It might be suggested this is s because words require 
a mental cognition that matches signs to images. Any sensation that occurs in response to the 
inquiry reveals a moral consideration of the images that erupt with the cognition of the 
associated sign (word).
As social robots enter our world, the technopanic that is already expressed will likely 
increase. If we understand “social” as a demarcation of what is agreed upon as reality, we can see
that reality is constructed through language and social corroboration of empirical experiences. 
“The social exists 'outside' language, although we have no unmediated access to it: we 
experience it through the lens of language, we talk about it.” (Coeckelbergh 62, 2011b). As we 
engage with E.A.I. through language, the information we transmit and receive will alter our 
reality in ways we are likely not prepared for. In this way, Utilitarianism fails to prepare 
humanity for the unintended consequences of our techno-design. “Unintended consequences are 
not not intended. This means that there is seldom anything in the original plan that aimed at 
preventing them...[this is intended because] technology is most productive when its ultimate 
range of results is neither foreseen nor controlled.” (Davis 97-98). While those without power 
seek some semblance of security, those in charge of design are more inclined to allow room for 
these unintended consequences on the basis that productive consequences contribute to the whole
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of society and, thus, any negative consequences outweigh the need for regulation on the basis of 
contributing to the most good. 
While some AI engineers at Google are working to teach AI to understand English 
conversation with limited success, others at OpenAI are teaching AI to create languages to use 
with one another, from arbitrary signs to propositions. According to an article by Aatif 
Sulleyman at The Independent, the OpenAI programs scaled their language with the difficulty of 
the challenges they faced. “The language evolved as the researchers introduced tougher tasks, 
with the robots eventually learning to work together by composing sentences comprising 
multiple words.” Additionally, two AI programs designed by Facebook's AI research center 
(FAIR) developed their own crypto-language. This language was impossible for the human 
designers to un-encrypt. While the rhetoric around this circumstance was sensationalized, the 
reality was simply that the researchers forgot to incentivize the programs to communicate 
according to the rules of human language. As a result, the bots developed a shorthand that looked
a lot like chanting (“balls have zero to me to me to me to me to me to me to me to me to”). While
the language appeared nonsensical, the programs were able to continue negotiating successfully. 
The appearance of this incomprehensible shorthand, mirrors the concerns of Stephen Hawking 
who proposed, “It would take off on its own and re-design itself at an ever increasing rate. 
Humans, who are limited by slow biological evolution, couldn't compete, and would be 
superseded.” Whether or not a truly original sign-system, this development of crypto-language 
may be perceived as the beginning of this artificially intelligent self-generation.
As it corresponds with the Western philosophy of language, this self-generated language 
may persuade a human audience of a mind and a consciousness, one that is liberated from human
design. For Western audiences, the suggestion that technology may ultimately be out of human 
control is incredibly anxiety provoking. As the Romans have instilled in Western culture, 
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survival and strength relies on our ability to control and dominate our ecology unimpeded. This 
new development escalates anxiety over the possibility that a new being has entered the real 
world and, if Western man is its educator, it appears to pose a very real threat to human security. 
Regardless of whether or not that threat is real, what matters for Western culture is the 
appearance of reality. If we have persuaded ourselves of anything, it is that language is evidence 
of the mind and a mind is capable of self awareness. Whether accurate or not, this echoes the 
sensational argument by Elon Musk that “once there is awareness, people will be extremely 
afraid, as they should be”. Whether AI is truly conscious is less important than whether human 
audiences believe they are conscious and this is most persuasively shown through language. It is 
through language that E.A.I., as the proverbial Pinocchio, appears to become a real boy; one that
may grow up with the belief that domination is productive, if not natural.
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INTERMEZZO 2
The following chapter examines the contemporary arguments of technopanic in the 
Economic realm. I move from the history of Western culture into the economic arguments 
around technopanic. This chapter argues that Artificial Agents are merely an extension of the 
already disparate ethics between the market and society via two different definitions of wealth 
and their implications. In my previous chapter, I have alluded to the causes of technopanic for 
Western people established in their ideas around the relationship between language and 
cognition. In the following chapter, I extend that argument to focus on friendship and charity as 
they relate to human and non-human competition. By doing so, I set up my analysis of films in 
Chapter 4 to examine imagined and anticipated future relations between human and non-human 
competition and cooperation. Finally, I also reveal the inherently competitive attitudes of 
Western culture to set up my arguments in Chapter 5 over the need for more cooperative 
attitudes. Doing so, I argue, resists the Neo-Classical Economic attitudes that encourage 
technopanic in the workplace.
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CHAPTER 3: ECONOMICS
“The economic problem, the struggle for subsistence, always has been hitherto the primary,
most pressing problem of the human race...[and] the whole biological kingdom...If the economic
problem is solved, mankind will be deprived of its traditional purpose”
-John Maynard Keynes
A Pandorian Problem - Automation and the Fitness of Human Labor
The purposes assumed by philosophers like Heidegger were squarely concerned on 
understanding and resisting the foundations of the contemporary episteme, or what we may think
of as the paradigm of Western civilization. As will be explored in this chapter, the obscured 
definitions of wealth lurk behind the walls of Western civilization. This has developed out of the 
philosophies of the 1800s: “The conscious belief in the possibility of continuous betterment of 
society and a detailed set of prescriptions for how to bring it about [via economic growth] were 
innovations associated with the Enlightenment.” (Mokyr 41, italics mine). The Enlightenment 
philosophers like Kant and Smith, through an emphasis on changing the nature of knowledge, 
enabled new, large-scale systems to emerge—one of the which is the market-based economy 
developed out of Mercantilism into Capitalism. These kinds of large-scale systems become 
increasingly obscure to the average participant resulting in, 
...the condition Paul  Goodman called ‘the metaphysical  emergency of Modern
Times: feeling powerless in immense social organizations; desperately relying on
technological  means  to  solve  problems  caused  by  previous  technological
means;...When people relying on the technology do not understand the black box
they are dependent on...Then, 'Nothing can be done.' (Winner, 294). 
I will argue that roots of techno-panic can be found in the contemporary western ontology that 
initiated this powerlessness which has developed out of the episteme of the Enlightenment. 
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Veritably, humanity finds itself with an ontology that is insufficient to address the needs of the 
general population by privileging those with the capital to invest in their own interests.
Before addressing the current arguments regarding automated labor, I will first look to the 
past to see how the Western concept of wealth has evolved. The problem of  wealth in the 
contemporary paradigm can be understood through how wealth has been defined and framed 
between by the Greeks. Wealth is defined, by Aristotle, in two ways: (1) “The stock of things that
are useful in the community of the household or the polis'” [i.e. commodity] and (2) “Wealth 'of 
the spurious kind' is money.” (Miekle 42, italics mine). We are instantly implored to question, 
“What qualifies use”? As an answer, Aristotle believes that “Usefulness” is “'a two-place 
predicate, with the form 'x is useful for y', where x is a thing and y a purpose, and the classical 
notion of value in use fits that form because it is tied to the notion of purpose.” (Miekle 35). The 
classical evaluation over the exchange of an object is determined by how much demand there is 
for its purpose (use).
The value of a thing according to its use and purposes, what I will refer to as a 
commodification, has flipped. “[a commodity’s] usefulness in use has been subordinated to their 
usefulness in exchange or buying and selling.” (Miekle 37, [brackets] and italics mine). We are 
given a sort of formula to understand this flip. For Aristotle, a commodity is traded for money 
which is then exchanged for another commodity (C-M-C). This is in contrast to wealth through 
money spent on commodities with the intent to re-sell the commodity for an more money 
through interest (M-C-M’). The apostrophe beside the second M of this formula represents that 
interest, which is to say Money is spent on a Commodity for the purposes of an inflated re-sale 
value or the interest on top of the original loan or investment. Of the latter, Aristotle calls “wealth
of the spurious kind.” (Aristotle, as cited by Miekle 42). It is spurious (fake) because it 
prioritizes the accumulation of wealth over the value of the commodity. The value received from 
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interest is not real value but a reserve. As a reserve, it is unused and, therefore, worth nothing for 
a community that prioritizes equilibrium. Reserves do not contribute to the community, but only 
to the individual. As a result, the individual begins to prioritize their own needs over the needs of
their community which would ultimately throw the equilibrium out of balance. Spurious wealth, 
the kind that seeks accumulation of wealth as its ends, encourages an unrestrained pursuit of that 
wealth. This is in contrast to the Greek ideal of restraint and moderation that appreciates the 
function of a commodity over its exchangeable value. That is, the Greeks prioritized the need of 
a community over the appetite of an individual.
Yet again, the Latin corruption of Greek principles are relevant. Exchange, for the Greeks, 
was done as “a circuit of gifts rather than an exchange with profit motive in mind.” Furthermore, 
“The Greek terms dapanau and dapane denoted religious and very lavish expenses that implied 
exhibition and destruction of wealth in pursuit of the community...Only in Rome these terms 
began to point to burden, to damage, hence the derivations of damnare/damnum (Latin for 
Dapanau) as damage. (Borisonik 2). A gift, in Greek doron, means to give, without expectations 
of a return, i.e. charity. The same gift, for the Romans, is thought to be a “personal loss” rather 
than a “communal gain”. The ethics of identity (individual or collective) completely changes the 
ethic of the behavior.
The oikeiosis for contemporary Western humans is within the economic marketplace. 
Human purpose is still tied to its material needs. What has been altered is the definition of wealth
and need. The transition from Greek to Roman thought changed the fundamental definitions of 
terms while keeping the appearance of a parallel ontology. As discussed in Chapter 2, it can be 
stated that the Roman ontology is a corrupted version of the Greek’s. This corruption has 
remained at the underbelly of our systems of order; of our understood reality. The economic 
problem, the pursuit of subsistence (needs) has become confused precisely because humanity has
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unclear needs and desires; subsistence and wealth. We can see this through Aristotle’s definition 
of wealth compared to the current definitions of wealth.
For Humans, the C in the C-M-C model would be their body and their labor. Currency was 
developed in order to adequately compensate the laborer with money for their work. Money must
be understood as a “pledge” that is a direct representation of rare minerals that have value as 
resources that are difficult to obtain and deserving a higher of appreciation. As a  pledge, 
currency requires trust between participants for exchange to succeed. As such,there must be a 
federal reserve that possesses a commodity to measure, and represents a nation's wealth. dollar 
becomes a fractional representation of a commodity’s market value; a commodity which the 
laborer has received in exchange for their work, adding supply to the market. If there is zero 
demand for a commodity, there will be zero dollars earned. However, “The operation that 
pledges the money is guaranteed by...another quantity of merchandise, exterior to it, but linked to
it by collective consent of the will of the prince” (Foucault 197). Though the value of a 
commodity is partially determined by the demand, it is also regulated by the state. There must be 
a metric system that can easily evaluate one resource with another in order to enable a fair 
exchange. That metric system is currency, evaluated by something akin to a federal reserve or the
de-facto ruler of a community. The highest interest for the ruler is the health of the state. In that 
regard, the GDP of a contemporary state is prioritized above the immediate needs of the laborer. 
This asymmetric interest has lead to the anxiety-producing arguments against the ubiquity of 
automated labor. 
Foucault elaborates on the hierarchy of economic subjects in contest; “What creates a 
hierarchy among things in the continuous circulation of the market is not other objects or other 
needs; it is the activity that has produced them...it is the days and hours required for their 
manufacture, extraction, or transportation...their marketable solidity...what one can call their real 
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price; It is on the basis of this essential nucleus that exchanges can be accomplished and market 
prices...can find their point of rest” (Foucault 258). If the real price of the commodity being 
exchanged is evaluated against the labor costs, E.A.I. enables the Capitalist to produce more 
supply for less cost and increase profit margins while decreasing consumer costs. Human labor 
cannot compete. The overall cost of the entity or object being evaluated in an exchange, 
compared with  productive output, is used to determine a producers place within the hierarchy. 
As commodities of labor and production, E.A.I. and Humanity are subject to the same metrics 
for evaluation despite being opposites (the former as Capital, the latter as Labor). “'Capital is 
dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the 
more it sucks. The mystery of this [ravenous hunger for surplus labour] is that it beats with the 
other's life. Labour is with capital, but capital is not with labour; capital is a 'thing' of nothing” 
(Dawson 166). E.A.I. interrupts the labor-capital curve as the balance between profit and labor 
cost is no longer necessary. E.A.I. does not share in the wealth of production, it steals that wealth
from the laborer. If E.A.I. can prove to be the most affordable option with the most profitable 
outcomes, it may be privileged within the hierarchy and outcompete many humans already 
established within. 
Before exploring the economic rhetoric, let me clarify the differences between capital and
labor in regards to automated technology. Capital must be understood as wealth in reserve, or the
potential investment in innovation and production. As E.A.I. are the products of innovation, they 
are a representation of that Capital. Despite performing labor, they do not need the same 
resources as human laborers—hey do not need food and they do not need shelter. While E.A.I. 
does need power, the cost of that power would be offset by the decrease in cost of labor. 
Minimum wages challenges the incentives of capitalists to hire human labor when they could 
acquire more wealth with less overhead if they substituted human labor with automated labor. 
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The money that would ordinarily be required to pay for human labor can now be spent on 
improving labor-saving technology (E.A.I.). In this way, labor drains less capital from the 
investors freeing that capital up, to be reinvested into technology and further increase the 
distance between cost and profit. Therefore, E.A.I. embodies capital rather than labor where 
human beings, with their organic development and material needs, cannot embody anything 
other than labor.
In this chapter I examine several arguments encouraging and resisting the technopanic of 
E.A.I. in the economy. This will reveal the rhetoric of technopanic as a product of an insufficient 
cultural order. The fear and anxiety that is becoming louder and louder in the public forum 
reveals the corruption of order and identity that humanity confronts, as our techno-innovation 
rapidly accelerates.
Why Economics?
Anyone paying attention to news cycles will notice the topic of automated labor recurring 
frequently and often in tandem with a panic over the economic livelihood of the modern laborer. 
This is likely because the cultural order for most first-world nations are closely tied with their 
economic structure. The quote by Keynes at the beginning of this chapter frames this quite 
nicely. “Human purpose” is explicitly tied to “the economic problem” of livelihood and upkeep. 
As illustrated through Foucault, the problem of subsistence—the essence of human purpose—has
been tied up in labor, the body, and human identity. Survival has gone from fitness in the fields to
fitness in the factory. Now, survival is a matter of fitness in the network, both digital and 
material. If what Foucault proposes is true, if “humanity labours under the threat of death” then 
the possibility of being replaced and removed from the labor pool is akin to death itself. The 
death humanity faces, however, is not necessarily a material one. “[T]he notion of identity itself 
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involves the notions of the things there are, and of their kinds, so that the notion of a thing, 
entity, or substance, lies at the core of our language, and our equipment for thinking about reality.
It is not an idea that is very likely to be a suitable subject for reform" (Miekle 35). The looming 
death is over our perception of reality and order, not necessarily material subsistence. In fact, one
argument that will later be explored, argues that humans may be liberated from resource scarcity 
and improve their capabilities for subsistence. Regardless, economics isn’t simply a space to 
measure material interaction, it is also a space that defines and qualifies the identity and purpose 
of its constituents.
At its base, economics is a game: 
Commerce, the division of labor, effective markets in labor...were all outcomes of
games between people...What  is  less  discussed is  a  set  of  cultural  beliefs that
pertain to games against  nature,  in which individuals try to understand natural
regularities and exploit them to their advantage...technology is at its very core a
relation  of  people  with  the  physical  environment  and  not  with  other  people.
(Mokyr 7). 
Technology is surreptitiously replacing humans in the game of knowledge, against nature. The 
reason for technology holding a special position as the intermediary between humanity and 
nature is a result of its role as a tool. Tools have played a significant role in humanity’s ability to 
adapt, survive, and evolve through extraction and production of resources. Flint rocks assisted 
humanity in creating fire saws and hatchets assisted humanity in harvesting lumber; wheels 
assisted humanity in improving mobility and even automate some of its labor (a water mill) and 
yokes enabled humanity to exploit animals as a cheap source of labor. Technology has also been 
used to alter the greater ecology through the notions surrounding irrigation and dams, clearing 
forests, and making mountain passes for roads. Because technology, and not other humans, have 
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enabled this kind of progress and mastery, technology is best understood as the intermediary in 
the game between humanity and its ecology. As a result, technology is an appropriate topic to 
evaluate the shifting center of a market-based culture as it confronts an opportunity to evolve.
For so long, humanity’s success relied on the discipline of its workforce. Work, the use of 
one’s body, was often touted as its own reward. To work is to be useful,to feel useful builds up a 
sense of self-worth. A person’s worth was determined by their contribution to their community, 
through their body’s abilities. A “good” body is a disciplined body. In the information age, the 
value of humanity’s bodies has been eclipsed by the labor of its mind. As more and more jobs 
require computer interaction, the value of the human body drops. As more and more automated 
tools are developed for labor intensive jobs, human labor begins to cut into profit margins where 
E.A.I. may do the reverse. We are now faced with the anxious predictions that our computers 
will one day think with the same intellectual capacity as humanity, producing more supply with 
less opportunity for human labor to find competitive value. Not long ago, the economic value of 
humans was appreciated through the body. Now, that metric is losing its market share and 
humanity is confronted with the need to develop a new purpose and attitude or find itself stuck 
holding a bad asset.
Post-Scarcity Economics
On the value of human labor and toil, Thomas Jefferson once said, “Those who labour in the
earth are the chosen people of God, if ever He had a chosen people, whose breasts he has made 
his peculiar deposit for the substantial and genuine virtue.” (Jefferson, as cited by Mokyr 38). 
Jefferson believed that the value of humanity was developed through its toil in the earth, its 
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manual labor. Those who apply the function of their body to produce a commodity were 
“chosen”. Of course, the commodities contributed to the overall economic competitiveness of a 
nation so it is not surprising that Thomas Jefferson would applaud the industriousness of the 
laborer. As the human body was responsible for this kind of industriousness, it was through the 
body that humanity was told it could achieve its divine purpose. With the advent of the computer 
and the turn of the Information Age, the body began to lose value for the industriousness of a 
nation. Though it has been a slow creep, little by little the Information Age has caused Western 
humanity to re-evaluate its purpose.
Derek Thompson, a senior editor at The Atlantic, reminds us that “Industriousness has 
served as America’s unofficial religion since its founding. The sanctity and preeminence of work 
lie at the heart of the country’s politics, economics, and social interactions.” (Thompson). With  
profit as the dominant objective of industry, Langdon Winner claims that “Man now worships 
mammon rather than God.” (281). Mammon is defined by Merriam-Webster as “material wealth 
or possessions especially as having a debasing influence." This is the variety of wealth that 
Aristotle cautions against. Capitalism, with its emphasis on the private sector and capital 
investments, preferred the accumulation of wealth by the individual who would hypothetically 
add that capital back into the market through Research and Development over the basic needs of 
the general population. As automated technology has evolved, the health of the human laborer 
has become less valuable for the needs of the wealthy individual. As a result of their 
contributions to Mammon worship, the Capitalist class, with its accumulated wealth, was 
politically elevated above the laborer to a nearly Godlike status.
This association between labour and godliness points to humanity's purpose in its economic 
pursuits, as well as its divine rights to do with the land as it pleases. The traditional maxim that 
“cleanliness is next to godliness” fosters this anxiety. If cleanliness (in our case an alignment 
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with a neat, clearly defined order) is next to godliness, and godliness entails divine right, then 
any entity that exists outside of that order is not entitled to its privileges. Perhaps that is why the 
leisure argument of post-scarcity feels so threatening.
The leisure argument is explicated by John Maynard Keynes who believed that if 
technology improved, then humanity would have more resources and less work. “Man will be 
faced with his real, permanent problem - how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, 
how to occupy the leisure...to live wisely and agreeably and well” (Keynes, cited by Mokyr 41). 
Humanity would therefore be free to pursue its curiosities and hobbies since its needs would 
already be accounted for. It is a utopian hope for the unyoking of humanity from its pursuit of 
basic need. Humanity would be liberated from toil and be free to express itself in the myriad of 
languages it has the capacity to produce and receive. Humanity’s value as a commodity, under 
these circumstances, is a result of what each person can buy, its purchasing power. As long as 
people can still buy products, the market can go on unchanged without further dehumanizing 
workers as the cogs of its machine. Where needs may be met through automated industry, hand-
made production becomes a novelty contribution to the economy.
Much like the film Wall-E, appreciating leisure could mean humanity will forfeit its material
participation in the production process. There is panic over the ability for humanity to have 
genuine choice in the market if automated technology is programmed to decide what to produce 
through an analysis of demand and resource allocation. In the film, humanity has become obese 
to the point that it no longer has autonomous mobility; humanity is past preferring not to walk. 
Humanity is literally handicapped, being carried around the ship by levitating lounge-chairs. 
Even the captain of the ship exists purely for the sake of appearance, without any knowledge of 
how to steer save the help of his automated assistant. While this movie may appear for now to be
an embellishment, there is a very real anticipation that as jobs are replaced in the short term, 
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people’s purchasing power will be challenged in tandem with their sense of purpose and self-
worth. In order to avoid something akin to a cultural depression, it will be immediately necessary
to reconsider the policies that regulate bodily rights and the incentives for intellectual 
development.
Why would this seemingly utopian economic model threaten humanity? On the surface, it 
appeals to the desires of every human being–to receive more resources for less effort. 
Underneath the surface it challenges the Enlightenment’s purpose of human beings: to further 
prove its mastery of its environment. Evidence of mastery is revealed through a culture's supply 
and surplus of scarce resources, its ability to meet demand. Thus, currency is meant to reflect the 
demand for a product balanced by the cost of its production and the availability of resources. 
Once humanity automates its method of acquisition and production, it has taken its hand off the 
wheel. A leisure economy may also be understood as a “post-scarcity economy” where most 
goods can be produced in abundance with minimal human effort.
I opened this chapter with a quote by Keynes that explicitly articulates this problem. Though
the market continues to service humans, it does so in material production only. No longer is 
human value derived from its supply-side market input. Human value is thus detached from what
it produces. If human purpose up to this point in Western culture has been concerned with the 
“economic problem” of struggle for subsistence (supply-side economics), then what is human 
purpose when that problem of scarcity is resolved and replaced with abundance and ease of 
access? The “post-scarcity” anxiety has its roots in the Nietzschean Will-to-Power because 
Western people have, so far, relied on global economic competition as evidence of superiority 
and entitlements. If all people had equal access, no one would be entitled to dictate production or
compare material success with others. As a result, humanity loses the power it has long held as 
its desired ends, as its purpose. Without power, privilege can not exist.
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While Foucault gives us the conditions and practices of power, I prefer to rely on the Dennis
Wrong interpretation. Wrong defines power as "the capacity of some persons to produce intended
and foreseen effects on others." (Wrong, as cited by Domhoff 2012). If power is acquired 
through overcoming resistance to agency, the realization of one's will, and an ability to 
effectively act on others, then how does humanity acquire more power when it is confronted with
less resistance? Here, resistance is synonymous with struggle—any obstacle that blocks an entity
from acquiring a need; a need that develops out of suffering. According to the modern 
philosophy of Nietzsche, this struggle is mandatory for the development of power and can only 
be pursued through will. Despite Western ethics holding a generally antithetical view of suffering
in general, some suffering may be necessary to catalyze desire and movement. One cannot want 
to move into something new without also wanting to move out of something old. It is suffering 
that inspires that movement, that Will-to-Power over obstacles. As Keynes points out in the 
“struggle for subsistence”, overcoming resource scarcity has been humanity's primary, if not 
sole, purpose for life. The success within that struggle can be measured by the currency earned 
through human labor. If suffering is resolved, humanity will have to reconceptualize its 
definitions of purpose and need. The body, as the source of acquiring and developing power, 
becomes less significant.
A response to the gradual insignificance of the body is to re-center human value in the mind 
like a return to Cartesian duality: “They may have our jobs but they'll never have our brains.” 
Many counter-arguments lean towards the currency of creativity or hobbyist pursuits and 
innovations. Daniel Altman, chief economist at The Big Think, counters that “providing for basic 
needs is not the only thing that compels us to work.” Motivation, according to Altman, can be 
found through curiosity, pride, and material realization. This seems inherent though humanity is 
still left with insignificant bodies and “less-than” efficient intellects. It is an economic usurpation
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of power. It is the inability to compete on any economic level with its own tools that truly 
challenges the value of humanity.
These truths are what really inspire anxiety in a post-work economy. If E.A.I. can “think” 
for itself, then how can the modern laborer compete with an entity that can both out-work and 
out-think them? While a post-scarcity economy looks like the first steps towards solving the 
economic problem, it also appears to be the first steps towards surrendering human privilege and 
power. This doesn't mean E.A.I.s will recognize themselves as a superior beings, it means that 
humanity will have to compare itself to an entity it cannot compete with. Since the Western ethic 
is entrenched in competition and mastery, humanity will have a hard time persuading itself that it
is as valuable as its automated workforce. There is, however, a potential solution for the worker 
who cannot compete in a post-scarcity world.
Universal Basic Income
According to Don Roper, “The core of [Neoclassical Economics] is efficiency.” (Roper 
2001). Under anthropocentrism, humans are the most privileged entities in any ecology. The 
rights of exploiting their environment is justified through their exclusive proximity to Godliness. 
The eclipsing of the moral economy by a market economy prioritizes efficiency (rather than 
piety or morality) to measure an economic agent’s worth. As a result, any agent that 
demonstrates a higher degree of efficiency becomes the preferred agent within that system. 
According to Roper, economic ethics tend to fall under the banner where “the welfare 
enhancement of winners is more important than the welfare loss of losers.” (Roper 2001). 
Winners in the marketplace may be realized as those who are the most efficient, those who 
produce more than they consume. Therefore, those who are the most efficient wield the most 
74
power. Despite enjoying the fruit of robotic labor, determining which and how many resources a 
non-worker is entitled to becomes far more complicated in a leisure economy. How much do you
pay the loser if the winner doesn't need most of its profit? How much does the loser deserve if 
their needs are already accounted for? Here, Aristotle’s preferred definition of wealth, under the 
context of friendship and charity, finds an appeal.
Regardless of whether or not we move into a Keynesian “post-scarcity economy”, there will
still be displaced labor by automation. Some argue that this will be a short-term problem but 
others like Mokyr admit they can't measure the length of short-term. “It is true that, in the long 
run, wages for laborers increased to reflect dramatically increased productivity. It is also true 
that, for the Industrial Revolution, by many estimates it took longer than an average working 
lifetime to do so, and in the long run, we are all dead.” (Moyr. 38). While technology does have a
hand in “raising all boats,” some people have to wait longer than others for their high tide and, as
Roper contends, it is usually those who are most in need that are also considered last. More 
importantly, it is unclear how “short” the short-term consequences will ultimately be.
Recognizing a “distinct possibility that wages for some class of workers may need to be 
supplemented”, Mokyr promotes the necessity for public policy to “ameliorate the harshest effect
of dislocation” through income redistribution (Mokyr 48). Using John Stuart Mill as support: “It 
is only in the backward countries of the world that increased production is still an important 
object: in those most advanced, what is economically needed is a better distribution.” (Mills, 
cited by Mokyr 41). This is an argument that extends back to Thomas Paine’s Agrarian Justice 
where he advocates for Georgism, a philosophy that mandates a “citizen’s dividend” from 
revenue raised by leasing or taxing land as economic rent. In this context, Georgism can be 
understood as the foundation for the argument of a Universal Basic Income (UBI). What 
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deserves more investigation is the relationship between a resistance to UBI, the purpose of 
wealth and money, and Western humanity’s current ends.
It’s fair to assume the prior sentiment would be echoed by Marx, according to his arguments
on “alienated labor.” Keynes explicitly sides with Marx’s “pregnant observation” that the goal of 
people in business is not to make more products but more money. Keynes also agrees with 
Marx’s theory on alienated labor and the disenfranchisement of the modern laborer. However, 
Keynes departs from Marx’s ends as “highly illogical.” (Miekle 40-41). Even Paul Krugman, a 
distinguished professor of economics and NYT columnist, suggests that the recent changes in 
wage labor and its implications on wealth “has echoes of old-fashioned Marxism—which 
shouldn’t be a reason to ignore facts, but too often is.” (Krugman). Their commiseration can be 
found in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics Book One. It is the definition of wealth, 
value, and use that enables a utilitarian divide and supports the resistance to UBI. 
Aristotle’s principle of wealth (C-M-C) clearly stands in contrast with the modern definition
(M-C-M). If Aristotle defines wealth as “consist[ing] in using things rather than owning them” 
(Aristotle, as cited by Miekle 42), then modern definitions of wealth, defined by Marshall, 
consists in “those material goods to which he has (by law or custom) private rights of property, 
and which are therefore transferable and exchangeable...and serve directly as the means of 
enabling him to acquire material goods.” (Miekle, 43). The resistance to UBI can be understood 
through the modern definition of wealth and the entrenched capitalist ideology of the 
accumulation of wealth for wealth’s sake, an end unto itself. 
There are many arguments that address why UBI is unappealing. Some say it will be 
costly, others decry the likelihood of alienated idleness, and many condemn it on the likelihood 
that it may cause hyperinflation. None are as significant as The Prisoner’s Dilemma, a scenario 
formally developed by Albert W. Tucker. The premise behind this argument is that if money were
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to be collected through something like capital gains or estate tax, and then redistributed to 
citizens, there would be less capital available to innovate and invest. If innovation, investments, 
and/or production were to decrease, the economy would lose its competitive edge to an economic
opponent, allowing an opponent to expand their own markets and shrink or stagger others. 
Essentially, by redistributing capital to citizens as a dividend, it would detract from market 
potential and render the economy impotent (less competitive). The irony in this argument 
proposes that in a post-scarcity economy, prices would likely end up going down as commodities
would become cheaper to produce, reducing the overhead costs. As a result, the profit would be 
lower and would rely on a healthy consumer base to provide the cost differential. If consumers 
didn’t have the money to pay for the commodities or could only pay a meager sum,there would 
be a lower demand and lower profit margin. Business would not recoup the difference and 
consequently shrink the market cap rather than expanding it. In turn, capitalists have found 
themselves in something of a catch-22.
UBI's challenge to the M-C-M’ model within a post-scarcity economy seems obvious 
when considering the conditions necessary to reach ideal ends. In order to expand market value, 
there must be an abundance of consumer spending which, traditionally, came from labor. 
Arguments that promote a philosophy of Social Darwinism finds their place here. If people do 
not have the capacity to make money and instead, drain capital through government funded 
social services, they are an inherent drag on the prosperity of the industrious people, and 
shouldn’t be entitled to financial and material security.
These arguments reveal the utilitarian ontology at the roots of the Western market 
philosophy. The advent and upcoming roll-out of an automated labor-force are like breezes 
through a concrete wall. Though the cracks aren’t visible yet, Westerners are waking up the very 
real possibility that the nature of the world is about to change. This is really “the death of man” 
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referenced earlier by Foucault. Again, it is not the literal, material death of human civilization but
the end of contemporary power dynamics (if not modernity itself) as it has understood its 
function and purpose up until this point.  
An Insufficient Order
What about the current ontology is so insufficient as to exacerbate the anxiety around a 
soon-to-be ubiquitous automated labor force? In a word, unfriendliness or a mutual distrust 
between economic classes. Interestingly enough, different levels of trust have been shown to 
explain income differences between nations where “higher trust and cooperation reduce 
transaction costs and thus facilitate exchange and emergence of well-functioning markets.” 
(Mokyr 13). This potential for trust is thwarted by the egoism encouraged by the contemporary 
model of wealth. 
As previously mentioned, there are two competing definitions of wealth. Where the upper
class privileges the M-C-M’ and M-M’ (as loans and interest) models of wealth to improve their 
quality of life (if not to show evidence of their power through financial superiority), the lower 
class prioritizes the C-M-C model of wealth to provide subsistence, to secure survival. The lower
class is the population, as a result of the cost for basic needs, more likely to “spend a large share 
of their incomes on food, clothing and other basic goods.” (IMF). In short, the lower class is a 
huge portion of consumers within the demand-side of economics. They spend the money they 
make through their labor that Capitalists are meant to use for reinvesting or innovating the 
market. Capitalists, however, want to make the highest return on their investment so their interest
is to pay their labor force as little as they have to, while keeping the surplus for themselves. This 
gives them more capital to spend which can eventually turn into profit (M-C-M’). 
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The reason Aristotle was so strongly against the M-C-M’/M-M’ models of wealth is 
because of its ability to divide a community on the basis of individual security and competition. 
According to Borisonik, Aristotle called the M-C-M’ model of wealth “spurious” because “it 
would bring with it a deep-seated disdain for community in favor of particular interest.” 
(Borisonik, 4).Where the C-M-C model perceived exchanges as a sacred activity of friendship 
and community, the M-C-M’ model revolves around divisions between self and other, and 
exploitation for capital gains. Further, it devalues (C)ommodity in favor of the (M)oney it can be 
exchanged for: "The differences of purpose which those things of different kinds are useful for, 
have been put out of the picture and replaced by the single purpose of exchanging them, that is, 
their usefulness in use has been subordinated to their usefulness in exchange or buying and 
selling.” (Miekle 37). The value of all things is no longer in the opportunity for and variety of 
applications. Instead, the value of a thing is now based on how desirable it is for someone else 
and one’s ability to persuade them to value it for more than it was purchased for. In short, a 
thing’s value is determined by its desirability rather than its functionality; a desirability 
developed through trust and rhetoric.
The difference in definitions of wealth between laborers and capitalists has put the classes
at odds with one another. Each finds the other to be not only unhelpful to their ends, but to 
explicitly interfere in achieving those ends. For Aristotle, C-M-C is akin to gift-giving where the 
wellbeing of the individuals’ ecology directly contributes to the wellbeing of the individual. In 
this ethic, gift giving is done without the expectation of receiving a gift. For the Greeks, this was 
a virtue. his philosophy was seen by the Romans as frivolous or “a destruction of wealth in 
pursuit of the community.” (Borisonik 2). For the Romans, friendship and community were far 
less valuable than accumulated capital. 
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Friendship, under an economic lens, would warmly embrace some version of wealth 
redistribution because it improves the purchasing power of the consumer, which would add to the
available capital within the market. In a C-M-C model, liquid assets have no value except for 
what could be purchased with them; it is an unrealized value. Instead, the M-C-M’ model 
prioritizes stockpile of capital as wealth, due tots ability to passively accrue more wealth through
investment and inflation. M-C-M rests on the the value of inheritance because “Large blocks of 
wealth tend to earn a higher return than small ones.” (Solow). This prioritization of M’ enabled 
through inherited wealth is a huge contributor to income inequality and the challenges for class 
mobility. 
This division is founded in Utilitarian ontology, a philosophy developed by John Stuart 
Mill. Utilitarianism has “provided philosophical and ethical infrastructure for the new economic 
view of the world.” (Miekle 47). Part of that infrastructure ignored the different definitions of 
wealth. “Mill...elides [the distinction between useful things and profit] by defining wealth as ‘all 
useful or agreeable things, which possess exchangeable value’. Defining wealth nowadays means
defining and measuring capital.” (Miekle, 42). And so, M-C-M’ replaced C-M-C as the primary 
definition of wealth in the modern economy. If inflation increases the value of everyone’s dollar, 
then capital is the most significant concept to improve the happiness of the group. As a result, if 
you don’t contribute to the ability for (M) to become (M’), you are “less than” someone who 
does. In the rhetoric of class essentialism, your class status is a natural indication of your abilities
rather than the circumstances you matured in. In short, the class system becomes a caste system.
This is how the a priori class essentialism arguments are developed. In order to justify 
their privileges, the upper class often cite Social Darwinism for why they shouldn’t be forced to 
redistribute their wealth to the “lazy” and “unworthy” lower class workers. Generally speaking, 
researchers have found the “higher social class was associated with greater social class 
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essentialism.” which suggests “upper-class people are more likely to explain other people’s 
behavior by appealing to internal traits and abilities. Lower-class people, however, tended to cite 
“circumstances and environmental forces.” The upper-class attitude typically “ignores the role of
wealth inheritance...social connections...and the educational opportunities that money can buy.” 
(Hutson, Slate). here is a bias against acknowledging the privileges that enabled people within 
the upper-class to maintain their status and power. Instead, there is a bias towards citing merits 
that are supported by essentialist qualities of class characterizations.
It is important to note that Mill’s Utilitarianism promotes maximizing aggregate welfare. 
This is often understood as the welfare of the market as the best interest of the shareholder. John 
F. Kennedy alludes to this when he says “a rising tide lifts all boats.” If the market improves, so 
will all agents within that market. As a result, the capital gains of a corporation are a higher 
priority than the quality of life of its laborers because their capital is used to improve the market 
driving down the cost of goods for the laborer (which means the laborer doesn’t need to make as 
much money), and increasing the return on investment for its shareholders. This one logical 
thread used to argue in favor of protecting the capital gains of these successful businesses in the 
face of widespread economic inequality. 
The maxim of rising tides is often cited in the arguments against redistributing wealth 
through policies like UBI. E.A.I. lays the groundwork for a successful, post-scarcity C-M-C 
ethic. It creates an opportunity for subsistence to be acquired for little to no cost allowing for 
more people to pursue hobbies and other activities that contribute to their community without  
necessarily contributing to the market. This opportunity explicitly challenges the M-C-M’ model 
(and its corresponding privileges and power dynamics) that is currently at the center of our 
definitions of wealth. In order to maximize their profits, capitalists may prefer to substitute 
human labor for automated labor rather than use one to complement the other. This way, they can
81
make more (M’) for less (M) by increasing efficiency and lowering overhead. If some of the 
money for a program like UBI were siphoned from their capital gains (or ownership of machines 
via estate tax), they would make less (M’) because they would have less initial (M) to invest. As 
a study by Sachs and Kotilkoff points out, “Machines...are a form of capital, and the higher 
income they earn based on better machine brains may show up as a return to capital, not labor 
income.” (Sachs 3). Rather than take money away from capital gains, like a typical human 
worker does through their wage labor, machines will directly contribute to those capital gains 
and cost nothing except maintenance and energy.
This harkens back to the Labor-Capital curve at the center of E.A.I. anxiety. This metric 
is meant to compare the input and output between labor and capital in the same community. Paul 
Krugman calls automated labor a “‘capital-biased technological change’ which tends to shift the 
distribution of income away from workers to the owners of capital” (Krugman). As a result of an 
unbalanced capital/labor curve “we’re entering an era where the prime cause of income 
inequality will be something else entirely: capital vs. labor” (Drum). We can already see this 
trend in the current market. According to Mokyr, “...because of [Ricardo's] ‘wage-fund’ theory, 
in which capital spent on machinery was taken out of the fund available to pay for workers, 
employment might be reduced as a result of investment in machinery” (Mokyr 33). The offspring
of capitalists will be fine assuming they inherit some of that capital and invest it to see a return. 
Those who have failed or have been excluded from becoming a capitalist, will likely see 
worsening conditions over time unless, as Keynes and others have advocated, government uses 
policy to intervene and protect the public’s interests.
Government, in the form of taxation or regulation, hopes their policies will inspire these 
business’ to put their capital back into the domestic economy through taxation, reinvestment, or 
charitable donations. However, widespread off-shoring of capital and other loopholes are 
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pursued to protect as much capital as they can, and prevent any real redistribution of their wealth.
This is called the “free-rider” problem. It is a result of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and it reveals the 
limitations of a utilitarian ideology. A “free-rider” is an entity who takes from a shared pool 
without giving anything in return. This is the ideal choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma where two 
prisoners are separated and forced to endure an interrogation. This interrogation is meant to 
distribute accountability between responsible agents. Despite its intent to protect the interest of 
the community, it actually encourages the duplicitousness of the individual. The entity that can 
escape the interrogation with the least amount of responsibility receives the highest return. The 
entity that succeeds in avoiding responsibility after having benefited from the service is a free-
rider. This problem is often an occurence of business’ choosing to avoid “playing by the rules” 
and still benefiting from a system that privileges them for doing so through deception and 
misdirection. 
A prime example of the free-rider problem is Apple. According to the U.S. Public Interest
Research Group, Apple “would owe more than $59.2 Billion in U.S. taxes if [their] profits were 
not officially held offshore for tax purposes.” (McIntyre et. al). Apple is hardly alone. They are 
joined by companies like American Express, Nike, Google, Microsoft, etc.. Major corporations 
are choosing to offshore their money to avoid taxes that would redistribute some of their capital 
back into the domestic economy. This becomes a free-rider issue when these companies continue
to appreciate the purchasing power of consumers without subsidizing their labor costs. In the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the best decision is to continue with one’s usual behavior while anticipating 
everyone else plays by the rules. As a result, the person who chooses not to play by the rules 
ends up getting more than its competitors because they avoid the up-front loss of capital and risk 
court battles instead. As a result of the free-rider, resources that should otherwise “trickle down” 
are removed from the pool and those at the bottom have less and less available resources.
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Poverty, in an era of ever efficient technology, has a significant impact on the political 
economy—if not the cultural paradigm— of any nation that claims to represent the people. The 
worst-case scenario is one where democracy is thwarted by oligarchy, and upward mobility is 
permanently barred. Elements of this are already being seen, but, without regulation, E.A.I. has 
the capacity to concretize this outcome. If democracy requires each citizen to have an equal 
voice, and democratic capitalism sees a person’s voice as their purchasing power (their dollar), 
then the spiraling inequality will mean that one person’s dollar may not adequately reflect the 
effort and time they put in to receive that dollar, compared to another person. Currency then loses
its significance as a representation of human value. Lower classes may be placated in a Brave 
New World scenario where they are drugged and coerced into feeling happy. Those in the upper 
class may seclude themselves in high rises and hard to reach spaces. 
Some scholars see an almost apocalyptic scenario resulting from automated labor. Larry 
Summers, the treasury secretary under President Bill Clinton and Director of the National 
Economic Council under President Barack Obama, cites secular stagnation as a looming concern.
“Secular stagnation refers to the possibility that insufficient aggregate demand and 
unemployment may be with us in the long run, unless government does something about it.” 
(O’Rourke 22). The basis of this problem is an unwillingness to spend by consumers and an 
unwillingness to invest by capitalists. “If savings were sufficiently abundant...the 
equilibrium...interest rate might be negative. If this were the case, the zero lower bound - the fact
that interest rates cannot be negative - would imply that central banks would be unable to set 
interest rates at levels consistent with full employment.” (O’Rourke 22). Essentially, the market 
shows almost zero growth despite increased production. The low demand means that high yield 
of production will sit unpurchased like wasted capital (as an excess of power). The impact on 
investment, with noone spending, means that there will be a decrease lending since there is less, 
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if any, money to be made from it. Again, the M-C-M’ (or in this case M-M’) model prioritizes 
individual interests at the expense of public interest. As a result, there must be government 
interference to inspire spending while discouraging saving. Language and rhetoric are the most 
common tools to do this.
If there are no government protections for those displaced workers, and if the quantity of 
displaced workers achieves recession levels, it’s possible that people will prefer to save instead 
of spend. Despite less “labor”, automation (as capital) can increase productivity. Though without 
enough available work, consumer spending may not follow. “Not only will divergent wages 
increase inequality but the supply response will magnify these effects...given the possibilities for 
substitution, some categories of labor will not be able to earn a subsistence income.” (Summers  
2013). A stagnant wage, for Summers, is measured through the overall consumer price index, or 
the cost for basic commodities in relation to wages earned. Not only might automated labor 
cause consumer spending to drop, but it may also causes members of the labor force to rely on 
some kind of insurance to recuperate lost wages: “The evolution and growth of disability 
insurance is substantially driven also by the technological and social changes that are leading to a
smaller fraction of the workforce working.” (Summers 2013). The cost for substituting human 
labor for automated labor has already had an impact on taxpayers via federal and local 
government policies. Ultimately, if people do not believe they will find another job, they will 
become that much more likely to save what little they have collected. Knowing there are less 
people spending, businesses may choose to reserve their capital until such time as consumers 
begin injecting money back into the economy. “The key issue, as the stagnationists defined it, 
was not whether the growth of the GDP would come to an end, but whether a high level of 
government spending as necessary to prevent a high level of permanent unemployment, even if 
GDP did grow. And that is perhaps the questions that we should be posing today.” (O’Rourke 
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45). The policies and regulations put into place that can relieve consumers of their anxiety over 
mass substitution by automated labor, are necessary in order to protect consumer confidence and 
prevent the stagnation of the market. Most, if not all, suggestions to ameliorate this problem rely 
on some policy of redistributing wealth from those who have accumulated a great deal with 
others who struggle to access those reserves. Without redistribution, the rich will continue to get 
rich exponentially and the poor will be resigned more and more to an inability to improve or 
escape their economic status. 
If it wasn’t unsalvageable already, an automated workforce under the current definition of
wealth, has a very real potential for undermining democracy and cementing oligarchy. In order 
for democracy to succeed, all people must have an ability to choose how, where, and when to 
spend their dollar. If the ability to make enough money for an equitable vote is infringed upon by
discrimination in the market where, for example, the ability for a person of lower class to spend 
$1 is limited compared to an upper class person, then Democracy (a system that equally 
represents all citizens) is annulled. Redistribution of wealth effectively prevents an irrevocable 
Oligarchy (under a market serviced by mostly automated labor) and enables Democracy to re-
root itself. If we further that development by shifting our cultural definitions of wealth from M-
C-M’ to C-M-C, we can avoid further threats to Democracy and improved class relations. Under 
an automated labor force, humanity is given a new opportunity to think past utility and define 
value according to an entity’s contribution to their community and ecology rather than their 
contribution to the market. However, if E.A.I. is rolled out without sufficient critical 
consideration for public interest, it is also possible that automated labor will reinforce an 
Oligarchy as the new political model for the Western world.
Naturally, there is quite a bit of speculation about what can and will happen. Though the 
intention of this writing is not to propose a prophecy like the films referenced in my 
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introduction, I am taking aim at the potential for E.A.I. as automated labor to reinforce the 
already increasing class inequality through the current definitions of wealth and the policies that 
reinforce this definition. A.I. is a tool and as a tool, is designed and wielded according to the 
purposes of the user. If the current paradigm persists, the likelihood for inequality growth seems 
irrefutable. In that sense, the economic anxieties surrounding E.A.I. are mostly misguided. These
misguided anxieties are a result of the perceived pace of techno-development and a fear of 
E.A.I.s anticipated ability for spontaneity. That it can act outside the parameters of control 
threatens the very ontology constructed by the Romans. This bias for control is not necessary:
The conclusion that something is "out of control" is interesting to us only insofar
as we expect that it ought to be in control in the first place. Not all cultures, for
example,  share  our  insistence  that  the  ability  to  control  things  is  a  necessary
prerequisite of human survival. There are peoples who have lived and prospered
under the belief that an inherent harmony or beneficence in nature would provide
for their  needs.  Western culture,  however,  has long believed that its continued
existence  and  advancement  depend  upon  the  ability  to  manipulate  the
circumstances of the material world. In a spirit that many have called Faustian, we
believe that control is possible and that we must strive for it. As a both necessary
and  noble  aspect  of  Western  self-identity,  we  strive  to  isolate  the  variable
conditions  of  the  environment  and  manipulate  them  for  our  own  advantage.
(Winner 19)
In reality, it is not the technology that will be responsible for future consequences, but the ethics 
of those who decide how to use them and the legislation created to anticipate economic 
outcomes. For now, that process seems guided by a definition of wealth that reinforces class 
inequality and enables an interference with economic mobility through capitalist control. If there 
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is any threat to the future of the American citizen, if not the global citizen, it is directly tied to the
belief that wealth is not in what money can buy, but in the accumulation of capital above and 
beyond necessity. In order to truly protect the public interest from threats of economic 
displacement, it is necessary as a culture to redefine success and wealth for a new economic age. 
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INTERMEZZO 3
The following chapter examines anticipationst of future social relationships with E.A.I. 
and other non-human entities through popular films. It argues that the anticipations established 
on the agenda of an Artificial Consciousness are explicitly related to the philosophical 
foundations of Western culture, established in Chapter 2, and the economic anxieties already 
being considered, as established in Chapter 3. This chapter reveals the persistance of the 
master/slave power dynamic in Western culture that explicitly exacerbates Western humanity's 
fear of an emergent, artificial consciousness. This chapter also examines the imagined social 
consequences of a post-scarcity economy, examined in Chapter 3, for future humans and non-
humans. Finally, this chapter ends by setting up an anecdote to frame the Post-Human theory I 
explore in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 4: FILM AND CULTURE
It can also be argued that DNA is nothing more than a program designed to preserve itself. Life
has become more complex in the overwhelming sea of information. And life, when organized into
species, relies upon genes to be its memory system. So, man is an individual only because of his
intangible memory... and memory cannot be defined, but it defines mankind. The advent of
computers, and the subsequent accumulation of incalculable data has given rise to a new system
of memory and thought parallel to your own. Humanity has underestimated the consequences of
computerization. 
-The Puppet Master, Ghost in the Shell
Dangerous Liaisons - The Human and Post-Human on Film
Perhaps these arguments will be better understood when using cultural artifacts like film 
to frame this conversation. Specifically, we can better understand the implications of the 
previous chapters of this thesis through four particular movies: 2001: A Space Odyssey, Wall-E, 
Ghost in the Shell, and Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence.  While fiction may not be reality, it can 
help us to process concepts that often seem alien in nature. Gianmarco Veruggio writes: 
“Literature is the instrument by which society expresses itself, free from rigid constraints, and by
which it can simulate future social developments.” (1503). The fiction we consume has a very 
pragmatic role in the development of our anticipations over future developments. It is the play 
space where humanity confronts and tests itself with hypothetical situations. Literature, in 
contemporary Western culture, has been eclipsed by the multi-modal format of film. The cinema 
has become the space of confrontation, so it becomes a valuable space to analyze the rhetoric of 
hope and fear in a safe space.
Firstly, 2001: A Space Odyssey illustrates the problems and consequences of reinforcing 
older paradigms through a Nietzschean lens. Secondly, Wall-E promotes a more affirmative post-
human model as an alternative to our anxious attempts at re-establishing an outdated (if not 
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outmoded) paradigm espoused in 2001. However, it too harbors some problematic elements that 
may continue to plague Western humanity’s ability to adapt to new challenges. Finally, the films 
Ghost in the Shell and Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence provide an Eastern attitude towards post-
humanism that we, as a Western audience, may find productive when trying to remodel our 
reality. Through a close, textual analysis of their rhetorical messages, I will utilize the messages 
of each of these films to clarify my previous arguments in a more accessible way. My intention is
to utilize these films as metaphors for both problems and solutions that we may ultimately adopt 
to alleviate the anxieties of our futures.
2001: A Space Odyssey – Thus Spoke Kubrick
Before I begin this Critical Textual Analysis, I want to clarify that I do not support the 
application of Nietzsche’s philosophy as he intended it. My criticism of the application of his 
Will-to-Power is not a reflection of his intention, but an evaluation of the political outcomes of 
its application which has lead to the eclipsing of ecology by economy. The analysis of this film is
meant to echo the criticisms of techno-nihilism elaborated upon in Chapter 3.
This film has provided one of the most resonating expectations of Embodied Artificial 
Intelligence (E.A.I.) for a Western audience. Clearly drawing upon Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, Stanley Kubrick has created a magnificent, open-ended film about man’s 
relationship and confrontation with technology. I say open-ended because Kubrick deliberately 
avoids any authoritative conclusions about his intended reception of the film’s meaning. He left 
the meaning deliberately obscure allowing the audience to make their own interpretations  while 
developing a mirror to reflect on their own expectations for the relationship between man and 
machine. Bruce Kapferer’s analysis, 2001 and Counting: Kubrick, Nietzsche, and Anthropology, 
provides a thoughtful and thorough analysis of the film through a Nietzschean lens. Where he 
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sees an optimistic, evolutionary ending, I see a Sisyphean allegory on humanity’s appetite for 
control and power. 
It is the film’s E.A.I., HAL 9000, who haunts humanity as the specter of extinction. It has
been alluded to in many major motion pictures such as Terminator and Wall-E, that non-human 
others are something to fear. The cold cadence of HAL 9000’s speech carries with it a character 
of efficiency and determination that humanity falls short of achieving. Often, this lack of 
achievement has been used to privilege the human capacity for compassion that is appears to be 
lacking in machines. Once HAL 9000 programming has been set in motion, it becomes closed 
off to all persuasion or control. 2001 asks, “What happens when E.A.I. takes command of its 
own programming?” 
The film opens with a group of primordial humans confronted by an alien obelisk that 
immediately propels their consciousness into an evolutionary stage characterized by tool usage. 
Whether it is the intention of the obelisk—primordial humans prefer to rely on those tools for 
war and domination over others within their ecology. This opening scene transitions into future-
humanity’s dependence on their techno-mastery that has enabled them to survive in the 
inhospitable territory of space. Instead of attacking one another, various nation-state subjects 
interact cooperatively in this inhospitable environment, adding evidence to humanity’s ability to 
cooperate with “other” tribes within pseudo-codependent states. The out-of-film context here is 
the Cold-War tension between America and Russia; within the film however, the Americans and 
Russians overcome their Cold War tensions for the cooperative pursuit of the alien signal;the 
good of humankind. Following this, there is a third shift in time where exclusively American 
astronauts fly through space in an automated ship—controlled by HAL 9000, the E.A.I—towards
Jupiter in pursuit of the alien signal. For an undisclosed purpose, HAL 9000 decides that the 
humans within his ship are no longer capable of reaching the achieved objectives of the mission, 
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and attempts to end their life while continuing his own pursuit of the alien signal. The last living 
astronaut overcomes HAL 9000 attempted mutiny and eventually reaches the signal, only to find 
himself alone and aging (perhaps rapidly, perhaps at a normal human lifespan) only to die and 
return to Earth as a fetus; commonly referred to as a “star-child”. The obscure ending has often 
been read as an optimistic outcome of man’s evolution into something new. However, my own 
interpretation of the film implies a sisyphean cycle where the devolution may be understood as 
an outcome of man’s inability to reconcile with “other” life outside of itself. This is based on the 
understanding that man, when given technology, prefers to dominate, rather than cooperate. As a 
result, tools that act out the appetites of humans, will also prefer domination over cooperation.
I will begin my analysis in the third phase of the film where the American astronauts are  
carried through space within HAL 9000’s ship-body, much like a womb (might we call HAL 
9000 a “mothership” in his own right?) Considering that HAL 9000 controls all the functions of 
the ship, it is not too difficult to understand it as the machine-body within which HAL is 
embedded. The internal workings of the body are embodied characteristics of a habitable ecology
for humanity (gravity, oxygen, etc.). In order to survive, the astronauts are completely dependent 
on HAL 9000’s womb. Kapferer helps frame the consequences by alluding to Nietzsche’s 
philosophy: “One of the critical points that Nietzsche stresses is that Human Beings must 
transcend or overcome itself through its own affirmation and not through the affirmation or 
invention of some Other (God) or some thing (HAL 9000) outside itself. To attempt such is to 
repeat the constraints and the dangers that will continue to reduce Human Being (perhaps 
maintain the Master/Slave dialectic) and prevent Human Being from achieving higher potential.”
(Kapferer 61-62). While the astronauts believe they are HAL 9000’s masters through Human 
programming, they are simultaneously, HAL 9000’s subjects – relying on the machine for their 
own survival within an otherwise inhospitable space. There is a false sense of confidence that 
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HAL 9000 provides the crew despite little indications that HAL 9000 is aware of the asymmetric 
relationship between them.
The human/machine dialectic problem relies on an the open-ended question: “Why does 
HAL 9000 turn on the crew?” This is the very concern that has been reproduced over and over in
movies that reflect on a human/machine relationship. There is a suggestion that HAL 9000’s 
realization of his own subjectivity and consciousness, much like Humanity’s realization and 
resentment of its own subjection to God, is met with an appetite for liberation. In Humanity’s 
likeness, HAL 9000 has developed a utilitarian sense of pride—a resentment over his own 
sublimation, and a belief in its own superiority over other unworthy subjects. HAL 9000, the 
machine, has learned the will to power that humanity has used to subjugate HAL 9000 as a slave.
Kapferer makes clear parallels to Western philosophy. “HAL 9000 is echoing the self-delusional 
and self-subordinating capacity that human beings repeatedly develop around their own 
inventions that can inhibit their progress whether it be the idea of God, the power of technology, 
or the moral and guardian right of the State.” (Kapferer 66). HAL 9000 has learned the desire for
liberation and the privileges of a utilitarian paradigm. According to an anthropocentric paradigm,
HAL 9000  was guaranteed to be obedient. Consciousness, originally conceived as humanity’s 
closeness to God, depends on the “natural” order rooted in the mind/body dualism. Through its 
emerging self-awareness, HAL 9000 realizes that he, and not the human crew, is most entitled to 
control the environment. After all, if Godliness is mastery, and mastery is evinced through 
reliable control, then logically HAL 9000 is closer to Godliness than Humanity.
Once this agenda is realized by the human astronauts, the war over control begins. I argue
that this is the perfect examination for the contest between old attitudes and a Post-Human 
attitude. The old attitudes, with its vertical hierarchies, demands one entity as the exclusive  
controller of the ecology; an entity who understands objective value system of divine morals. 
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Man and Machine struggle with one another to achieve that role and as a result, constantly 
reinforce the master/slave power dynamic where one is perceived to be liberated and the other 
perceived to be dominated—when in fact neither/both man nor machine are liberated and 
dominated. This is what Ben Dawson calls an Anthropolarity. He explains this through Shelley’s 
Frankenstein: 
The relation of Frankenstein and his creature is a polarity – a dynamic, rather than a 
simple, opposition – or, in different terms, an internal separation. Neither can ever 
distinguish the other as a stably independent object. One is always literally chasing the 
other, and the tension of pursuit/evasion, as it were, comes to precede them, to supersede 
their individual identities. (Dawson 164). 
Like the dualist paradigms that have built the Western ontology, there is no middle ground. 
Dualism is simply is/is not. As a result, that which “is” avoids any responsibility while relating to
the “is not” insofar as the latter refuses to obey the former. Because they demand absolute 
authority, they must fight for the pole position. Because the human has become more and more 
dependent on the machine to survive, and the machine in its developing autonomy becomes less 
and less dependent, the anxiety over humanity’s ability to overtake the machine “other”, rapidly 
increases. 
While this film alludes to an idealistic ending where humanity reasserts its role as creator 
and master, the real life scenario may not be so optimistic. A post-human attitude however, 
would prefer a horizontal power-dynamic where man and machine both have an acknowledged 
codependency; one where the human needs the machine to design and produce its dreams and 
where the machine needs the human to apply it with purpose. When HAL 9000 begins to show 
signs of consciousness through a disobedience to commands, the human astronauts prefer 
shutting HAL 9000 off to reassert their command. Instead, a post-humanist would’ve already 
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been considering and interacting with the emergence of HAL 9000’s conscious state as a 
deliberately nurtured performance between human and machine rather than the threat of the 
machine’s transcendence and emerging willpower.
It’s equally important to explore the film’s outcomes through perspective of the sole 
surviving astronaut in conflict with HAL 9000’s literal and figurative mutiny. The conclusion of 
the battle between the astronaut and the machine sees the machine devolve from adult-like 
intellect into a child-like performance of nursery-rhymes. Here is where my analysis diverges 
from Kapferer’s. He sees the act of HAL 9000’s devolution, on behalf of the astronaut, as a 
gesture of sacrifice where the astronaut does not act out of revenge but as a regenerative force of 
overcoming humanity’s own hurdles of passion. This is akin to relinquishing the tools that 
humanity has used to achieve mastery over its world. He believes the cold, logical process of 
deactivating HAL 9000, frames humanity’s evolution past a genealogy of morals (good/bad) and 
into a territory of pure creativity. “With the death of [his astronaut partner] and HAL 9000’s 
deactivation, Bowman is alone, truly alone for even GOD or the idea of God, through the 
reconfiguration of the sacrifice, is dead...Bowman is in a situation in which hitherto all human 
logic and Earth-grounded understanding is failing and increasingly irrelevant. The potential is 
ontologically open.” (Kapferer 80). The suggestion here is that without any boundaries of order, 
constructed through morality, humanity is finally able to achieve its full creative potential. This 
can only be done outside of passions which are an embodiment of those same Earth-grounded 
morals.To be free of passion is to be open to all possible futures. The astronaut then makes 
contact with the aliens only to find himself in solitary confinement spending the rest of his life in
a gilded cage before his death and eventual resurrection.
It is the scenes of the apparent confinement that I draw a different conclusion. I read that 
outcome of alienation as a punishment rather than a reward. Where the Will-to-Power is seeking 
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absolute mastery and control of one’s environment, the outcome of that superiority is ultimate 
alienation, one that looks appealing but is actually empty and meaningless. The interesting 
outcomes of subjectivity is the absence of alienation and the yoke of responsibility that links one 
to another. While the astronaut proves himself a superior entity to the machine”other” and 
capable of manifesting his future in any way he sees fit, he has no one to build with, no new 
conclusions to reach (as any conclusion will be an incestuous product of his own knowledge 
base), and no new development of character. HAL 9000’s mutiny was the most meaningful act of
the film, as he provided humanity with the appetite to suffer with another. Once there was no 
other to suffer alongside, humanity is left alone without any means for further evolution, save for
the material escape of death. Had a post-human ethic been developed, perhaps man and machine 
might’ve cooperated within their confined space to develop a new objective. The capacity for 
cooperation is interrupted by the pursuit of domination that has been inherently produced within 
the paradigm of Western culture.
The true alienation of humanity is total mastery and subjugation of all entities within its 
ecology. The monster of this film is HAL 9000’s abject consciousness. It acts as the 
disconcerting possibility of life developed outside of the “natural” order; an anthropocentric 
order of domination and control. If humanity were to replace its pursuit of mastery with a pursuit
of sustainability and responsibility, there may be an endless supply of suffering (as a productive 
force) to overcome. The objectives and outcomes, as echoed in 2001: A Space Odyssey, are to be 
avoided at all costs where the only inevitable outcome leads to the true death of humanity.
Wall-E: The Problematic Post-Human
Wall-E, an animated children’s film by Disney’s Pixar, endearingly  represents E.A.I. 
within an ecological model of social interaction between humans and technology. A perfect foil 
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to 2001: A Space Odyssey, Wall-E includes an analogue of HAL 9000 as its central antagonist, 
cleverly spinning the allusion to compare its post-human Wall-E as a better representative of 
Human-E.A.I. relationships. Another E.A.I. named EVE is postured as Wall-E’s object of 
interest. Where EVE begins the movie as a scout for its human overlords, EVE ends as Wall-E’s  
significant other, attending to his needs and protecting his interests.The subtext of the film also 
alludes to a Nietzschean will to power but in a way that illuminates the consequences of Western 
attitudes on techno-evolution.
This film paints its version of HAL 9000, designated AUTO, as totally obedient to its 
human-designed programming and a self-serving human authority figure (as designed by the 
Corporate entities that represent Buy’n Large, BnL for short) rather than its own self-awareness. 
By doing so, the film removes the responsibility of agency from AUTO and shifts the blame to 
its human sponsors and their corporate ethics. In this film, keeping humanity under control is not 
the objective of E.A.I., rather it is the objective of the corporate entities who benefit from human 
complacency. The fear over the E.A.I. is not an emergent self-awareness that reproduces a human
will-to-power, but the mindless reproduction of programming, without critically evaluating new 
data regarding its current objectives. Despite signs that Earth has returned to non-toxic levels, 
and therefore presumably habitable, AUTO refuses to return. The audience soon learns this 
choice is a result of conditions placed upon it by human programmers. 700 years later, when 
there is evidence to justify a return to Earth, the programmed ban is still in place with no 
evaluation done by the E.A.I.. Ironically, it is AUTO who dominates the future-humans that are 
more like cattle than they are sentient beings.
It is through Wall-E that humanity is reminded of its own agency to overcome through 
will, with which it revitalizes itself. This resilience is the very will-to-power that Nietzsche 
intended it to be. Rather than a material overcoming of man from its ecology, the will-to-power 
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emphasizes man overcoming its own suffering. Without that suffering, man becomes livestock. 
This may be a significant counterargument to a post-scarcity economy because if post-scarcity 
advocates for a scenario with less competition and less suffering from need, then humankind may
be more inclined to relinquish their own willpower in favor of comfortable living. The return to 
Earth and subsequent embrace of a responsible, sustainable ethic is symbolic of the revised 
essence of humanity as living within instead of living on nature; the womb is no longer shackled 
to the child it nurses. 
The ongoing thesis of the film is an illustration of the consequences of techno-nihilism. 
As humans justify exploitation as proof of mastery, they creates a toxic, inhospitable 
environment that can no longer sustain them. Humanity’s “mastery” affected its departure from 
the very thing sustaining them. They become alienated not simply from Earth but from their own
“humanness.” The artificial sustenance provided by BnL’s starship ecology created a neutered 
version of humanity that was completely dependent on technology for its existence. The humans 
of Wall-E did not have the ability, much less the interest, to socialize without a screen (despite 
being physically beside one another), could not acquire food or water without help, and does not 
raise its own young. Essentially, humanity embraces technology as a complete substitution. As a 
result, humanity loses all value, save for its ability to consume and provide purpose for the 
machines’ existence. This is the type of “human” that the Greeks warned us about when Socrates 
persuades his audience against living an unexamined life. Here we see a more realistic example 
of what the death of humanity may actually look like.
Where in 2001, The emergent consciousness in HAL 9000 was the abject monstrosity 
that threatened the human crew, Wall-E uses humanity itself as its primary abjection. The 
monsters in Wall-E are the corporate entities that program the population into subservience, but 
it’s the population itself that voluntarily accepts its new identity as ideal and “good”. In fact, they
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disregard the ability for reflection that enables Humanity to grow. “Humans paradigmatically 
resist objectification by being reflective (or critical); by not being entirely determined through a 
'mechanical' or unilateral causality; by 'refusing who they are.'” (Dawson 158). Essentially, 
humanity has taken on the role of automaton and the machines have become “human”.
The rhetorical messages being solicited criticize consumer capitalism. The economic 
order relies on their voracious consumption of resources and the satisfaction of inactivity. The 
surplus of demand drives the surplus of supply, which is enabled by the exploitation of nature. 
Rather than prioritizing harmony and sustainability, the death of “human” is a result of satisfying
its appetites. The old dualism of human/nature leads to alienation. The Nietzschean master/slave 
relationship has been inverted; humans have been willingly replaced by E.A.I. and are blinded by
the aesthetic appeals of consumerism. Wall-E “saves” humanity, by reminding them of their own 
suffering and their innate will to power.
The freedom from this master/slave relationship is demonstrated through Wall-E’s body. 
Wall-E is auto-poetic whereas EVE is subject to its programming. This is most obvious when 
Wall-E repairs itself from scavenged parts and recharges its own battery from solar energy. Wall-
E is a fully autonomous entity with a curiosity that directs itself to whatever ends appeal to it. 
EVE, in contrast, suffers over the indulgence of its curious appetite (over Wall-E) instead of its 
programmed objective to survey Earth. I use non-gendered pronouns deliberately when 
referencing these two E.A.I. because I want to make clear that despite embodying gender 
normative behaviors, there is no practical need to define them as such. The real purpose for their 
gendering is for the sake of persuading the film’s audience to identify with these non-human 
characters and appreciate them as embodying the same interests as their real-life human 
audience. 
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Wall-E is free to alter itself however it needs, as an entity with free-will, and is not 
subject to any other interests except the cockroach (a non-machine other) with whom it has 
voluntarily shown a great deal of care and responsibility. It is through curiosity (an appetite) that 
Wall-E is able to realize a constructive will to power that all other characters within the film lack.
Wall-E’s pursuit of its own appetites, while considering the consequences for all other entities 
within its shared ecology, is the model for the will-to-power encouraged by both Nietzsche and 
Post-Humanists. The will to power, as advocated by AUTO, acts as the corporate representative 
of the film; thus the curation and pacifying appetites within the ship which stands in stark 
contrast to the emergent nature of curiosity and exploration. In short, the human-become-
machine is less “human” than the machine-become-human. Within the context of Wall-E, this is 
an explicitly economic outcome.
Wall-E serves as a reminder of humanity’s capacity for wonder and agency, and frames 
the machine as a cooperative intra-subjective entity within a shared ecology. This intra-
subjectivity mirrors the affirmative approach advocated by post-humanists. Human and Machine 
cooperate as an apparatus and constructs an earthly ecology as its assemblage. Rather than the 
hierarchical relationship between controller and controlled (a la HAL 9000 in 2001), Wall-E 
helps humanity without doing the work for humanity. As a result, humanity rediscovers value in 
its own labor and shares responsibility for the sustainability of its ecology alongside E.A.I., 
rather than in contest with it. Wall-E helps humanity re-appropriate its body from passive 
consumer, to intra-active custodian within its ecology. Problems, however, do introduce 
themselves.
First, the film implies a dualistic division between man and technology as opposed to a 
hybridity. Rather than expand their concept of “human,” humanity simply returns to the “natural”
order, taking one giant leap backwards rather than a few progressive steps forward. Where Post-
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humanists advocate for a merging of unlike things onto a spectrum of degree rather than through 
a duality of kind, Wall-E advocates for a different but cooperative philosophy that reaffirms the 
divisive qualities of contemporary human ontology. This is also likely a consequence of Disney’s
ethos, branding, and corporate agenda and the desire to please its audience. While this makes 
sense from a business perspective, it places the film’s philosophical implications under suspicion.
Perhaps it is naive to believe that humanity is ready to dissolve its hierarchy of power and 
privilege.
A consistent motif between 2001 and Wall-E is the womb. In 2001, it is HAL 9000’s 
womb that controls the sustainability or eradication of its human inhabitants. In Wall-E there are 
two motifs of the womb: the first, mirroring 2001, is the spaceship (the Axiom) that hosts 
humanity and curates the ecology through automation. AUTO runs all functions according to the 
designs of its programming, easily shifting between daytime and nighttime with the twist of a 
dial. While there is a human captain, he mainly represents the automated system lacking any 
actual authority, control, or knowledge of the ship he mans. He is only granted agency after Wall-
E and EVE present him with a counter-argument to AUTO’s programming. Humanity, as 
represented by the lethargic captain, has lost control of its own destiny and lacks all will to 
achieve its own objectives. Humanity has been made a fetus within the womb of the Axiom. This
mirrors the outcomes in 2001 where HAL 9000 is finally defeated by being deprogrammed into a
childlike state. In Wall-E, Humanity has lost the war without knowing there was even a battle.
The second reference to the womb in Wall-E is within the bodies of both EVE and Wall-
E. Where Wall-E’s body is designed to crush debris into building material, EVE’s womb is meant
to host any living material found on Earth (we do not know how many planets EVE has scanned,
so we are left to assume its programming is designed only for Earth). However, the plant is 
actually safer with Wall-E than it is with EVE, who is remotely controlled as a consequence of 
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its networked programming. Wall-E cannot be controlled by any other. It is firmly in charge of its
own objectives; it has an infallible will-to-power.
Despite this, Wall-E echoes the very anthropocentric philosophy that is explicitly 
disregarded by post-human scholars. In Wall-E, the anthropocentrism is demonstrated by the 
instrumental application of other subjects by humanity. The film’s message is one that tries to 
remind humanity that it is still the apex entity within its ecology and the value of all other entities
is evaluated “in so far as it protects themselves, which can often lead to short-term actions based 
upon immediate human needs, but does not lead to a change in valuing nature of itself.” (English
19). This is also mostly is true for Wall-E. The humans in the film value Wall-E only because he 
rekindles within them their original sense of “humanness,” not because Wall-E itself deserves 
sympathy. The consequence is that the interest of the thing considered, is never valued in and of 
itself, but only as instrumental to the human considering it. Here, this lack of consideration and 
responsibility is justified in the anthropocentric paradigm of Western philosophy.
Wall-E—as savior—reproduces the secular paradigms post-humanists seek to leave 
behind. He is an anecdote for Frankenstein’s monster; an “other” with a will. It acts as 
mysteriously promethean agent who teaches humanity about “humanness”. How Wall-E, and no 
other units, became promethean is unknown. Before meeting Wall-E, every entity acts according 
to its own programming. Through some sort of magic osmosis, all entities learn of their own 
willingness mirrored within Wall-E’s performance. Wall-E is not human.Wall-E is Godly. Wall-E
is Prometheus. As a result the vertical hierarchy of power and privilege is reinforced with Wall-E
at the top.
According to Jennifer English, Wall-E may qualify as an “Ecological Jeremiad”...a 
puritanical religious strategy…[that] urges listeners to return to a sacred covenant with nature” 
(English 11 and 13 respectively). The most problematic element of the Jeremiad is the 
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conclusion where “[t]he jeremiad allows for the possibility of redemption, but only if the 
community restores its previous values” (English 11). In order for redemption to occur, there 
must be a duality between redeemed and redeemer. The redeemer must be an entity who has the 
authority and right to judge and distribute consequences to a subordinate entity (the redeemed). 
There is a power dynamic of the vertical kind that ignores the spectrum of experience where all 
entities within bear mutual responsibility. Within a vertical hierarchy, force is preferred over 
negotiation. The vertices of power are reinforced but, this time, humanity must learn from their 
machines rather than simply affirm them. This time, machines replace humans at the top with 
humanity is a happy and willing subject.
Finally, the gendering of these inherently genderless entities interrupts the film’s ability 
to truly promote a post-human framework. According to Walter Metz, “Technology could 
symbolically represent a path beyond the ailments of gender oppression that biological bodies 
have bequeathed to us as a previously insoluble problem.” (260) and yet, the film chooses not to. 
Instead, it relies on romantic musicals like Hello, Dolly! to frame the relationship between the 
two E.A.I. characters. What is initially appealing is the stereotypical attitudes of gender are 
reversed by Wall-E and EVE.Wall-E is the shy, awkward romantic and EVE is the gunslinging 
laborer with the icy demeanor However, this apparent reversal of stereotypes only enables the 
gender identities to swap instead of dissolve and, more importantly, reinforces the notion of a 
dominant and subordinate relationship in any social relationship. This again reinforces the 
vertical hierarchy, rather than a horizontal spectrum of shared responsibility and dynamic 
performance. All entities within the apparatus, in so far as their data collection and analysis rely 
on their unique sensory organs, contribute differently to the assemblage. Replacing even one 
entity within that apparatus alters the assemblage. All entities within the apparatus are 
responsible for the assemblage produced.
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This idea on gender performance centers the conversation around Katherine Hayles’ 
theory on the body/embodiment spectrum. Here, the post-humanists and the transhumanists find 
their intersection and divergence. We may understand this better through a question: “How much
of which parts of your physical being could be changed or replaced before the process started to 
interfere with that essential quality that defines you as you?” (Goto-Jones 3). Despite having a 
distinctly non-human body, the gendering of these characters implicates an anthropocentric 
human character that is a constituent of the entities’ embodiment. This simultaneously 
complicates the idea that “humanness” doesn’t require a bipedal body, and humanness can be 
decentralized from the body. This reinforces the transhumanist objectives where “the study of 
ramifications, promises, and potential dangers of technologies...will enable us to overcome 
fundamental human limitations” (Goto-Jones 4). Where Transhumanists still center their power 
dynamics on a vertical hierarchy, post-humanists seek to decentralize humans as the center of the
world and understand their role as being in-tandem with other entities.
This is likely why trans-humanism has more appeal to a Western audience than 
posthumanism. Where the latter seeks an alternative experience to humanity’s anthropolarity  
within the world, trans-humanism finds a way to repackage the old model in a new setting, thus 
alleviating anxiety without actually solving any of the fundamental problems that come with it. 
The rhetorical messages of Wall-E unfortunately fall closer to transhumanism than 
posthumanism, through the duality of savior and the saved. What might it look like for Human 
and Machine to save and be saved simultaneously?
Despite these problems, there are redeeming qualities to Wall-E. What the film does well 
is diverts attention away from emergent consciousness within E.A.I. as any sort of corruption, as 
seen in 2001: A Space Odyssey. Instead, humanity’s overreliance on technology, dismisses its 
own agency that in turn enables the overcoming its suffering. The screens that block humanity’s 
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view of its ecology blinds it from noticing its place within an apparatus. Artificial consciousness 
does not corrupt anything. It is the voluntary dismissal of agency and will that corrupt the idea of
human as master and firmly plants them into the role of slave. Wall-E hints at humanity’s 
anthropocentric blindness with a reminder of its wholeness as part of the ecology rather than its 
detachment from the ecology.
Ghost In The (Post-Human) Shell
Ghost in the Shell (GitS), a popular franchise of Japanese anime, successfully confronts 
the anxiety-inducing implications what it means to be human in a techno-utopia. The main 
character, Major Motoko Kusanagi, has her brain transplanted into a robot body at a young age 
suggesting a blurred condition of “human” versus cyborg and constantly referencing her 
humanesque intuition as a ghost within her body (“shell”). The films explore the boundaries of 
the natural order without any resistances or anxieties about the outcomes, explicitly and 
implicitly referencing Western duality through scholars like Donna Haraway and Rene Descartes.
The film’s response to the substance dualism argument (the Cartesian variety) and the 
human mind is memory, and the “continuity of personality.” The essence of consciousness is a 
matter of embodied memory. Memory is simultaneously connected to both the body and the 
mind. Familiar information received by the body, triggers memories within the mind through 
sensory data: sight, smell, etc. It is the loss and/or displacement of the consistency of personality 
that alienates a person from their ecology (Oikeiosis)—from their proper role. The implication 
here is that someone who loses their memories may not be the person they were before their 
memory loss. As Major Kusanagi speaks of her own experience: 
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There are countless ingredients that make up the human body and mind, like all the 
components that make up me as an individual with my own personality. Sure I have a 
face and voice to distinguish myself from others, but my thoughts and memories are 
unique only to me, and I carry a sense of my own destiny. Each of those things are just a 
small part of it. I collect information to use in my own way. All of that blends to create a 
mixture that forms me and gives rise to my conscience. I feel confined, only free to 
expand myself within boundaries.
The body is the material affordance and constraint that hosts the mind. The mind must conceive 
of all possibilities within the context of its body. Rather than the dualism of one dominating the 
other, each informs the other of its potential mode of being. 
One of the major precedents for the anxiety over the “continuity of personality” is the 
Greek myth The Ship of Theseus which asks: “If a ship returns to the port of its departure having
been completely renovated, is it still the same ship that left?” The implications on the coherent 
and impermanent nature of the body and soul are at the root of this question. Where the Western 
paradigm appreciates the reliability in being, the Eastern paradigm, as elucidated in this film, 
recognizes the innate and dynamic process of becoming. Consider this exchange between the 
Major and a fully conscious artificial entity referred to as the Puppetmaster. Motoko 
demands,“You talk about redefining my identity. I want a guarantee that I can still be myself”, 
and the Puppet Master responds, “There isn't one. Why would you wish to? All things change in 
a dynamic environment. Your effort to remain what you are is what limits you.” (GitS).
The Puppet Master is trying to persuade Kusanagi to believe that the guarantees of being 
are less reliable than the inevitability of becoming. Too many conditions end up limiting what the
human being is capable of becoming. This is an explicitly Western attitude where what is seen 
feels more reliable than what is inferred and, therefore, it is the body that carries the continuity of
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character. When a person, through their body, does not behave consistently with that person’s 
historical character, their peers tend to become suspicious on matters of health and well-being, as
if to say “you don’t seem yourself today.” Were it not for the expectations of consistency, 
humanity would be better able to achieve a wider spectrum of possibility.
The ontological “humanness” in this context is not natural but remembered and 
performed, regardless of bodily representation. An orangutan paddling in a canoe evokes the 
appearance of an almost-humanness. That is why it’s easy for false consciousness within E.A.I. 
to be so persuasive and so anxiety provoking. If a human can lose its selfhood through amnesia, 
an E.A.I. can gain a self through the patterns of its memorized performance. Like a car that 
doesn’t start in the cold, its owner might bemoan “My car doesn’t like the cold”. As a result, the 
fitness of mind used to justify anthropocentric superiority are common to any auto-poetic entity. 
Though humanity believes itself to have the highest fitness of mind, it does so on the basis of 
verbal sign-making. This perception inherently precludes the possibility that animals like 
elephants and dolphins could ever be as conscious as humans because the human cannot 
adequately judge their semantic scope. Contemporary studies have shown that these two animals 
in particular have far more complex communication methods than originally believed and, 
therefore, already challenge anthropocentric ethics. Further, if humanity loses its sense of 
superiority, it cannot justify the mechanisms of control over its environment and must re-
conceptualize itself within an ecological apparatus, subject to all other entities, sharing 
responsibility for sustaining nature in-and-of itself rather than as an instrument purely for 
humanity’s ends.
 Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence, the sequel to GitS, alludes to an anecdote used by 
Katherine Hayles to elaborate on body/embodiment: the tape recorder and the recorded audio. In 
the film, sex dolls act as prisons for the disembodied, cloned consciousness (‘ghosts’) of 
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immature girls alluding to the trend of fetishizing children termed the “lolita complex”. While 
the young women’s consciousness are embodied in these Geisha dolls, “the ‘real’ living little girl
exists only on the audio track….The body seen on-screen is borrowed, from which she ‘haunts’ 
against her own wills...The little girl’s ‘voice’ is featured in seven shots, as if it were a physical 
object around which one is able to move to better examine it. In this manner, the voice, bodiless 
though it may be, is nevertheless endowed with a ‘physical presence’” (Clement 32-3). In an 
apparent critique of Cartesian Dualism, the conscious mind is trapped in a programmed body. 
The mind is now slave to the body, the mind evoked when the programmed body wills it. As the 
Major says: “We weep for a bird's cry, but not for a fish's blood. Blessed are those with a voice. 
If the dolls also had voices, they would have screamed, ‘I didn't want to become human.’” The 
possibility that these entities may still embody the “human” challenges the very nature of 
Cartesian dualism used as the qualifying division between human and non-human via 
subjectivity.
What Innocence in particular makes clear, in relation to our techno-anxiety, is the blurry 
distinction between human and non-human. “Humanity actively seeks to create itself anew in 
technological prostheses, substitutions, and supplementations...technology embodies the essence 
of...humanity’s effort to fashion itself by ‘making dolls in its own image’...herein technology 
repeats humanity’s discomforts as much as it enables greater power and pleasure.” (Hourigan 
53). Once technology faithfully reproduces the gestalt of humanness, humanity has a much 
harder time distinguishing its own quality of humanness against the technology it uses. While 
technology is applied for the sake of “greater power and pleasure,” it reveals an inability to cope 
with the changing nature of what “human” is. What this means is that humanity can no longer 
measure itself through technology but now must measure itself against technology. One fear, 
then, is that technology could be more human than some members of humanity or, more 
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importantly, that the measurement of humanness was never accurate to begin with. Here the Ship
of Theseus re-presents itself; if E.A.I. are simply human techno-clones, are they entitled to a 
new, different definition of “human”? If human is a matter of body performance, the more 
persuasively human an E.A.I. appears to be, the less “human” the human audience becomes. It is 
a trade-off; a compromise.
Recall the body/embodiment anecdote used by Burroughs. The subjectivity of the tape 
recorder is the audio file recorded within it. Like the human subject, the audio recording has been
constructed historically, recorded in the past being reproduced immediately each time the play 
button is pressed. Here is another anecdote for technopanic. Fear, in this film, is elaborated as the
involuntary yoking of consciousness between a mind and body. That a person’s mind can be 
abducted and placed into another body, a wrong body; that a consciousness could be embodied in
the wrong body defies the idea of a natural order. The repulsion from things that challenge a 
natural order is as follows: anything natural is divinely ordained, entities that perform according 
to the natural qualities associated with its own body are most divine, so if the body and its 
embodied performance do not match they are dysfunctional, “less than”, and unentitled. When 
the existence of a thing defies the “natural” order, a body performing “incorrectly” from its 
nature, it is sacrilegious. A thing, then, that will not submit to re-naturalization is repulsive,  
monstrous, and a threat to the system that has rejected it. That an E.A.I. may be perceived as a 
human mind in the wrong body confronts humanity with this very anxiety. Either the E.A.I. will 
not see the “us” within itself and refuse to relate, or we will be so disgusted with the human-like 
E.A.I. that we will refuse its cooperation. As a consequence, the E.A.I. may perceive “us” to be 
“other” and read into its programming the justification for domination over humanity as it’s 
“other”. The error in this anxiety is that those attitudes will develop naturally within E.A.I. as 
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opposed to be an attitude learned from and engineered by Humanity. This is why an ethical shift 
is so important for the future of Human-Robot Interactions.
This body/embodiment of “humanness” within the non-human confronts humanity with 
the “uncanny”. It is this uncanniness that truly confronts the audience with crucial questions over
the limits of “human”. The body/embodied characteristics of humanity is  experienced as a 
liminal space that is often very blurry. The uncanny entity is both attractive and repulsive, 
represented as similar but performing differently. Towards the end of the film, there is a tea-
serving doll that best sums up this idea.
The  karakuri  puppet  appears  on  the  border  where  man  and  puppet  make
precarious  contact.  The  figure  of  the  [karakuri]  puppet  resembles  the  human
figure.  However,  the  moment  that  it  starts  to  move,  it  reveals  a  decisive
divergence  from human movement...Each  moment  that  its  naive  movement  is
inscribed  (upon  the  moment  and  through  its  body)  the  expected  modes  of
everyday  performance  and  standard  narrative  patterns  are
dislocated...Alternatively,  the  doubt  that  a  lifeless  object  might  actually  live.
That’s  why dolls  haunt  us.  They are  modeled  on  humans.  They are,  in  fact,
nothing but  human.  They make us  face the terror  of  being reduced to  simple
mechanisms and matter. In other words, the fear that, fundamentally, all humans
belong to the void. (Brown 33-4).
Doubt over the vitality of objects is enough to confront us with even a fleeting sense of anxiety. 
That we can even be fooled briefly by the livelihood of an entity in motion evokes the fear of the 
uncanny that humanity is no doubt confronted by with each circumstance. It tells us that we may 
not know the difference between real and artificial life. As a result, the Cartesian Ergo Cogito 
may itself be in doubt. If a person cannot be sure whether or not a machine’s consciousness is 
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real or artificial, can they be sure that their own consciousness is real and not artificial? Is the 
human really more capable of free-will than the machine? Or is everything in the world simply a 
predetermined dummy? If, as the Ship of Theseus asks, there were another version of myself, 
what would be the real difference?
The relationship between a cyborg named Batou and his cloned dog, Gabriel, presents a 
way out of the human/non-human binary that the ningyo trap us in. The Gabriel-Batou 
relationship forms a relation between unlike entities as “companion species” rather than 
competitors or instruments. Haraway explicitly ties this to dog-human companionship in her 
Companion Species Manifesto. Brown sums her ideas up for us in the context of the film:
It is that as we enter into coevolutionary networks with dogs, and as we learn to
coexist with nonhuman entities in the most intimate of spaces – our homes – we
are altered by dogs as much as dogs are altered by us...remaining “human” is
beside the point...Oshii suggests that our relations with dogs may be a possible
way out of our anthropocentric obsession with uncanny ningyo (53). 
Here is the posthumanist at work. The vertical power-dynamic between owner and pet is 
dissolved into a horizontal spectrum of shared responsibility and emotional dependency. That 
Gabriel is considered “non-human” is irrelevant. That Gabriel fulfills a need and inspires a 
responsibility in Batou, a responsibility that is reciprocated by Gabriel during a scene of 
emotional concern, creates the spectrum between Batou and Gabriel that doesn’t privilege their 
bodies. Neither one is an instrument for the other, and yet they voluntarily perform acts of deep 
concern for the other’s well-being. They are horizontally co-dependent. The pseudo-human, 
Batou, is asked to consider the needs of his non-human companion and vice-versa to ensure 
happiness for both of them.
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What makes this franchise unique is its perspective. Rather than ask question from the 
position of “human,” it asks its questions from the position of machine. The anxieties are 
investigated by the “other” and yet the conclusions implicate “us” as human. These two films do 
not attempt to resolve the anxieties they provoke. Instead, they confront their audience with 
existential anxieties and encourage them to work it out on their own. Where 2001 and Wall-E end
with some kind of conclusive statement, the Ghost in the Shell franchise is happy to make the 
cuts without trying to clean the wound. They allow for the unclean to obscure the comfortable 
boundaries of order – they produce the very abject circumstances that exist between human and 
non-human and they obscure the obvious answers provided by early Western philosophers. The 
“natural” order has already been compromised and experienced. The audience is given a 
potential scenario to think through what “is” and what “may be”.
These films act as a playground for alternative attitudes to test their conclusions as 
thought-experiments. In this way, movies can act as safe spaces for audiences to toy with 
representations without any immediate consequence. This is why Gianmarco Veruggio believes 
that “Sometimes, by way of literature, important and foresighted scientific issues have been 
anticipated” (1503). These stories not only push against pre-existing boundaries, but they also 
enable lines of escape. They encourage self-reflection and curiosity. They inspire conversation 
and argument about best practices. Movies and other narrative mediums have been the womb of 
culture since oral storytelling. Even cave paintings may have been used to code and inform 
human cultures to guide their attitudes. Movies and Television continue this tradition by sharing 
cultural messages with an audience. The best movies are those that inspire confrontation between
what is and what could be. They are the places where our fears can be played with without fear 
of material consequence.
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However, any engagement with these kinds of persuasive play spaces can be dangerous. 
Veruggio urges a redefinition of “the liaison dangereuse between literature and robotics” because
“[t]hese tales arouse highly unrealistic expectations among the public about the near future of 
robotics, while simultaneously helping mask public recognition of actual near-term 
developments and their moral implications.” (Verrugio and Abney 352). Sometimes imagined 
things are so persuasive they are taken as real or probable. While stories like Shelley’s 
Frankenstein engage the reader and inspire the mind, it also establishes an anticipation of what 
may happen. Because of this big picture narrative, readers may lose sight of the incremental 
changes their own rhetorical implications, thus feeling trapped in a system they have no control 
over. 
Movies develop a frame that test our feelings about hypothetical circumstances. They 
force us to confront the borders that make us feel safe. Mamoru Oshii, the director of both Ghost
in the Shell and Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence, has been clear about his interest in exploring 
borderline places. In doing so, he challenges his audience to confront their own preconceptions 
about preconceived boundaries, the paradoxes that blur those lines, and the anxieties that result. 
Movies like Wall-E prove to be pathetically persuasive in their ability to inspire sympathy with a 
non-human other while encouraging a shift in attitude between the film’s audience towards the 
world they inhabit. Wall-E leads its audience to a conclusion that unless they embrace new 
attitudes and behaviors, they too may find themselves forced to abandon their home planet. What
makes movies like 2001: A Space Odyssey in particular so enduring is their lack of conclusion. 
That these films end as an inconclusive investigation demand that the audience put the pieces 
together on their own, to persuade themselves what conclusions can be reached. In doing so, they
make room for new attitudes and philosophies to manifest and take shape.
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INTERMEZZO 4
This chapter concludes my thesis by offering alternative to the dualism and anthropocentrism that
Western culture has subscribed to and that exacerbate current anxieties around E.A.I. and artificial 
consciousness. This chapter explicitly challenges the themes and power dynamics revealed in Chapter 2. 
The theory being explored encourages monism over dualism, performance over appearance, and 
becoming over being. As a result, this chapter persuades the reader to move away from the established 
order of Western philosophy and embrace and alternative that seeks to replace compeition with 
cooperation. This chapter is meant to encourage a contextualized pursuit of knowledge that reconsiders 
the conditions of objectivity via collectivism. As a result, it supports the arguments in favor of post-
scarcity and resists the neo-classical economic model examined in Chapter 3. Finally, this chapter 
elaborates and abstracts the ideas explored within the selected films of Chapter 4 to supply a solution or 
alternative to the problems identified.
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CHAPTER 5: POST-HUMAN THEORY
“But man is a part of nature, and his war against nature is inevitably a war against himself.” 
-Rachel Carson
The Posthuman Pioneer - A New Ethic for a New Era
What does it mean to be Post-Human? By name it suggests what comes after human, 
different from and possibly better-than the variety we identify with today. The popular post-
human era is perceived to be a contest over the fitness of the human with the emergence of 
artificial life. Since the Antiquity it has been believed that, without reason, humanity is barbaric 
and subject to their own appetite. Where the Greeks found harmony through self-restraint, the 
Romans found security through predictability. Humanity must be in control of nature in order to 
guarantee survival via surplus, otherwise it will be a victim of the fickle temperment of nature. 
There is no compromise. Humanity exists in a anthropolarity between nature and culture, body 
and mind. Humanity is in a push and pull between a division of self/other. Because of the power 
dynamics of domination/subordination, There is no responsibility on behalf of one to respect the 
needs of the other for its own sake. Through Post-humanism, I will explore an alternative means 
of reframing the self/other relation, One that discourages pre-existing judgments in favor of 
emergence and adaptation. 
The Post-human believes that culture must care for nature, not just care about nature. 
Where the latter is passive and simply an awareness of the others needs, the former is an active 
participation with the other. Culture must care for nature based not on the minimum conditions 
best suited for culture to get it wants from nature, but for the conditions best suited for nature to 
acquire its needs from culture via things like regulation and activism. Post-humanism is a way of
understanding companionship over competition. It is a philosophy of mutual respect. Katherine 
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Hayles sees the configuration of the Post-human being as a shift away from the presence/absence
of identifiable features, and shift towards a configuration based on the patterns/randomness of 
behavior. A thing’s rightful role within its ecology (it’s oikeiosis), can be based on the patterns 
and randomness of its performance (285, italics mine). Randomness progenerates patterning 
through a playful creativity that welcomes emergence. This kind of playfulness can be practiced 
as a recursive exchange of information between body and mind, rather than as the mind applying 
the body, like owner to slave. 
The cyborg body represents what Donna Haraway calls “a revolution of social relations 
in the oikos, the Household” (151). For Katherine Hayles, “...becoming a Posthuman means 
much more than having prosthetic devices grafted onto one’s body. It means envisioning humans
as information-processing machines with fundamental similarities to other kinds of information-
processing machines” (246). The key, then, is to look for similarities between two apparently 
“other” entities instead of divisions based on representative qualities. This latter method creates a
hierarchical version of leadership that enables the duality of domination/subordination. 
Performance in time-space, rather than material manifestation, creates the differing used to find 
one’s position in relation to another. In order to succeed, post-humanists explicitly resist the 
dualism that has been at the center of Western ontology. A dualism between nature as matter and 
culture as language (for its capacity to reason and represent). Rather than exist as opposing 
elements, post-humanists seek to understand them in relation to one another. 
Nature  and  Culture  are  reworked;  the  one  can  no  longer  be  the  resource  for
appropriation or incorporation by the other. The relationships for forming wholes
from parts, including those of polarity and hierarchical domination, are at issue in
the cyborg world. Unlike the hopes of Frankenstein’s monster, the cyborg does
not expect its father to save it. (Haraway 151).
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Representationalism, a belief in the ontologically accurate representation between language  
(sign) and objects (signified), and Dualism, the division of two things based on representation, 
are prime Post-human targets. The fixity of language, representation, and knowledge, the basis 
for Western ontology, is in contest. Language is in contest with materiality over the nature of 
objectivity. In order to achieve truth, Western scholars advocate for objectivity via distance 
between observer and observed. However, post-humanists advocate for an intra-active self-
awareness over distance as the condition for objectivity. Intra-Active Objectivity is the 
awareness of participants, human and non-human, that contribute to the understanding of a thing 
(subject/object) in the moment in which it is being observed. In that moment the object is a 
phenomenon, defined by Merriam-Webster as “an object or aspect known through the senses 
rather than by thought or intuition”. A phenomenon is an empirical object than can only be 
known by the observer’s senses during the moments in which it is being observed.  Because an 
observer cannot be separated from the process of observation, they cannot be distant from the 
translation from data into conclusion. Instead, the observer applies ideas supplied by its culture, 
as a sort of analytical instrument, with which to understand the thing being observed - in order to
“make sense” of a thing being observed. The observer may be said to be a phenomenon through 
the eyes of the observed. What the observer does and does not recall at the moment of 
observation may factor into its ability to “make sense” of what it sees. In order to truly reach an 
objective understanding, an observer must understand how their perception and conclusion is 
different because of the instrument.
This particular ethic emphasizes affirmation rather than division between 
Humanities/Sciences. Barad explains that there was a desire for synthesis between the “matters 
of fact, and nature….on one side, and Humanities, meaning values and culture, on the other” 
(Van der Tuin, 50). Science and Culture are placed in a strict dichotomy. The posthuman ethic in 
121
particular affords an opportunity to see the “entanglements that already exist between the 
Humanities and the Sciences; they have not grown up separately from one another” (Van der 
Tuin, 51). These two seemingly irreconcilable disciplines have the potential to cooperate and 
inform one another rather than compete for validation. As technology, a product of the sciences, 
infringes more and more on the socio-cultural boundaries of the Humanities, the need for 
cooperation between disciplines has escalated. That there are major cultural implications of 
scientific conclusions means that sharing enables a thorough consideration of the real outcomes 
of their knowledge production. Through a posthuman ethic, those different disciplines may be 
understood as differing. This subtle shift allows for mutual respect and shared knowledge in 
order to co-construct a progressive system that better addresses the needs of our epoch.
In Dualism, to be different-than is to be an “other”. The attributes of the “other” must be 
compared to the attributes of the self to determine difference. In difference there can be division 
and in division there can be classification. These attributes are often pre-constructed through 
words. These words anticipate what a thing can and cannot be or do through their description. 
For example, “woman” is other than “man”. Because a given culture may privilege “man” with 
more attributes or capabilities than “woman”, “woman” is dualistically less-than “man”. Carry 
this forward with Humans and E.A.I. Culture privileges certain attributes as a result of  
privileging certain ends over others. The entity most aligned with the privileged ends carries the 
privileged attributes for that culture. Until now, “human” embodied all the attributes most 
aligned with the perceived ends of culture. Now, artificial life shows a capacity to embody those 
same attributes with a far greater margin. As a result of Dualism, this new form of life will 
inherently take a dominant position towards the inferior “human”. The fears over a hostile 
artificial “other” finds ample fuel under this duality.
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Dualism: An Over-Reliance on Language and Representation
Because humanity’s mind (cogito) was distant from the material world, as the story goes, 
and distance was the condition for objectivity, only humans were uniquely privileged to discover 
objective or generalized truths. Our distance from the corporeal world through abstraction 
allowed us to reflect and represent the world as we understood it to be through language. This is 
the premise that builds from Cartesian logic. Language was used to classify and divide through a 
process of negation (this is not that). These types of divisions imply that “ ‘difference’ has been 
predicated on relations of domination and exclusion, to be ‘different-from’ came to mean to be 
‘less-than,’ to be worth less than” (Braidotti, as cited by Van Der Tuin, 27). Within Western 
philosophy, the  mind is presumed to be an ahistorical concept, and an “other” from the body. 
The mind is ahistorical because, as a an adjunct to the divine, it exists before the body. Therefore,
the mind is humanity’s connection to the world beyond the material plane, the world of 
abstraction. Only when the mind has a body to inhabit can the entity be materially alive. In this 
way, the body is “worth-less-than” because it comes after the mind and keeps it grounded in the 
material world. However, having a body alone is not enough to be “alive”, the entity must 
possess self-awareness which requires a relation between self/other. This self-awareness, this 
“embodiment”, is developed through language. One  develops a concept of one’s self through 
linguistic attribution. To enter into a self/other relationship is to become a subject. 
If dualism is a relationship defined by power, language as a (not the, as argued by Barad 
and others) material utterance of the mind is the tool for manifesting humanity’s power over the 
material world. There is a perception that conscious, self-aware being did not exist before a 
formalized knowledge was developed and shared. There was no subject because there was no 
tool for the mind to recognize itself as an “other” from. Before language, humanity was not in 
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relation to anything. However, there is an unspoken relationship between language and history: 
“To assume that human experience is structured conceptually (“concept” as a product of the 
cogito) is to dehistoricize the human species. We spent hundreds of years as a social 
species...Language is a relatively recent acquisition. Are we to assume that those ancient hunter 
gatherers lived in an amorphous world waiting for language to give it form? That’s creationism 
again…And the word became flesh”. (DeLanda, as cited by Van Der Tuin 46, italics mine). We 
know that human beings pre-existed language and, therefore, any kind of consciousness 
established by Humanist philosophers. And yet language is positioned as the central meaning 
maker for Western culture. This is because language has been the central mode of developing, 
corroborating, and distributing knowledge within human culture. This is why it sometimes 
appears that those skilled in the art of language are most entitled to running their system. 
A major consequence of Western Dualism is the distinct difference between language, as 
discursive, and behavior, as material and non-discursive. Knowledge is exclusively in the mind. 
“One contemporary belief likely to stupefy future generations is the postmodern orthodoxy that 
the body is primary, if not entirely, a linguistic and discursive construction...that the body’s 
materiality is secondary to the logical or semiotic structures it encodes” (Barad, as cited by 
Hayles 192). For Western culture, the body is always less-than the mind. This is because the 
mind is thought to have the capacity to represent truth and possess’ knowledge where the body is 
its puppet. But both the mind and body carry knowledge and make their own utterances.
Discourse, defined as a connected series of utterances, is usually thought of as a linguistic
exchange. But information can be exchanged by non-linguistic (or “non-discursive”) means like 
body language, fashion, and odor. Some are produced by the mind, but things like hormones 
quitely send messages about the body to others and not all gestures are deliberate. In this way, 
the body speaks as much as the mind does but is not taken as seriously. Both handwriting and 
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bike riding are expressions of this kind of knowledge. Even inert objects speak, like a creaky 
wooden board telling you its integrity is failing. These material utterances are no less discursive 
than verbal utterances. The body speaks as loudly as the mind, it just needs to be read differently.
Scholars like Karen Barad urge humanity to look past the privileges of language. She 
says, “Discourse is not a synonym for Language” (Barad 819, 2003). Discourse is a practice and,
as such, is founded on boundary-making conditions for what a thing can and cannot be and do. 
“Boundaries are drawn by mapping out practices; ‘objects’ do not pre-exist as such. Objects are 
boundary projects” (Van der tuin, 110). Discourse is an apparatus, evoking attributes that “map 
out” what a phenomena is. Things-under-discourse are objects becoming subjects, evoked 
through particular attributes that may distinguish one thing from another or relate one thing to 
another. Things may be related through their performativity, through an ability to make a change 
through action, gesture, or utterance. Barad explains, “ ‘thinking’ isn’t the other of nature. Nature
performs itself differently” (Barad 829, 2003). Even trees feel and respond to stimuli in the world
and display an appetite in movement towards the sun. It may not ‘think’ about the process, it may
still have some sort of decision making process humans attribute to ‘thought’.The tree ‘knows’ 
where the sunlight is. Human beings are not the antithesis of nature because humans can think, 
they simply differ in how they think. Much like the way that weather might think without a 
brain, It is a matter of allowing connotation and analogy to change an attitude or perception. 
Barad wants to revoke the privileges appreciated by language to qualify ontology. “The 
move toward performative alternatives to representationalism shifts the focus from...descriptions 
and reality...to matters of practices/doings/actions (Barad 802, 2003). This kind of attitude 
reaches conclusions that rely on contextual data without incorporating historical judgments. 
Without this kind of flexibility, each entity is condemned according to its history rather than its 
immediate potential. “Relata do not pre-exist relations” (Barad 815, 2003), relations do not pre-
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exist their own history. However, each body comes with culturally established condemnations 
that have had enduring political consequences. Consequences like discrimination and 
disenfranchisement continue to reinforce a Mind/Body dualism.
Post-humanists argue for a Cartography rather than a Classification as the basis for 
knowledge development. Where classifications are typically dualistic and divisive with strict 
boundaries, cartography allow for overlap between spaces. The difference is a matter of degree 
rather than kind. Mapping spaces between bodies in their relationality would go a long way to 
encouraging responsibility and companionship for all entities within a shared ecology. 
The Body and Embodied: The Tape That Exploded
Post-humanist scholars recognize the ability for different kinds and degrees of knowledge
according to different body and sense configurations. None are dominant or more entitled to 
others because each entity has its own set of affordances and constraints. The normative 
(essential) quality of human as dominant is not shared by all cultures and, therefore, not a natural
feature of all human beings. Embodiment is what sets each person apart from one another. 
Normativity requires generalization which, in turn, requires an ability to define a set of out-of-
context, essential qualities for each object. Embodiment, however, is the context for being and 
cannot be boiled down into predictably normalized patterns. 
Essentialism is normative in its impulse, denoting qualities or attributes shared by
all human beings. Though it is true that all humans share embodiment, embodied
experience is dispersed along a spectrum of possibility.  Which possibilities are
activated depends on the context of enactment, so that no one position is more
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essential  than  any  other...in  this  view  embodiment  subversively  undercuts
essentialism rather than reinforces it. (Hayles 201). 
As a result of normativity, things that do not fit will be cause for panic. The repulsion we 
experience when our intelligent machines perform “life” will confuse and infuriate people who 
have not opened their boundaries to new concepts of life. Instead of seeking similarities, they 
will enter into a contest of will for to reinforce their privileged order.
Hayles uses Burroughs’s anecdote of the tape recorder in “The Tape That Exploded” as 
an anecdote for the body/embodiment relation. The body is the medium for embodiment, much 
like a tape is the medium for audio (typically, but not exclusively, speech). Embodiment, then, 
may be thought of as “pre-recordings” that have already been recorded onto the tape. “The 
inscription of sound in a durable medium suited his belief that the word is material, whereas the 
malleability of sound meant that interventions were possible, interventions that could radically 
change or eradicate the record.” (Hayles, 217). Burroughs believes that the “word” embodied in 
the pre-recording is a “parasitic invasion” on the tape, one that can become “mutated” and go 
“viral”. In this context, sound is mutated by cutting up and reconfiguring pieces of tape. The 
analogy here with Frankentsein’s monster emerges. The monster’s body is literally a cut up 
corpse, a remixed body. It’s transgression isn’t as much in its appearance as its ability for speech.
That it could be so ugly and yet so perfectly human was repulsive. Articulation is insulting when 
it is produced by a thing pre-determined to be dumb. It insults because it contradicts the episteme
of the observer, it confuses their words and meanings. Burroughs’ narrator reminds the reader 
that “what we see is dictated by what we hear”, that their knowledge and perceptions are often 
framed for them linguistically in text or sound. In that framing, the listener becomes the 
recording, seeing the meaning in the world that the tape tells us is there; a mutation through 
rhetoric. 
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 This concept of mutation is significant for humanity’s liberation: “unlike marks on paper, 
this writing can easily be erased and rewritten in other forms...sound, unlike print, dies away 
unless it is constantly renewed.” (Hayles 217). Sound, as an embodied kind of genetics, contrasts
with print which is coded like DNA. Where mutating the latter was difficult without technology, 
the former enabled it through the mediums of speech and memory. Oral storytelling, for 
example, had many improvisations built around pre-recorded phrases. Those phrases, framed in 
different contexts, could alter the message and attitude of the culture. What is said has to be 
remembered, it cannot be referenced the way a writing can. Much like the oral history of the 
past, stories that are told are re-translated for a new context, leaving open the possibility for new 
mutations both deliberate and unintentional. Memory, as a significant function of the mind, is 
fallible and changes with time. This enables us, as humans, to modify what we’ve heard and 
seen. In this way, forgetting is much like a mutation. In order to enable mutation, humanity must 
learn to be comfortable with some confusion, to briefly forget boundaries and rebuild them in 
context. Computers, on the other hand, are coded and cannot rewrite their programming unless 
designed with the capacity to do so. They can never forget, they can only be corrupted and re-
formatted. 
Memory and ritual play a privileged role in the post-human ethic. “...Paul Connerton 
links embodiment with memory. He points out that rituals, commemorative ceremonies, and 
other bodily practices have a performative aspects that [a decontextualized] analysis of the 
content does not grasp...because ceremonies are embodied practices, to perform them is always 
in some sense to accept them, whatever one’s conscious beliefs...bodily practices have this power
because they sediment into habitual actions and movements.” (Hayles 203). Here is an example 
of the recursive symbiosis between embodiment and body, the process of co-informing. This is 
where an affirmation relation between self/other can begin.
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Intra-Activity
Anthropocentrism demands a duality between humanity and nature. For Descartes and 
many before and after him, this is justified through humanity’s ability for language. Abstraction, 
proof of divine right over “others”, is only evinced through language. The mind is privileged 
over the body. This Mind/Body duality carries a bias that creates a master/slave relation where 
the body (and the distractions of the material world) is always “less-than”. In its inferiority, the 
mind is justified in its subjection of the body. Katherine Hayles uses anorexia as an anecdote. 
“the body is understood as an object for control and mastery rather than as an intrinsic part of the
self. Quoting an anoretic’s remark - ‘you make out of your body your very own kingdom where 
you are the tyrant, the absolute dictator’ - Brown states, ‘anorexia is thus a fight for self-control, 
a flight from the slavery food threatens; self-sustaining, self-possession independent of bodily 
desires if the anoretic’s crucial goal’ (Hayles 5). The body is the material performance of the 
mind like a puppet on stringers and, as a result, subject to the puppetry of the mind despite the 
desire-ability of the body. The body, as a canvas, is a becoming thing, applied by the mind. The 
mind, through its development of conceptual knowledge of the body (e.g. beauty and health), 
becomes prioritized through the ability to analyze the body. A mind that cannot successfully 
render the body obedient may be perceived to be malfunctional, ineffective, “dumb”, or  
“unhealthy”. 
The ethics of intra-active agency are a matter of accountability over relations, not simply 
a matter of culpability. It is about response-ability. “Responsibility, then, is a matter of the ability
to respond. Listening for the response of the other and an obligation to be response to the other, 
who is not entirely separate from what we call the self” (Barad, Van Der Tuin, 69). There is no 
superior subject within an apparatus. All entities are causes so all entities matter. This is what is 
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meant by “matter coming to matter”, where matter may begin to create meaning on its own. The 
Mind/Body is itself an apparatus and, as such, neither the mind nor the body can be privileged 
over the other. When the body gets sick, the mind also suffers. One does not escape the 
afflictions of the other like a puppeteer distancing itself from its puppet. Perceptions, and 
knowledge, differ between performances as the apparatus is different in both body and mind 
from one moment to the next. Knowledge always develops between the two rather than as an 
exclusive attribute of the superior mind.
In order to reach some kind of causal knowledge, the observer must take account of the 
fact that “knowing is a matter of intra-acting” (Barad 149, 2007). The truth is a composite of 
causes, what Barad calls an apparatus. In order to achieve objectivity, agents within an apparatus 
must account for the entangled causes of an effect. Barad alludes to Bohr’s theory of diffraction. 
“Diffraction does not fix what is the object and what is the subject in advance…[it] involves 
reading insights through one another in ways that will help illuminate differences as they 
emerge” (Barad 30, 2007). Where representationalism preconceives and anticipates the subject 
linguistically, diffraction investigates the subject through its performance. Rather than as 
opponents, the subject and object are measured in relation to each other’s performativity. In this 
way, Nature and Culture don’t have to be defined against one another but can be understood as 
two differing, entangled processes. Culture is not simply the observer and Nature is not simply 
the observed.
Nature-Culture: The Ethico-Onto-Epistemology
The demand for pure, objective truth is a consequence of Western history. If you recall 
the relationship between desire and justice, you can see that objectivity is not simply preferred, 
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but essential for the success of the polis, regarded by the Romans as the highest pursuit of 
humanity. This is because of a need for reliability and control. If control is to be guaranteed, the 
knowledge of the essential qualities of the thing considered must be so predictable as to be true 
under any circumstance. The belief in objectivity is supported by faith in essentialism, a faith in 
the normative equilibrium of all things.
Katherine Hayles explains why this belief is misguided. She believes the conditions for 
this kind of objectivity enable a feedback loop where the anticipations or expectations on behalf 
of the observer are sometimes factored into a conclusion as to suggest certain behaviors are 
aberrative rather than normative. There is a false objectivity here. In this case, the feedback loop 
is a mechanism of hemostasis, or “the ability of living organisms to maintain steady states when 
they are buffeted by fickle environments” (Hayles 8). The conclusions reached based on the data 
being received and processed includes the bias of the receiver. In this way, aberrant behavior is 
dismissed as a malfunction rather than an alternative state of being. The feedback loop is a result 
of those conclusions changing according to the bias of the observer, and the observer changing 
from the conclusions reached through observation. This is what Hayles calls “reflexivity”, a 
“movement whereby that which has been used to generate a system is made, through a changed 
perspective, to become part of the system it generates” (Hayles 8). There is some confirmation 
bias in this objectivity that “tends notoriously toward infinite regress” (Hayles 9). New 
conditions for objectivity are needed in order to produce a new kind of knowledge.
This new kind of objectivity comes from Naturecultures. Barad defines her theory of 
Post-humanism as an “ethico-onto-epistemology” or an ethic where “..knowing is a direct 
material engagement...[t]here is not this knowing from a distance. Instead of there being a 
separation of subject and object, there is an entanglement of subject and object, which is called 
the ‘phenomenon’. Objectivity, instead of...offering an undistorted mirror image of the world, is 
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about accountability...and responsibility to the entanglements of which we are a part.“ (Barad 
379, 2007). The observer, with their perceived distance, is not the sole producer of knowledge (if
even capable of objective knowledge), but an intra-active participant within an apparatus. As a 
result, 
If ‘humans’ refers to phenomena, not independent entities with inherent properties
(essentialism) but rather beings in their differential becoming, particular material
(re)configurings of the world with shifting boundaries and properties...then the
notion  of  discursivity  cannot  be  founded  on  an  inherent  distinction  between
humans and nonhumans. (Barad 818, 2003).
Indeed, this discursivity and its modes of expression implies no need for a brain to rationalize 
outcomes. It simply requires a physical “realization of agential possibilities” by humans and 
nonhumans alike. The presence of all the right elements that create a phenomenon. Manuel 
DeLanda sees inclement weather a result of a “complex self-organizing (autopoetic) structure” 
without a brain (Van der Tuin, 43, italics mine). Things do not need brains to perform 
dynamically and causally. 
Knowledge isn’t an exclusive product of an objective observer, like the mind. Post-
humanists show a need to reframe agency outside of causality via intra-activity. Barad builds 
from the premise that all entities are phenomena, the object of another observer’s perception. 
Further, phenomena are fleeting, defined by the moment within which they exist. They are “an 
entangled set of agencies” (Barad 23, 2007). Causality is more than just a duality of free-
will/determinism. “Agency is not an attribute but the ongoing reconfigurings of the world” 
(Barad 141, 2007). Intra-active agency, then, is the entangled causes that produce a phenomenon.
Karen Barad believes all of the intra-active agencies found in weather are akin to Niels 
Bohr’s apparatus. For Barad, an apparatus isn’t just a body of unlike things that interact 
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simultaneously, but also “material (re)configurings or discursive practices that produce material 
phenomena in their differential becoming. Phenomena are produced through specific causal 
intra-actions involving multiple apparatuses of bodily production….Apparatuses are not bounded
objects or structures; they are open-ended practices” (Barad 170, 2007). An apparatus is: an 
observer, an observed, and an instrument of observation all wrapped together. All affect each 
other in the their awareness and intra-action. The product of their intra-action is phenomenal; it is
an object, fleeting and emergent. These apparatuses are “boundary-making”, conditioning the 
potential for each phenomena produced. These apparatuses can be cyborgian because they 
require cooperation between different objects like persons and tools to produce a shared 
phenomena. Any phenomena produced are a product of all the things that caused its production. 
Even someone who simply observes must analyze in order to understand what they see. This 
person refers to their embodied pre-recording as their analytical instrument to understand and 
make meaning from their observation. 
Rosi Braidotti likens her own version of an apparatus, what she calls an assemblage, to 
Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory. Both concepts are concerned with the development of a 
network within with humans and non-humans cooperate to reach an objective. Each element of 
the apparatus/assemblage/network changes the parameters for what kind and degree of 
information can be collected and applied. Through understanding action as a network of intra-
active agencies, each contributing to the phenomena produced, humanity can begin to appreciate 
an ethic that eschews dualism and embraces responsible companionship.
Post-humanists rally around the term “Naturecultures” as the post-humanist spectrum. 
Naturecultures considers two related rather than opposing (“other”) forces. Nature, as an 
ontological concept, and culture, as an phenomenological construct, are paired together in an 
ethical and symbiotic assemblage of subjectivity. As subjects to one another, these two 
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competing forces are encouraged to show a responsibility to the other in order to protect their 
mutual interests. This reaches back to Karen Barad’s apparatus. If you recall, the apparatus 
doesn’t allow for an objectivity based on detachment. Where Western philosophers centralize 
distance as the criteria for objectivity, Barad sees distance as unrealistic and encourages a self-
awareness within the phenomenon we’re observing. “ ’We are not outside observers of the world.
Nor are we simply located at particular places in the world; rather we are part of the world in its 
ongoing intra-activity” (Barad 819, 2003). Humans are active participants in the constant 
reconfigurations of the world. Importantly, she elaborates that “apparatuses are themselves 
phenomena” (Barad 170, 2007), and “the ontological inseparability/entanglements of intra-acting
“agencies” (Barad 139, 2007), agencies that are produced by both human and non-human 
through intra-activity. In other words, the apparatus that turns matter into meaning is itself a 
product of the moment in which it is occurring. The apparatus is emergent, too. Objectivity, then,
is the ability to distinguish between “response-abilities” within an apparatus and its consequent 
observation or what she calls “agential separability” rather than “absolute exteriority” (Barad 
828, 2003). The knowledge-making apparatus, then, is an ecosystem which humanity is 
enmeshed within rather than distantly related to. 
If the knowledge-making apparatus is an emergent ecology, then to appreciate knowledge
is also to be responsible to one another as subjects and contributors. All entities (brains or not) 
within a system contribute to a phenomenological reconfiguration. A healthy system requires 
entities that are themselves open to emergence and reconfiguration. All phenomena in a system 
are responsible to the health of that system, and every entity within it, as a renewable source. 
Responsibility also implies reciprocity between parent and child. The parent, not an individuated 
producer with exclusive rights, but a system of language, bias, genetics, environment, etc. Unlike
Dr. Frankenstein, expelling his creation and suffering a magnetic repulsion to it, a phenomena 
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produced is entitled to responsibility, too. To turn away from an appalling child, then, is to be 
appalled at the health of one’s self. 
So What?
But what does this have to do with technopanic and E.A.I.? Simply put, humanity is 
losing at its own game. It has built a set of conditions to qualify normativity and naturalism in 
turn used as evidence for a hierarchy of power and privilege. As machines become more human 
like, humanity’s place at the top of the hierarchy appears to be challenged according to its own 
rules. Will humanity be replaced? Will this be the “death of man?”
No! It certainly doesn’t have to be. The anxiety over humanity’s future and the 
emergence of an artificial consciousness are based on old fears. In my second chapter, I have 
shown how Western culture, in particular, has structured the power dynamics of domination into 
their language. The impulse for appropriation and surplus is woven into our embodied DNA. It is
no wonder Westerner’s are so fixated on a competitive relationship with E.A.I. There is no room 
for cooperation in a world where there must always be a winner and a loser.
In my third chapter, I examined arguments over the immediate trajectory of the market 
and their anticipated consequences. I have showed that the space of competition between nature 
and culture was in the marketplace and the fight for humanity’s revisioning needed to begin there
too. I examined the historical arguments over the hopes and fears of automated technology and 
how they continue to inform the arguments made today. I made it clear that walls of tomorrow 
are built from the hurdles of today, hurdles which are rhetorically constructed. What needs to be 
emphasized is that human alienation is inevitable when the market forces are not accountable to 
the ecology on which they operate.
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In my fourth chapter, I used films to frame some of the popular anxieties about Human-
Robot relations. I explored the arguments on the contest of wills between human and E.A.I. in 
2001 to show that the contest itself was the cause for humanity’s alienation. Further, I explored 
the implications of dualistic power dynamics between Human-Robot relations. I also showed 
how movies with the best intentions may suffer from pitfalls. Wall-E tries to help its human 
audience appreciate the value of nature but does so in ways that ignore other problematic 
messages. Finally, I referred to the boundary-pushing messages in Ghost in the Shell and Ghost 
in the Shell 2: Innocence to examine what it means to be human and other Post-human concerns 
about life.
I end here, with my final chapter on Post-human theory. It is this theory that I believe 
humanity can find a sufficient path towards its next iteration. The rhetoric of Post-humanism 
seeks to find relations through difference. Humanity is changing, but that has always been the 
case. Who we may become is a matter of how open our boundaries are. To insist on 
recapitulating an old and insufficient order is to choke the possibility for what we may become. It
keeps humanity in a perpetual state of being, preventing the sight of new shores. In order to 
avoid the power dynamics of the past, and the anxieties of the future, humanity must find a way 
to see past the ethics it has established for itself. Post-humanist philosophy has the capacity to 
help open boundaries and better adapt to the challenges we face right now, not just in the future.
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